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neers in Washington to be talk to the inspectors out in the field; then we will go out to the plant and see whether this makes sense. If we can't do any of that ahead of time because we don't have the analysis from the utility, it is almost impossible for us to do our job.

That was one of these objections of these people as well, and it went to the very heart of what this group of utilities was proposing, which is basically to throw out the exemption process that everybody else was using to come into compliance with the rule, and instead to have a new approach for them.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Yes, and I guess I would question why-would you briefly address why you thought the exemption process was not adequate in this case, why Mr. Stello had to meet with the utilities and come up with some accommodation beyond the exception proc

ess.

Mr. ZECH. I would have to consult with him on that, if I may. Mr. DEFAZIO. Go ahead.

While you are doing that, I will just read into the record from a document dated May 2, 1984, Memorandum for Robert L. Ferguson, Section Leader, Fire Protection Section, Chemical Engineering Branch DE, from five different fire protection engineers.

On page 4, these five professionals state the new interpretation regarding the nature of fire area boundaries, which states that the "boundary walls and floor-ceiling assemblies need not be continuous; conflicts with previous staff criteria as defined in the branch technical position. Therefore, the technical basis for our review has been changed. This change has been effected as a result of utility initiatives via management directive, without following usual, appropriate NRC procedures or considering relevant staff input, which I would assume would be both the exception process and/or a new rulemaking.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.-May 2, 1984 Memorandum for Robert Ferguson, from Fire Protection Engineers on Appendix R.]

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Since 1982, the NRR fire protection staff has performed their review of Appendix R exemption requests to a consistent basis. This basis has * been formally issued in Generic Letter 83-33. New interpretations of the basic Appendix R requirements have been developed. These new interpretations are contrary to existing guidance and will permit neither a timely nor consistent resolution of Appendix R deviations. Specific recommendations for resolution of the issues are proposed.

Background

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During our reviews of a significant number of Appendix R exemption requests,
it became apparent that many utilities had not assessed compliance with the
Rule on the basis of valid fire areas as defined in our Branch Technical
Position. In addition, some utilities did not provide complete fire
detection and automatic fire suppression systems on the basis of recognized
industry practice (as defined by the National Fire Protection Association) and
sound fire protection engineering principles. As a result, Generic Letter 83-33
was issued to further clarify our position and to avoid future conflict. To the
extent that utilities significantly deviated from these positions, resolution was
attained through the exemption process under the time constraints imposed by
10 CFR 50.48. Since April 1982, when the staff began reviewing significant
numbers of exemption requests, a consistent basis has been established for
the level of safety that must be achieved in order to deviate from the Rule.
Contrary to this established guidance and against specific recommendations
by the staff, new guidance, in the form of intepretations of Appendix R,
was developed in support of the Regional Appendix R workshops.

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Robert Ferguson

1.

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Prevailing Staff View

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The recently drafted "Interpretations of Appendix R" states that
licensees, that have not assessed compliance with Section III.G
of Appendix R on the basis of fire areas or with the provision of
fire detection and suppression systems throughout a fire area as
delineated in Generic Letter 83-33, must perform an "evaluation to
assess the adequacy" of fire area boundary construction, and detection
and suppression system coverage. This evaluation does not have to be
submitted on the docket for NRR review as is currently done under the
exemption process and no guidance is furnished as to the nature of the
evaluation.

If, during the audit, the inspection team takes issue with the adequacy
of fire area boundaries or the extent of fire suppression and detection,
the licensees would present the evaluation as justification for the
existing configuration and attempts at resolution would be undertaken.
If the issue(s) could not be resolved, it (they) would be deferred as
an "unresolved item" for subsequent NRR action.

Originators Opinion

Appendix R was promulgated as a means of expediting resolution of post-
Browns Ferry SER fire protection open items and to provide a basis for
consistent resolution of them. The lack of a requirement in the new
"Interpretations" for timely, advance documentation of the licensee's
analyses of deviations from the staff positions of Generic Letter 83-33
undermines the basis for originally promulgating Appendix R because,
by requiring no prior review and deferring resolution of issues to the
audit, a significant time delay will result. In addition, due to the
varying composition of the audit teams, the resolution of technical
issues may vary to a significant degree. For example, under similar
conditions at different plants, one audit team may accept a partial
fire suppression system while another team may insist upon complete
area-wide protection.

Additional Appendix R audits are scheduled to occur well into the future. It is also anticipated that unresolved audit issues would require NRC action, which would necessitate further delays. These delays would not be expected under the staff's previous approach because all significant technical issues would be resolved by NRR in advance of the audit.

To the extent that plant modifications would be necessary to satisfy staff concerns, these modifications would be further delayed because agreement as to the nature of the modifications would not be reached" until some time after the audit. Whereas, under our previous approach, agreement is reached at an earlier stage and the schedule for completing the modifications commences well in advance of the audits, normally at the time the SER is issued.

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Under the new interpretations, no specific guidance is provided to the
utilities regarding the nature of the evaluations that they are expected
to perform. Based on the staff's previous experience, we feel that
licensees are likely to conduct evaluations which vary significantly
as to the degree of comprehensiveness, completeness, and the application
of sound fire protection engineering principles. Consequently, the staff
is likely to find that all relevant considerations have not been taken
into account and that an equivalent level of safety has not been provided.
For example, a utility may conclude as some have attempted that a
particular fire protection configuration, such as a partial height fire
barrier between redundant shutdown divisions, is adequate based on an
assumption that no "credible" fire will occur. However, there is no
generally recognized method to predict the location, magnitude and
resulting damage of a fire in any location, consequently design basis
protection is mandated by the rule.

Licensees, confronted with the inadequacy of their evaluation at the
time of the audit, may request additional time to conduct a more
thorough evaluation or refer the matter to NRR for approval, similar
to the exemption process. This will only result in further delays
toward eventual Appendix R compliance

In addition to the time considerations involved, areas that are not
in compliance with the Rule may be construed by some utilities as
being acceptable although the same conclusion will not be held by the
staff. Therefore, under this approach, there is no way to ensure a
consistent level of fire safety.

Under the new interpretations, licensees that have already committed to fire protection modifications in conjunction with previously requested and approved exemptions may now elect to delete their commitments from these modifications and propose a new approach which may provide a lesser degree of safety and which would not be ultimately acceptable to the staff.

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Under the new interpretations, greater reliance is placed upon the
Appendix R audit. However, an audit, by its very nature, is a limited
scope effort. Only a sampling of areas and systems is reviewed. Since
it is a limited effort, the staff would not have reasonable assurance that
all potentially significant safety problems were discovered.

If, under the new interpretations, an audit team discovered a number of
safety problems within some areas of the sample, there is no mechanism
to resolve the larger question of the adequacy of the protection in
the un-audited areas. As a result, more areas of the plant may be
in non-compliance with potentially serious consequences if a fire
should occur.

Robert Ferguson

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3.

4.

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Because of the new interpretations it will now be the staff's position that all that a utility needs to do to justify fire area boundaries and the extent of fire detection and suppression is an "evaluation". It is therefore likely that an individual utility will have some form of evaluation available for the audit team. If serious safety problems are discovered during an audit, the inspection team will not be in a position to efficiently resolve or cite the utility for the condition because they have literally done what the new interpretations require. Also, there is nothing specifically written or implied in the interpretations that utilities will be sanctioned or cited for inadequate evaluations. With the reduced likelikhood of enforcement action, utilities will be less inclined to take the Rule seriously and the staff itself will be increasingly frustrated in their efforts to achieve resolution of unresolved issues.

The new interpretation regarding the nature of fire area boundaries,
which states that boundary walls and floor/ceiling assemblies need
not be continuous, conflicts with previous staff criteria as defined
in the Branch Technical Positions. Therefore, the technical basis
for our review has been changed. This change has been effected as a
result of utility initiatives, via management directive, without
following usual appropriate NRC procedures or considering relevant staff
input.

At a meeting between the staff and the Nuclear Utilities Fire Protection
Group in March 1983, it was agreed that the Group would propose criteria
for the NRC acceptance of partial coverage suppression and detection
systems. To this date, the Group has been unable to provide any criteria
due to the number of variables that must be considered in each case.
It is therefore doubtful that the individual utilities will be able to
assess Appendix R compliance of such systems based on an evaluation, as
permitted by the recent interpretations.

Originators Assessment of Consequences

The adoption of the new "Interpretations of Appendix R" undermines
the Rule by causing significant delays associated with the identification
and resolution of fire protection related safety problems. It may also
result in a lack of consistency in the resolution of safety deviations.
The interpretations also change the technical basis of the Rule and
our review efforts by redefining the nature of fire area boundaries.

Related Efforts

None

Recommendations

5.

1.

2.

Do not issue the "Interpretations of Appendix R" as presently
written, but as amended in by Enclosure 1.

Re-affirm that the staff positions as delineated in Generic Letter 83-33 are the basis for resolving technical issues associated with compliance with Appendix R.

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