Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and US Policy toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea
Alexander T.J. Lennon, Camille Eiss
MIT Press, Jul 9, 2004 - Political Science - 392 pages
An analysis of the policies of preemption and regime change as well as an examination of US policy options for dealing with each country in the "axis of evil."
In January 2002, President George W. Bush declared Iran, Iraq, and North Korea constituents of an "axis of evil." US strategy toward each of these countries has clearly varied since, yet similar issues and policy options have emerged for US relations with all three. Reshaping Rogue States seeks to improve our understanding of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as well as of current and future policy options to combat the threats these nations pose. The book's comprehensive analysis of preemption and regime change debates the circumstances under which each policy might be justified or legal under international law. Prominent strategists and policymakers consider alternatives to preemption—including prevention, counterproliferation, and cooperative security—and draw conclusions from efforts to bring about regime change in the past. Reshaping Rogue States also reviews the differing policy challenges presented by each so-called axis member. Specifically, it considers how the United States might strike a balance with North Korea through multilateral negotiations; the changes within Iran that call for changes in US policy; and the dilemmas the United States faces in post-Saddam Iraq, including continuing insurgency, instability, and the feasibility of democracy.
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The Clinton Department of State's official change in the political lexicon from "
rogue states" to "states of concern" in 2000 was the most significant shift as it
marked a conscious effort to move away from the ineffective one-size-fits-all
Ibid. 9. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September
2002, p. 15, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed March 18, 2004). 10.
Some statements by administration officials were interpreted to mean that
... 1998.3 There has been no official word on what the new doctrine means for
force postures or for the actual conduct of military operations (at least not yet)
beyond those undertaken against Al Qaeda in response to the September 1 1
... concept as its official strategy in the 1960s). Putting the United States first,
allies second was not necessarily painless, but it has proved effective. U.S.
strategy could still converge with individual allies. Because of the uncertainties
about the ...
This and all quotes by Bush cited in this article have been excerpted from the
official White House website, located at www.whitehouse.gov. 2. See www.dod.
gov/speeches/2002/s2002/s- 2002 1202.depsecdef.html (accessed January 10, ...
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