Collective ActionPublic choice, an important subdiscipline in the field of political theory, seeks to understand how people and societies make decisions affecting their collective lives. Relying heavily on theoretical models of decision making, public choice postulates that people act in their individual interests in making collective decisions. As it happens, however, reality does not mirror theory, and people often act contrary to what the principal public choice models suggest. In this book, Russell Hardin looks beyond the models to find out why people choose to act together in situations that the models find quite hopeless. He uses three constructs of modern political economy--public goods, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and game theory--to test public choice theories against real world examples of collective action. These include movements important in American society in the past few decades--civil rights, the Vietnam War, women's rights, and environmental concerns. This classic work on public choice will be of interest to theoreticians and graduate students in the fields of public choice, political economy, or political theory--and to those in other disciplines who are concerned with the problem of collective action in social contexts. |
Contents
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PRISONERS DILEMMA | 16 |
TYPES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS | 50 |
CONTRACTARIAN PROVISIONS | 97 |
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION | 125 |
RATIONALITY IN THE PRISONERS DILEMMA | 138 |
Iterated Prisoners Dilemma and the HangedMan Paradox | 145 |
SinglePlay Prisoners Dilemma | 151 |
The Stag Hunt | 167 |
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Common terms and phrases
2-person Prisoner's Dilemma achieve activity American Anatol Rapoport argues argument assumption asymmetry behavior Brian Barry choice collective action collective action problems collective bads commonly compelling conform contexts contingent choosing contract by convention contractarian contributions cooperation coordination equilibria coordination game costs and benefits Cournot analysis defect discussed in chapter dollars economic effect effort environmental environmentalists equilibrium example extrarational fair firms game theory group action Hence hysteresis Ibid incentive individual interactions interest groups involve issue iterated Prisoner's Dilemma k-subgroup large groups latent groups latter less level of supply lobbying logic of collective matrix million moral motivations narrow self-interest norm Olson's one-shot one's ongoing organizations outcome paradox participate payoff payoff matrix percent perhaps Petersburg Paradox play players political pollution possible prefer relevant rule sanctions Schelling Schelling's sense Sierra Club single-play Prisoner's Dilemma small-number Social exchange theory stag hunt substantial Suppose tion vote