authorities produced by the opposite counsel refer. red the court to the opinion of Ch. J. Ellsworth, in the case of Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dal. 327. where he says," an appeal is a process of civil law origin, and removes a cause entirely, subjecting the fact as well as the law to a review and retrial;" and to the opinion of Marshall, Ch. J. in the case of Pennington v. Coxe, 2 Cranch, 61. March 7. MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court to the following effect: The majority of the court is clearly of opinion, that in admiralty cases an appeal suspends the tence altogether; and that it is not res adjudicata until the final sentence of the appellate court be pronounced. The cause in the appellate court is to be heard de novo, as if no sentence had been passed. This has been the uniform practice not only in cases of appeal from the district to the circuit courts of the United States, but in this court also. In prize causes, the principle has never been disputed; and in the instance court, it is stated in 2 Browne's Civil Law, that in cases of appeal it is lawful to allege what has not before been alleged, and to prove what has not before been proved.* The court is, therefore, of opinion, that this cause is to be considered as if no sentence had been pronounced; and if no sentence had been pronounced, it has been long settled, on general principles, that after the expiration or repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law committed while it was in force, unless some special provision be made for that purpose by statute.f Clerke's Praxis, tit. 54. "Nam in appellatione a sententia definitiva licet non allegata allegare et non probata probare.” The cases of Wilmot et al claimants of the schooner Collector, and Lewis, claimant of the schooner Gottenburgh v. United States, were reversed upon the same principle. YEATON V. THE U. S. The following sentence was then pronounced by the court: This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof the court is of opinion, that an appeal from the sentence of a court of admiralty brings the whole case before the appellate court unaffected by the sentence of condemnation from which the appeal is made, and that a sentence of condemnation cannot be pronounced on account of a forfeiture which accrued under a law not in force at the time of pronouncing such sentence, unless, by some statutory provision, the right to enforce such forfeiture be preserved. The court is, therefore, of opinion, that the sentence pronounced in this cause by the circuit court of the district of Maryland, affirming the sentence of the judge of the district court in this cause, be reversed and annulled; and the court, proceeding to pronounce the proper sentence, doth direct that th libel be dismissed, and the property libelled be restored to the claimants, they paying the duties thereon if the same have not been already paid. And, on the motion of the attorney-general, it is ordered to be certified that in the opinion of this court, there was probable cause of seizure. THE UNITED STATES v. POTTS AND OTHERS. per Round cop THIS was a case certified from the circuit court bottoms for the district of Maryland. The question upon the edge," are which the judges of that court differed in opinion turned up ut not liable to dutics, altho' was, imported under the deno mination of Whether round copper bottoms turned up at the raised bot. edge are liable to the payment of duty within the toms." mcaning of the several acts of congress. V. POTTS. The following facts were admitted, viz. that the THE U. S. defendants imported a certain quantity of round copper plates, under the denomination "flat bottoms;" round copper plates turned up at the edges, under the denomination of "raised bottoms," and square and oblong copper plates, under the denomination of" sheets." That the round copper plates, and the round copper plates turned up at the edge, are never used, nor imported for use in the form in which they are imported, although they are capable of being used, but not with convenience or advantage, in that form; but are worked up by the manufacturers in this country into vessels of use after importation. That the round copper plates, as well as the square copper plates, are cut from large sheets which are made by pressure under a roller, but are ever imported in the size or shape in which they come from the roller. That it is a great convenience and saving to the manufacturer here that the sheets of copper should come in a round rather than in a square shape, avoiding great waste by clipping and repeated heats. That all the said articles are sold and bought by weight, and the same price paid for the round plates, and the round plates turned up at the edges, as for the square or oblong plates. That the round copper plates turned up at the edge are raised at the edge from four to five inches. That copper plates of this description are sold for eighteenpence sterling per pound, and that copper wrought up into vessels or implements of any kind, are sold at two shillings and fourpence to two shillings and sixpence per pound. That there is no copper imported into this country, under the denomination of plates; but that the square and oblong plates, which are commonly called copper plates, and are admitted to be free of duty, are imported under the denomination of sheets. Harper, for the defendants. This case differs from that of the United States v. Kid & Watson, 4 Cranch, 1. in one circumstance only. In that case it does not appear but that the V. POTTS. Tax U. S. copper plates turned up at the edge were imported under the denomination of copper plates, and the jury expressly found that they came under that description. But in the present case they were imported under the denomination of "raised bottoms." The real question is, whether these raised bottoms are to be considered as manufactured copper, or as much a raw material as plain copper plates. The acts of congress on this subject are all to be construed together. They are the act of July, 4, 1789. c. 2. Oswald's edit. Laws U. S. vol. 1. p. 21. The act of 10th of August, 1790, § 1. Laws U. S. vol. 1. p. 251. The act of May 2, 1792, § 2. Laws U. S. vol. 2. p. 71. And the act of June 7, 1794, Laws U. S. vol. 3. p. 108. Rodney, Attorney-General. In the case of the United States v. Kid & Watson, the jury having found that the articles imported came under the description of copper m plates, there was nothing left for judicial decision. It But a question of revenue ought not to be left to the caprice, or misunderstanding of juries. ought not to be left to the different customs or names used in different ports of the United States. The decisions on this subject ought to be uniform, and they can only be made so by the opinion of this court. The case was submitted without argument. March 7. MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivered the opinion of the court to the following effect: The opinion of this court is, that copper plates turned up at the edge are exempt from duty, al though imported under the denomination of raised THz U, S. bottoms. 'It appears to have been the policy of the United States to distinguish between raw and manufactured copper. From the facts stated, the copper in question cannot be deemed manufactured copper within the intention of the legislature. The opinion certified to the court below was, that round copper bottoms turned up at the edge are not liable to the payment of duty within the meaning ot the several acts of congress. V. RUSH v. PARKER. ERROR to the circuit court of the district of This court will Maryland, in an action of replevin. give time to procure afficia vits as to the matter in dis. I. P. Boyd, for the defendant in error, contended, value of the that the replevin bond being in the penal sum of pute. 1,200 dollars only, was conclusive evidence that the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, did not amount to 2,000 dollars, and consequently this court has no jurisdiction in the case. Martin, contra, stated that he did not know till yesterday that this point would be made in the cause, and prayed time to show by affidavits the real value of the matter in dispute. Which The court granted. LIVINGSTON, J. thought that leave ought not to be given, on account of the delay it would produce. He had found a practice established here of receiv ing such affidavits; but he did not know of any case in which time had been given to produce them; and he would not consent to give it now. The case was |