tence? Because they have no definite meaning, unless we state what she does know.

The subject and assertive are essential parts of every simple sentence; because every simple sentence must have a subject and assertive either expressed or implied; but of all sentences in which we employ requisite assertives, the essential parts are the subject, the assertive, and the requisite.

To suppress any one of these three parts destroys the sentence, which shall evidently appear from the following examples taken from the sentence, she knows me: first suppress the subject, she, and you destroy the sentence, because the remainder, knows me, makes no sense. Secondly, suppress the assertive, knows, and the same consequence follows; as she me makes neither a sentence nor common sense. Thirdly, suppress the requisite, me, and the remainder, she knows, is as imperfect as either of the other two remainders. Any of the other words in a sentence may be suppressed and yet leave an assertion.

ON TIME.

Time is the universal measure of universal existence.

Universal existence signifies animate, inanimate, and immaterial existence.

As space is the universal container of all material objects, so is time the universal container of all existence; and as the exact space in which any material object is contained, declares its quantity of matter, so does the exact time in which any thing existed, declare the measure of that existence. Space is infinite, and so is time.

As space is measured by lines, so is time by motion.

ON THE DIVISIONS OF TIME.

Nature and art have already divided time so as to answer all the necessities and utilities of life; namely, into centuries, reigns, years, months, days, hours, minutes, seconds, springs, summers, autumns, winters, mornings, evenings, etc.; but as each of these divisions is as well known to the peasant and mechanic, as to the grammarian and philosopher, our remaining duty is evidently no more than to class them, to define each class, and then distinctly to point out the form of the assertive coinciding with it. The following preliminary observations may help to remove some of the difficulties which too frequently attend the study of this part of grammar.

Observation the 1st. Yesterday, last Saturday, and June 1830, are past times; and to-morrow, next Saturday, and June 1860 are future times; these are truths to which all mankind bear willing testimony.

2nd. That there is an eternity of time past, and an eternity of time to come, we have the acquiescence of all who believe in God. How can you believe that God has no beginning, and deny that there is an eternity of time past? or how can you believe that God has no end, and deny that there is an eternity of time to come?

3d. That to-day, this week, this month, this year, this century, or any other division or period of time, containing the transit or passage of the future into the past, is, by that transit, divided into a past and future time.

4th. That the past division is constantly increasing, and the future is as constantly decreasing, and shall so continue until its transition into the past is completed, and the whole period that before consisted of a past and future, becomes one undivided past. The only exception is the future eternity, which cannot run wholly into the past.

Let us illustrate the last two observations by an example. Is not to-day divided into a past and future time? That is, is not there a part of to-day past, and a part of it to come?

Does not the past part of it constantly increase, and the future part as constantly decrease, until the whole of the future part runs into the past, which we then call yesterday? What is here said of to-day may as truly be said of this week, this month, this year, this century, etc., because the same transit instant that divides to-day into a past and future time, divides this week, this month, this year, this century, this minute, this second, and every other passing period or division of time, even eternity itself, into a past and future also: and, as time is continuous, the same instant that begins the future, must end the past, and yet be no part of either the past or future. Any of our readers, to whom the foregoing part of this observation may not appear perspicuous, has only to look at his watch or clock, and test what we say by its practical application to the passing hour. Let us suppose when he looks, that he sees the hour-hand between two and three, and the minute-hand exactly at five; that is, the passing hour, which is pointed out by the hour-hand, began exactly at two, and shall end at three. It is divided into a past and future; and the minute-hand, which is the representative of the transit instant, shows that the past part is twenty-five and the future thirty-five minutes; that is, the past part and the future part together make sixty minutes, or the entire thing divided consequently, there can be no such time as that which some grammarians call the present time. Let us suppose there is such a time as the present. This present time must be contained in the passing hour, because the time before the passing hour is past time, and the time after it is future time, and past time or future time cannot be present time hence the present time, is neither before nor after the passing hour. It must be contained in the passing hour, if there is such a time. For the same reason as above, the present time cannot be in the past part of the passing hour ; that is, it cannot be in the twenty-five minutes, because they are past time, nor can it be contained in the thirty-five minutes, because they are future time, therefore the present time is not contained in their sum, which is the passing hour; and we have before proved, it is not contained in any time

before or after the passing hour; hence, it is no part of any time, which was required to be proved.

We shall conclude these observations by stating, that the principal use of a watch or clock is to show the past part of the forenoon or afternoon. The hour-hand shows the past complete hours, the minute-hand shows the past complete minutes of the passing hour, and the second-hand shows the past complete seconds of the passing minute. The secondhand partly corrects the inaccuracy of the minute-hand, and the minute-hand that of the hour-hand. But how can we know the past part of either without knowing the transit instant, or boundary between the past and future? We can by no other means know it, nor can we look at a good watch or clock without knowing this transit instant, or boundary. Each of the hands represents a boundary between a past and future time. The second-hand represents the transit instant, or boundary, between the past and future seconds of the passing minute. The minute-hand represents the transit, or boundary, between the past and future minutes of the passing hour; and the hour-hand the boundary between the past and future hours of the passing fore or afternoon. Notwithstanding the perpetual transition of future time into past, renders a mathematically accurate representation of the transit instant impossible, yet, if utility or the affairs of life hereafter require a more exact representation than that which is now made by our time pieces, our watch and clock-makers will soon furnish means of showing it.

The construction of our language, shows that our ancestors designed only three different classes of times, and three transits: namely, the class of detached past times, the class of attached past times, and the class of future times.

One of each class we shall briefly call the detached, the attached, and the future.

The transits are: the passing, the past, and the future transit.

The reader may here ask, how does the construction of our

language show, that the forms of our assertives relate to these three times and transits and to no other? Our reply is to be found in an attentive perusal and critical examination of the definitions and transits themselves, and in the just and consistent agreement which that perusal and examination must discover between the forms of our assertives and the said times and transits. We may add that the time, or point of time, with which any assertive in the language coincides, must be some one of these we have named.

The passing transit is that instant that ends the past and begins the future; as now, the instant pointed out by a true time-piece.

The detached past time is a past time detached from the future by some other interval; as, yesterday, last January, the ninth century.

Yesterday is a past time, by observation the first it is detached from the future by the past part of to-day; hence it is a detached past time.

Each of the other examples will be found to correspond to the definition as well as yesterday.

(See Observation 1st.)

The attached past time is the past part of a passing time; as the past part of this day, week, month, year, or century.

Is not this day, week, year, or century, a passing time? Is not the past part of each attached to the future part of the same? By the definition, they are attached past times.

(See Observation 2nd.)

The past transit instant, is the final instant of any detached past time; as, noon, five o'clock, midnight.

Was not noon the final instant of the morning? five o'clock the final instant of the fifth hour? and midnight the final instant of yesterday?