EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1994 - Europe |
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Page 2
... large number of committees associated with the Commission in the exercise of its executive functions . Over the years , the system has become increasingly complex , including both advisory and oversight ( so called " management " and ...
... large number of committees associated with the Commission in the exercise of its executive functions . Over the years , the system has become increasingly complex , including both advisory and oversight ( so called " management " and ...
Page 13
... large number of firms throughout the European Union , it has much more to gain by being tough in any individual case than a national regulator : weak enforcement would destroy its credibility in the eyes of more firms . Thus it may be ...
... large number of firms throughout the European Union , it has much more to gain by being tough in any individual case than a national regulator : weak enforcement would destroy its credibility in the eyes of more firms . Thus it may be ...
Page 14
... large number of firms throughout Europe also explains why it is less vulnerable to the risk of " regulatory capture " than national regulators . Perhaps the greatest advantage of EC membership in a period of far- reaching policy changes ...
... large number of firms throughout Europe also explains why it is less vulnerable to the risk of " regulatory capture " than national regulators . Perhaps the greatest advantage of EC membership in a period of far- reaching policy changes ...
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Common terms and phrases
administrative Agency Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title Badia Fiesolana budget budgetary bureaucracy Cassis central comitology Commission officials Commission proposal Community policy concerning Conseil d'Etat COREPER Council of Ministers decisions delegation and control dynamics of delegation EC policy EC regulation Economic and Social Eichener environmental Europe European Commission European Community European Parliament European University Institute example factors functional spillovers genuine policy innovation Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD health and safety important intergovernmental intergovernmentalists internal market Jean BLONDEL lack large number legislation Maastricht Treaty market failure Member Merger Control Regulation mutual recognition national experts national governments national regulators non-majoritarian institutions over-regulation policy entrepreneur policy entrepreneurship policy-making political control print SPS problem procedure regulatory complexity regulatory policies regulatory powers regulatory process regulatory programmes rules Section serious policy control Single European Act Social Dumping social regulation solutions Stefano GUZZINI supranational institutions task expansion technical theories Treaty of Rome Understanding Regulatory Growth unstoppable growth