CSBA CENTER FOR Strategic

AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

TESTIMONY

Statement of Dr. James Jay Carafano, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform, April 29, 2003

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and speak on this important subject. This committee hearing raises a vital, and I believe not yet satisfactorily addressed issue, the sufficiency of the Department of Defense's organization and force structure for protecting the US homeland. While the armed forces have served the nation extremely well in responding to security concerns in the wake of the September 11 attacks and prosecuting the global war against terrorism, the debate over the department's future roles and capabilities has been shallow and inadequate.

Now is not just the right time to assess the future place of the Defense Department in protecting the homeland, it is the essential moment. Many have compared this administration's current initiatives to the period coinciding to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. This comparison is indeed apt. The National Security Act of 1947 marked the beginning of the effort that created a new organization and national security structure that protected the nation throughout the course of the Cold War and into the present. The administration's current efforts to draft a different strategic direction could yield a new security architecture that may also stand for generations. It is worth remembering, however, that the national security instruments used to fight the Cold War were not cut from whole cloth. It took over a decade of experimentation, trial and error, and innovation to create the national security system that we know today. Thus, it is worthwhile at the onset of this process to take stock of where we are and ensure the "first order" questions, the determination of the ends, ways, and means, are being properly addressed.

Current Guidance, Organization, and Practices

The Department of Defense's efforts to define its future role in protecting the homeland appears tentative at best. For example, the 2002 Defense Authorization Act required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report within six months on the department's efforts in counterterrorism and homeland security. As far as I am aware, this report is still in draft. Two institutional factors may, in part, account for the hesitant steps in addressing present and future tasks. First, the means of evaluating and providing guidance on new roles and missions are only somewhat changed from the system that was used at the end of the Cold War. Second, the new organizations the department has created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to address issues regarding protection of the homeland are still in their infancy. It is far too soon to judge how effective they will be in articulating new requirements, obtaining resources, and managing forces and programs.

1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Suite 912, Washington, DC 20036 Tel: 202-331-7990 Fax: 202-331-8019 http//:www.csbaonline.org

Any discussion of how the department evaluates proposed domestic security missions must begin with a consideration of strategy. The purpose of strategy is to make sure the appropriate linkage of ends, ways, and means, ensuring effort is focused on securing key objectives while efficiently and effectively utilizing the instruments at hand. Equally important, strategy can be a powerful catalyst for change. For example, "Shape, Respond, Prepare," the US military strategy presented in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review was intended not just to describe how the armed forces would be employed but also to make the case for building a wedge to invest in new operational concepts and advanced technologies.2 This approach worked. Some of these new capabilities recently saw extensive service during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In short, strategy can and has been an effective tool for turning institutional and operational practices in a new direction.

Within the Pentagon there is an important nexus between strategy and the operations of the Department of Defense. Strategy serves to inform the formulation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) which imparts the Defense Secretary's programming and fiscal priorities to the military departments. The DPG provides the major link between the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Defense budgeting system. Thus, any assessment of the department evaluates and determines its mission needs for protecting the homeland over the long term must begin with these keystone documents, the DPG and the administration's national strategies.

Strategic planning documents prior to the September 11 attacks were virtually devoid of any reference to homeland missions. It is, therefore, not surprising that these issues received scant attention within the defense community. For example, in 1999 the Defense Department conducted Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE-05), to that point its most detailed, wide-ranging analysis of the Reserves' potential future organization, structure, and missions. RCE-05 made four major recommendations with respect to homeland security. In large part, however, these conclusions were not translated over to the Defense Planning Guidance and the report's conclusions in the area of domestic security were virtually ignored. Out of over a million Reserve Component troops, less than an additional thousand personnel were dedicated to the task of protecting the homeland.3

In September 2001, shortly after the 9/11 attacks the Department of Defense published its most recent Quadrennial Defense Review. This review also included elements of a new military strategy. The challenge of protecting the homeland was addressed, but only to repeat the military's traditional responsibilities in defending the nation and supporting civil authorities. Likewise, the new National Strategy for Homeland Security and National Security Strategy simply stated that the Defense Department contributes to homeland security through its military mission overseas, traditional defense missions, and support for civil authority." The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, published in December 2002, offers no specific guidance on the use of defense assets for domestic missions. Only the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and

2 The National Defense Panel, Assessment of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, np, http://www.defenselink.mil/topstory/ndp_assess.html].

3 James Jay Carafano, "The Reserves and Homeland Security Proposals, Progress, Problems Ahead," CSBA Backgrounder (June 19 2002), p. 8.

4 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: September 30, 2000), pp. 18-19. The elements of military strategy highlighted in the document also briefly discussed the importance of defending critical infrastructure and mentioned the potential requirement for new force structures or organization to support homeland security. 'See, for example, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 2002), p. 13.

6

Key Assets addressed the Department of Defense's domestic role in any substantive way, though even here the strategy largely reemphasizes traditional responsibilities. In general, the current national strategies do little more than describe the military's present role. They are more doctrine than strategy. They are not a catalyst for change or innovation.

Additionally, the status quo approach to the role of defense in domestic security appeared to be largely reflected in the DPG. In some areas, the guidance seems to have been very specific. For example, the secretary has directed particular attention to enhancing the preparedness of military installations, with increased funding for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and conventional explosive detection equipment and emergency response capabilities.' This year the Defense Department plans to spend about a $1 billion to enhance security at military installations. For the most part, however, the department has given little focused direction to the Services.

8

The absence of a decisive course appears to be reflected in the organization of the joint staff and the Services. Each has adopted a different method for organizing and addressing domestic security issues. The Joint Staff established a Homeland Security Directorate within its Strategy and Policy Directorate (J5). The Air Force formed a Homeland Security Directorate under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, but also maintains a separate Air Staff section for civil support. The Army created a homeland security integrated concept team, led not by the Army Staff but by a Director of Homeland Security at the Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia. In addition, the Army has a Consequence Management Integration Office serving under its Director of Military Support on the Army staff. The Marine Corps also created an integrated concept team and established a homeland security section at its Warfighting Lab at Quantico, Virginia." It is not clear that the Navy has created any unique command structure to deal with domestic security issues. A survey of this plethora of organizations raises the question of whether the military can forge an effective joint approach to homeland missions, as they do with other military operations, if the joint staff does not have suitable counterparts in the Services with which to interact.

In addition, until recently the organization of the Defense Department has lacked any center of gravity that could serve as a focal point for assessing the adequacy of force structure, missions, and requirements. The wake of the September 11 attacks, however, has introduced two potential candidates: the recently established Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and a new combatant command, US Northern Command (NORTHCOM). It is, quite frankly, too soon to tell if these organizations will have a significant impact on how the department determines missions and requirements. There are a number of issues that need to be addressed.

It does not appear that the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense has a clear mandate. The department's homeland agenda could well cut across issues of policy, acquisition and technology, and

Office of the President, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (Washington, DC: February 2003). pp. 45-46.

Department of Defense, memorandum, subject: Preparedness of U.S. Military Installations and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Attack, September 5, 2002. "Pentagon Launching New Program to Protect 200 Installations," Homeland Defense Watch, April 21, 2003, p. 5.

Steven Metz, “Military Support to Homeland Security," paper presented to the Lexington Institute, February 27, 2003, pp. 13-14.

force management. There is some question of whether the placement of the office or its relationship to other elements of the secretariat will allow the new assistant secretary to play an appropriate role. Assistant Secretary Paul McHale recently described his responsibilities as "recommending to the Secretary [of Defense] the roadmap for the Defense Department's role in securing our nation." It is not completely clear, however, what portfolio his office will have to manage and implement this roadmap,10

One seemingly still unresolved issue is the how the functions of military support to civilian authorities will be managed. In the past, support to state and local governments for natural and technological (manmade) disasters was coordinated by the Secretary of the Army acting as the executive agent for the Defense Department. With the establishment of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense, this organization is being rethought. The support function could well be added to the portfolio of the assistant secretary, coordinated by a new Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Support." If the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense, however, is intended to serve primarily a policy function managing operational missions might be a significant distraction. In addition, any organizational structure that assigns elements of the secretariat with operational responsibilities will likely also require the Joint Staff to take on additional responsibilities in this area, like promulgating deployment orders. Such an approach could create as many problems it is intended to solve. An organizational design that plunges high level staffs into operational missions diverts important resources from the staff's primary tasks. This issue bears watching. How the department elects to handle the executive functions of performing military support to civilian authorities could be an important bellwether for gauging the effectiveness of the Pentagon organization for support of homeland missions. Also key to the success of the department will be its relationship between the new assistant secretary and NORTHCOM. If history is any guide, the department would do well to clearly sort out functions and responsibilities now. By many accounts, since its establishment in 1987 the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict have always had an uneasy relationship. Over time, the command's statutory authority over special operations budgets and the gravitas of being a combatant command gave SOCOM a dominant position in driving the agenda for determining the future of special operations forces, largely marginalizing the role of the assistant secretariat.

A final concern driving the agenda for the future will be the place homeland missions are assigned in the military's transformation effort. Transformation reflects innovation on a grand scale, undertaken to 12 exploit major changes in the character of conflict. The Secretary of Defense has created an Office of Force Transformation to serve as an incubator for innovation in warfighting, acquisition, and business practices, but the Pentagon has no equivalent for domestic security missions." The department's latest transformation planning guidance does not even address homeland security issues.14 As a result, it is

13

10 Statement by Mr. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 8, 2003, p. 6.

Jim Garamone, "Homeland Defense Chief Speaks of New Responsibilities," American Forces Press Service, March 19, 2003, np, [http://www.defenselink.mil].

12 Testimony of Andrew F. Krepinevich before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2002, [http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/T 20020409. Defense Transforma/T.20020409. Defense_Transforma.htm].

13 Metz, "Military Support to Homeland Security," p. 14.

14

The only reference related to the homeland is a restatement of the objective in the Quadrennial Defense Review to protect critical base structures against attack. Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance (April 2003), p. 10.

hardly surprising that the Services have given the problem scant attention. For example, the Army's current 108 page transformation roadmap devotes less than a page to the topic." Excluding domestic security from the main axis of the transformation effort may well hamstring the military effort. If the challenge is not an integral component of the Pentagon's transformation plan, it is doubtful that it will ever get the resources, let alone the intellectual capital required to foster new initiatives and appropriate programs.

Looking Forward

The current strategic guidance, organization of the Defense Department, and military force structure would be adequate if the status quo were acceptable. This may not be the case. Current strategies rely heavily on the notion that the best defense is a good offense, placing a premium on preempting or interdicting threats before they reach US shores. But the almost infinite links with the rest of the globe, which carry the people, goods, services, and ideas that define America's place in the world, belay the idea that every attack can be stopped at the source. In addition, adequate defense is part of a good offense. Knowing the homeland is secure, allows the United States greater freedom of action abroad. There is some question whether the US military currently provides the best mix of offense and defense to ensure the security of the homeland over the long term. There are major strategic issues that do not appear to have been adequately addressed. These include the adequacy of the nation to respond to multiple, catastrophic terrorist attacks, assuring the safety of critical infrastructure, and preparing for new threats that may emerge in the future. Some degree of new strategic thinking, organizational change, and force structure innovation could well be required to meet these needs.

16

Addressing outstanding security concerns might begin with a fresh appreciation of the strategic guidance given to the department. This could start with scrapping the distinctions between "homeland defense" and "homeland security" that the department has put forward to prescribe and limit its own role in the domestic realm. The department sees its responsibilities as largely homeland defense, protecting US borders and waters against traditional military threats. Homeland security, as defined in the national homeland security strategy is "detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States." The distinctions between homeland "defense" and "security" seem to have little practical or legal utility. Also, it is not clear that America's enemies will clearly recognize these boundaries and limit their methods and operations so that they can be countered either by the military or other federal agencies as appropriate. In fact, they may seek to use these artificial distinctions to find gaps and seams in US security that can be easily exploited. Second, in practice, many federal agencies will play a role in countering both conventional and terrorist military threats.

The nation would be better served if specific strategic goals for the Defense Department, as with the other federal agencies, were outlined using the six critical mission areas established in the homeland

15 Department of the Army, Army Transformation Roadmap (2002), p. A-4.

16 Office of the Press Secretary, The White House Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, October 8, 2001,

[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-2.html].