Network Protocol Design with Machiavellian Robustness

This thesis is on the subject of network protocol design. It takes a collection of known, practical problems that we face on the Internet—namely, abuses of the network—and considers these problems in light of both existing practical countermeasures and abstract analysis. Protocol design features and techniques with Machiavellian robustness are then proposed to address these problems, to the extent that such a remedy is possible. A protocol called ‘Invite’ is then designed from scratch using these new techniques. The Invite protocol thus serves as a practical example of design for Machiavellian robustness, but its duty as a protocol is to convey that robustness to some other protocol, so it is then applied to email (and its well-known abuses such as spamming and mailbombing). In that context, its effectiveness is analysed and compared with other approaches, both proposed and currently practised. Lastly, the broader implications of Machiavellian robustness are considered, suggesting possible avenues of future research.