Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and US Policy toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea
Alexander T.J. Lennon, Camille Eiss
MIT Press, Jul 9, 2004 - Political Science - 392 pages
An analysis of the policies of preemption and regime change as well as an examination of US policy options for dealing with each country in the "axis of evil."
In January 2002, President George W. Bush declared Iran, Iraq, and North Korea constituents of an "axis of evil." US strategy toward each of these countries has clearly varied since, yet similar issues and policy options have emerged for US relations with all three. Reshaping Rogue States seeks to improve our understanding of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as well as of current and future policy options to combat the threats these nations pose. The book's comprehensive analysis of preemption and regime change debates the circumstances under which each policy might be justified or legal under international law. Prominent strategists and policymakers consider alternatives to preemption—including prevention, counterproliferation, and cooperative security—and draw conclusions from efforts to bring about regime change in the past. Reshaping Rogue States also reviews the differing policy challenges presented by each so-called axis member. Specifically, it considers how the United States might strike a balance with North Korea through multilateral negotiations; the changes within Iran that call for changes in US policy; and the dilemmas the United States faces in post-Saddam Iraq, including continuing insurgency, instability, and the feasibility of democracy.
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In a striking parallel to Ronald Reagan's Cold War reference to the Soviet Union
as the "evil empire," President George W. Bush's 2002 State of the Union address
candidly redefined the enemy in precisely three parts: "States like [Iran, Iraq, ...
1 Later, on June 1, 2002, Bush clarified the implications of the strategic shift in his
West Point commencement speech, where he compared today's security
situation to the Cold War: "For much of the last century, America's defense relied
on the ...
According to the Cold War theory of deterrence (expressed as "mutually assured
destruction" by the United States, "flexible response" by NATO, and "dissuasion
du faible au fort" by France), such uncertainty was intended to foster prudence, ...
Diverging from the strategy of one's allies is nothing novel; in several instances
during the Cold War, the United States initiated a national strategy that NATO and
most allies only subsequently adopted with varying degrees of tension and ...
The Cold War brand of strategic uncertainty had virtues in its time, but not under
existing circumstances. Second, preemption and prevention need to be managed
as tools that can (and should, as a Kantian European would say) be assembled ...
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