supposing them to be true, are utopian, and cannot be carried into effect in the present condition of society. I deny the first branch of this objection; but admit the second to be well founded. No system of morals which is rue, can be utopian-this term being understood to mean visionary and impracticable. But a true system may not be reducible to practice, on its first announcement, by a people who do not know one jot of its principles, and whose guides sedulously divert their minds from studying it. Christianity itself has not yet been generally practised; but does any rational man on this account denounce it as utopian and worthless? It would be folly to expect judges and juries to abandon the existing practice of criminal jurisprudence, and to adopt that which is here recommended, before they, and the society for whom they act, understand and approve of its principles; and no one who bears in mind by what slow and laborious efforts truth makes its way, and how long a period is necessary before it can develope itself in practice, will expect any new system to triumph in the age in which it was first promulgated. I have frequently repeated in this work, that, by the moral law, we cannot enjoy the full fruits even of our own intelligence and virtue, until our neighbors have been rendered as wise and amiable as ourselves. No reasonable man, therefore, can expect to see the principles expounded in this work, although true, generally diffused and adopted in society, until the natural means of communicating a knowledge of them, and producing a general conviction of their truth and utility, shall have been perseveringly used for a period sufficient to accomplish this end. In the meantime, the established practices of society must be supported, if not respected; and he is no friend to the real progress of mankind, who, the moment after he has sown his moral principles, would attempt to gather the fruit of them before he has allowed summer and autumn to bring the produce to maturity. The rational philanthropist will zealously teach his principles, and introduce them into practice as

favorable opportunities occur; not doubting that he will thereby sooner accomplish his object, than by making premature attempts at realizing them, which must inevitably end in disappointment *

SECTION II.

MORAL ADVANTAGES OF PUNISHMENT.

AFTER the intellect and moral sentiments have been brought to recognise the principles of the divine administration, so much wisdom, benevolence, and justice, are discernible in the natural laws, that our whole nature is ameliorated in consequence of undergoing the punishments annexed to them. Punishment endured by one individual also serves to warn others against transgression. These facts afford another proof that a grand object of the arrangements of creation is the improvement of the moral and intellectual nature of man. So strikingly conspicuous,

indeed, is the ameliorating influence of suffering, that many persons have supposed this to be the primary object for which it is sent; a notion which, with great deference, I cannot help regarding as unfounded in principle, and dangerous in practice. If evils and misfortunes are mere mercies of Providence, it follows that a headache consequent on a debauch is not intended to prevent repetition of drunkenness, so much as to prepare the debauchee for 'the invisible world;' and that shipwreck in a crazy vessel is not designed to render the merchant more cautious, but to lead him to heaven.

* The leading ideas expounded in this chapter have been most ably and eloquently followed out by Dr. Charles Caldwell, Professor of the Institutes of Medicine in the University of Lexington, Kentucky, in his 'New Views of Penitentiary Discipline, and Moral Education and Reformation of Criminals,' published at Philadelphia in 1829, and reprinted in the Phrenological Journal, vol. viii. pp. 385, 493. Mr. Simpson also has treated the subject with great ability in the same journal, vol. ix. p. 481, and in the appendix to his work on the Necessity of Popular Education,'-a work in which he has expounded and applied many principles of the present treatise with much acuteness and felicity of illustration.

It is undeniable, that, in innumerable instances, pain and sorrow are the direct consequences of our own misconduct; at the same time it is obviously benevolent in the Deity to render them beneficial directly, as a warning against future transgression, and indirectly, as a means of leading to the purification of the mind. Nevertheless, if we shall imagine that in some instances it is dispensed as a direct punishment for particular transgressions, and in others only on account of sin in general, and with the view of ameliorating the spirit of the sufferer, we shall ascribe inconsistency to the Creator, and expose ourselves to the danger of attributing our own afflictions to his favor, and those of others to his wrath; thus fostering in our minds selfconceit and uncharitableness. Individuals who entertain the belief that bad health, worldly ruin, and sinister accidents, befalling them, are not punishments for infringement of the laws of Nature, but particular manifestations of the love of the Creator towards themselves, make slight inquiry into the natural causes of their miseries, and bestow few efforts to remove them. In consequence, the chastisements endured by them, neither correct their own conduct, nor deter others from committing similar transgressions. Some religious sects, who espouse these notions, literally act upon them, and refuse to inoculate with the cow-pock to escape contagion, or take other means of avoiding natural calamities. Regarding these as dispensations of Providence sent to prepare them for a future world, they conceive that the more that befall them the better. Farther, these ideas, besides being repugnant to the common sense of mankind, are at variance with the principle that the world is arranged so as to favor virtue and discountenance vice; because favoring virtue means obviously that the favored virtuous will positively enjoy more happiness, and negatively suffer fewer misfortunes, than the vicious. The view, therefore, now advocated, appears less exceptionable, viz. that punishment serves a double directly to warn us against transgression, and

purpose

indirectly, (when rightly apprehended,) to subdue our lower propensities, and purify and vivify our moral and intellectua powers.

Bishop Butler coincides in this interpretation of natural calamities. Now,' says he, in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power.* For pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions; and we are endued by the Author of our nature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences.' 'I know not that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions. And, by prudence and care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet: or, on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned pussion, wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable; i. e. they do what they know beforehand will render them so. They follow those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely death. This every one observes to be the general course of things; though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by experience, that all our sufferings are owing to our own follies.’—Analogy, part i. ch. 2. In accordance with this last remark, I have treated of hereditary diseases; and evils resulting from earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, and other convulsions of Nature, may be added to the same class.

It has been objected that such punishments as the breaking of an arm by a fall, are often so disproportionately severe, that, in appointing them, the Creator must have had in view some other and more important object than that of making them serve as mere motives to the observance of the physical laws; and that that object must be to influence the mind of the sufferer, and draw his attention to concerns of higher import.

In answer I remark, that the human body is liable to *These words are printed in Italics in the original.

destruction by severe injuries; and that the degree of suffering, in general, bears a just proportion to the danger connected with the transgression. Thus, a slight surfeit is attended only with headache or general uneasiness, because it does not endanger life; a fall on any muscular part of the body is followed either with no pain, or with only a slight indisposition, for the reason that it is not seriously injurious to life; but when a leg or arm is broken, the pain is intensely severe, because the bones of these limbs stand high in the scale of utility to man. The human body is so framed that it may fall nine times and suffer little damage, but the tenth time a limb may be broken, which will entail a painful chastisement. By this arrangement, the mind is kept alive to danger to such an extent as to insure general safety, while at the same time it is not overwhelmed with terror by punishments too severe and too frequently repeated. In particular states of the body, a slight wound may be followed by inflammation and death; but these are the results not simply of the wound, but of a previous derangement of health, occasioned by departures from the organic laws.

On the whole, therefore, no adequate reason appears for regarding the consequences of physical accidents in any other light than as direct punishments for infringement of the natural laws, and indirectly as a means of accomplishing moral and religious improvement.

In the preceding chapters we have obtained glimpses of some of the sanctions of the moral law, which may be briefly recapitulated. If we obey it, many desirable results ensue. In the first place, we enjoy the highest gratifications of which our nature is susceptible, in habitual and sustained activity of our noblest faculties. Secondly, We become objects of esteem and affection to our fellow men, and enjoy exalted social pleasure. Thirdly, Whatever we undertake, being projected in harmony with the course of Nature, wil prosper. Fourthly, By observing the moral