Brute Facts

Front Cover
Elly Vintiadis, Constantinos Mekios
Oxford University Press, 2018 - Philosophy - 275 pages
Brute facts are facts that don't have explanations. They are instrumental in our attempts to provide adequate justifications for other facts or phenomena. Brute facts inform many people's views about the structure of the world, and are part of philosophical interpretations in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Yet, despite the considerable literature on explanation, the question of bruteness has been left largely unexamined. The chapters in Brute Facts address this gap in academic thought by exploring the central considerations which surround this topic. How can we draw a distinction between facts that can reasonably be thought of as brute and facts for which further explanation is possible? Can we explain something and gain understanding by appealing to brute facts? Is naturalism inconsistent with the existence of (non-physical) brute facts? Can modal facts be brute facts? Are emergent facts brute? This volume brings together contributions by authors who offer different answers to these questions. In presenting a range of different viewpoints on these matters, Brute Facts engages with major debates in contemporary philosophy concerning modality, naturalism, consciousness, reduction and explanation.
 

Contents

Introduction
1
Must There be Brute Facts?
19
How to Make the Case for Brute Facts
28
Bruteness and Supervenience Mind vs Morality
45
Brute Necessity and the MindBody Problem
63
Are Modal Facts Brute Facts?
97
Truthmaking and the Mysteries of Emergence
113
Are There Brute Facts aboutConsciousness?
130
The Provenance of Consciousness
155
Brute Facts about Emergence
177
There is Nothing Really Wrong with Emergent Brute Facts
197
Emergence Inexplicable but Explanatory
213
Naturalism Emergence and Brute Facts
234
Emergence Downward Causation and No Brute Facts in Biological Systems
248
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