side, sent word to the General (St. Ruth) that he thought there were signs of a movement on the opposite bank, and suggesting that additional guards be sent in, as only a few companies had remained in the town. St. Ruth replied by a sharp and testy remark, reflecting on the courage of the officer, to the effect that he was frightened by fancy. By the time this brusk reply had reached him the officer saw enough to convince him infallibly that an assault was about to be made and he again sent with all speed to the camp entreating the general to credit the fact. St. Ruth replied by saying that if the officer in charge was afraid of such attacks, he might turn over the command to another. Sarsfield was present at this last reply, and he at once judged the whole situation correctly. He implored St. Ruth not to treat so lightly a report so grave from an officer of undoubted bravery. The Frenchmancourageous, energetic, and highly-gifted as he unquestionably was unfortunately was short-tempered, imperious, and vain. He and Sarsfield exchanged hot and angry words; St. Ruth resenting Sarsfield's interference, and intimating that the latter henceforth should "know his place." While yet this fatal altercation was proceeding, an aid-de-camp galloped up all breathless from the town-the English were across the river and into the defences of Athlone! Even now St. Ruth's overweening self-confidence would not yield. "Then let us drive them back again," was his answer, at the same time directing troops to hurry forward for that purpose. But it was too late. The lodgment had been made in force. The English were now in the defences. The walls of the town on the camp side had been left standing, and only a siege could now dispossess the new occupants. Athlone was lost! *

Amongst the slain on the Irish side in this siege was the glorious old veteran, Colonel Richard Grace, who was governor the preceding year. His great age-he was now nearly ninety years of age-caused him to be relieved of such a laborious position in this siege, but nothing could induce him to seek, either in retirement or in less exposed and dangerous duty, that quiet which all his compeers felt to be the o'd man's right. He would insist on remaining in the thickest of the fighting, and he died "with his harness on his back." He was one of the most glorious characters to be met with in Irish history. The erudite author of the Green Book supplies a deeply interesting sketch of his life and career.

LXXI." THE CULLODEN OF IRELAND." HOW AUGHRIM WAS FOUGHT AND LOST. A STORY OF THE BATTLE-FIELD; THE DOG OF AUGHRIM," OR, FIDELITY IN DEATH!

T. RUTH fell back to Ballinasloe, on Ginckle's road to Galway, which city was now held by the Irish, and was in truth one of their most important possessions. The Frenchman was a prey to conscious guilty feeling. He knew that Sarsfield held him accountable for the loss of Athlone, and his pride was painfully mortified. How often do dire events. from trivial causes spring! This estrangement between St. Ruth and Sarsfield was fated to effect the destinies of Ireland, for to it may be traced the loss of the battle of Aughrim, as we shall see.

At a council of war in the Irish camp it was at first resolved to give battle in the strong position which the army had now

taken up, but St. Ruth moved off to Aughrim about three miles distant on the road to Galway. The new position was not less strong than that which had just been quitted. In truth its selection, and the uses to which St. Ruth turned each and all of its natural advantages, showed him to be a man of consummate ability.

Close to the little village of Aughrim-destined to give name to the last great battle between Catholic and Protestant royalty on the soil of Ireland-is the Hill of Kilcommedan. The hill slopes gradually and smoothly upward to a height of about three hundred feet from its base, running lengthways for about two miles from north to south. On its east side or slope, looking towards the way by which Ginckle must approach on his march westward to Galway, the Irish army was encamped, having on its right flank the pass or causeway of Urrachree, and its left flank resting on the village of Augh. rim. A large morass lay at the foot of Kilcommedan (on the east, sweeping round the northern end of the hill) which might be crossed in summer by footmen, but was impracticable for cavalry. Through its centre, from south to north, ran a little stream, which with winter rains flooded all the sur. rounding marsh. Two narrow causeways, "passes," or roads ran across the morass to the hill; one at Urrachree, the other at the town of Aughrim; the latter one being defended or commanded by an old ruin, Aughrim Castle at the hill base. * Along the slopes of the hill, parallel with its base, ran two or three lines of whitethorn hedge-rows, growing out of thick earth fences, affording admirable position and protection for musketeers. It may be questioned if the genius of a Wellington could have devised or directed aught that St. Ruth had not done to turn every feature of the ground and every inch of this position to advantage. Yet by one sin of omission he placed all the fortunes of the day on the hazard of his

* The most intelligible, if not the only intelligible, descriptions of this battle-field are those of Mr. M. J. M'Cann, in the Harp for June, 1859; and in a work recently issued in America, Battle-fields of Ireland, unquestionably the most attractive and faithful narrative hitherto published of the Jacobite struggle,

Sars

own life; he communicated his plan of battle to no one. field was the man next entitled and fitted to command, in the event of anything befalling the general; yet he in particular was kept from any knowledge of the tactics or strategy upon which the battle was to turn. Indeed he was posted at a point critical and important enough in some senses, yet away from, and out of sight of the part of the field where the main struggle was to take place; and St. Ruth rather hurtfully gave him imperative instructions not to stir from the position thus assigned him, without a written order from himself. "At Aughrim," says an intelligent Protestant literary periodical, "three apparent accidents gave the victory to Ginckle. The musketeers defending the pass at the old castle found themselves supplied with cannon balls instead of bullets; the flank movement of a regiment was mistaken for a retreat; and St. Ruth lost his life by a cannon shot."* The last mentioned, which was really the accident that wrested undoubted victory from the Irish grasp, would have had no such disastrous result had St. Ruth confided his plan of battle to his lieutenantgeneral, and taken him heartily and thoroughly into joint command on the field.

I know of no account of this battle, which, within the same space exhibits so much completeness, clearness, and simplicity of narration, as Mr. Haverty's, which accordingly I here borrow with very little abridgement :

"The advanced guards of the Williamites came in sight of the Irish on the 11th of July, and the following morning, which was Sunday, 12th of July, 1691, while the Irish army was assisting at mass, the whole force of the enemy drew up in line of battle on the high ground to the east beyond the morass. As nearly as the strength of the two armies can be estimated, that of the Irish was about fifteen thousand horse and foot, and that of the Williamites from twenty to twenty-five thousand, the latter having besides a numerous artillery, while the Irish had but nine field pieces.

* Dublin University Magazine, for February, 1867.-"Some Episodes of the Irish Jacobite Wars."

"Ginckle, knowing his own great superiority in artillery, hoped by the aid of that arm alone to dislodge the Irish centre force from their advantageous ground; and as quickly as his guns could be brought into position, he opened fire upon the enemy. He also directed some cavalry movements on his left at the pass of Urraghree, but with strict orders that the Irish should not be followed beyond the pass,' lest any fighting there should force on a general engagement, for which he had not then made up his mind. His orders on this point, however, were not punctually obeyed; the consequence being some hot skirmishing, which brought larger bodies into action, until about three o'clock, when the Williamites retired from the pass.

"Ginckle now held a council of war and the prevalent opinion seemed to be that the attack should be deferred until an early hour next morning, but the final decision of the council was for an immediate battle. At five o'clock accordingly, the attack was renewed at Urraghree, and for an hour and a half there was considerable fighting in that quarter; several attempts to force the pass having been made in the interval, and the Irish cavalry continuing to maintain their ground gallantly, although against double their numbers.

"At length, at half-past six, Ginckle, having previously caused the morass in front of the Irish centre to be sounded, ordered his infantry to advance on the point where the line of the fences at the Irish side projected most into the marsh, and where the morass was, consequently, narrowest. This, it appears, was in the Irish right centre, or in the direction of Urraghree. The four regiments of colonels Erle, Herbert, Creighton, and Brewer, were the first to wade through the mud and water, and to advance against the nearest of the hedges, where they were received with a smart fire by the Irish, who then retired behind their next line of hedges, to which the assailants in their turn approached. The Williamite infantry were thus gradually drawn from one line of fences to another, up the slope from the morass, to a greater distance than was contemplated in the plan of attack, according to which they were to hold their ground near the morass until they could be sup