9

Given the strength of the argument that the Commission intended to promulgate two 72-hour standards, it is not necessary to answer the criticism in the May 1984 Memorandum that the staff's proposed interpretation proffers no safety basis for the distinction between the two standards.

May 1984 Memorandum at 4. The interpretation is not obliged to provide a technical justification for its adherence to standards in effect for over five years.

However, some of the staff's remarks in reply to the Memorandum may have obscured the safety basis for the distinction between the two standards. The staff tries to turn the Memorandum's criticism into a defense of the proposed interpretation by asserting that "there is little, if any, safety distinction to be made" between the two standards. SECY-85-306, Enclosure 8, at 3. The staff here appears to be putting forward a backup argument, which roughly paraphrased, is that "even if it was not the intention of the Commission to promulgate two 72-hour standards, the staff is not now proposing a significantly new rule, for there is little difference between the two 72-hour standards."

if there is little, if any, difference between them, then it seems odd to propose an interpretation the main purpose of which is to assert a difference.

Therefore, rather than have the proposed interpretation appear to be without technical justification, we note briefly what we are given to understand the technical justification to be: there is indeed little safety difference between achieving cold shutdown by the 72-hour mark and starting at the 72-hour mark to go to cold shutdown with equipment which has been repaired by that time. However, there is a significant safety difference between the level of fire protection given equipment which must be able to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours and the level of fire protection given equipment which need only be repaired within 72 hours.

Therefore, Appendix R aims for certain levels of fire protection, not time limits on certain phases of operation. It is the essential aim of Appendix R to require that a system be given fire protection appropriate to its safety functions. Thus the Appendix first establishes a minimum level of fire protection for normal cold shutdown equipment. The level is appropriate because it "provide [s] a margin in achieving cold shutdown conditions." See 45 Fed. Reg.

However, the Appendix then establishes a higher level of protection for the alternative system, for it is the system of last resort. The levels are, to be sure, expressed in terms of time, but the terms are not limits on operation; they are, instead, more like the time ratings on

10

fire boundaries, which are measures of the level of fire protection.

C. Fire Damage

We here recommend that the staff's proposed interpretation on fire damage be modified in much the way in which the May 1984 Memorandum would like it to be modified.

we do not agree with the Memorandum's claim that the interpretation significantly changes anything in Appendix R. Rather we recommend modification because the scope of the phrase "fire damage" in the interpretation could be misunderstood and a related subsection of the Appendix, one which deals with damage by fire suppression, thereby obscured. Sections III.G.1 and 2 of Appendix R require that fire protection assure that particular features of shutdown systems be "free of fire damage." The staff's proposed interpretation assigns a functional meaning to the phrase "free of fire damage:" "that is, the structure, system or component under consideration is capable of performing its intended function during and after the postulated fire, as needed." SECY-85-306, Enclosure 4, at 1-2.

The Memorandum argues that the proposed interpretation does not share the Commission's concern in promulgating Appendix R that shutdown systems not be disabled by fire suppression agents. The Memorandum apparently construes the phrase "fire damage" liberally to mean any fire-related damage, including damage from fire suppression, but is concerned that licensees will construe the phrase more literally to mean only "damage by fire" and conclude that they are under no further obligation once they have shown that the redundant shutdown systems will be free of disabling damage by fire. The Memorandum recommends that the interpretation be modified to explicitly require that the shutdown systems not be disabled by fire suppression agents. May 1984 Memorandum at 5.

The staff (EDO) agrees that shutdown systems are not to be disabled by fire suppression, and claims that its proposed interpretation intends only to make it clear that the lack of protection against purely cosmetic damage would not justify rejecting a request for an exemption.

at 8.

SECY-85-306

The reply could have noted that Appendix R, in section III.G.3, clearly requires consideration of damage from fire suppression systems. The section mandates alternative shutdown systems first where the licensee cannot meet section III.G.2's requirement that protection of redundant trains of hot shutdown systems ensure that at least one of

11

the trains will be free of fire damage, or, second, where these trains may be subject to damage from fire suppression systems. The staff's proposed interpretation does nothing to remove this section, and thus the phrase "fire damage" can be construed literally without relieving licensees of an obligation to protect against damage from fire suppression. Indeed, unless the phrase is construed literally, part of section III.G.3 will be pointless. If "fire damage" means any fire-related damage, the second part of section III.G.3, the part which requires an alternative system where redundant trains could be damaged by fire suppression systems, is redundant, for that part of section III.G.3 assumes that it is possible to meet section III.G.2's requirement that at least one redundant train of hot shutdown equipment be "free of fire damage" and yet still face a risk of damage from fire suppression systems. (If the requirement in III.G.2 is not met, the first part of section III.G.3 applies.) But if "fire damage" includes any fire-related damage, then the situation assumed by the second part of section III.G.3 could never arise, and there would be no need for that part.

The interpretation's functional definition of fire damage could be read to make the second part of section III.G.3 seem pointless, for the standard is worded generally enough to permit the conclusion that it applies to damage from any fire-related source, including fire suppression systems. Thus, insofar as it purports to be a definition of the phrase "fire damage," it appears to attribute the same generality to the phrase. For the sake of clarity the staff's proposed interpretation might be modified to say that the functional standard of damage applies both to damage by fire and damage by fire suppression, and that the two kinds of damage are discussed in sections III.G.2 and III.G.3, respectively.

We are told that the interpretation is a response to the industry's having asked the staff to say what it meant by "damage by fire." Given this context for the interpretation, it can be argued that there is no need to make the clarifying changes we are recommending. However, as the very existence of the Memorandum's criticism of the interpretation shows, it will be read and seriously weighed by some who are not as aware of the context of the interpretation as some parts of the industry and staff are. Clarification of the interpretation could help prevent further misunderstanding.

12

D. Automatic Fire Detection and Suppression

Sections III.G.2.b and c of Appendix R require that in certain circumstances, hot shutdown capability be protected by fire detectors and automatic fire suppression equipment "installed in the fire area." Other provisions of Appendix R also speak of such equipment as "installed in the fire The staff's fifth proposed interpretation says that "detection and suppression providing less than full area coverage may be adequate to comply with the regulation." SECY-85-306, Enclosure 4, at 2. The staff has been in the practice of requiring an exemption process for less than full area coverage, but the proposed interpretation would require only that the licensee perform for later NRC audit an evaluation of the adequacy of the partial coverage the licensee wanted to install.

The May 1984 Memorandum recommends that the staff continue its practice of requiring exemptions for partial coverage. As with the proposed interpretation on fire boundaries, the Memorandum argues that the prior NRC review afforded by the exemption process reduces inconsistency in the implementation of Appendix R and prevents the cost and delay entailed whenever something found inadequate in an NRC audit after installation has to be replaced. May 1984 Memorandum at 5. The staff (OELD) first notes that the sections under consideration say only "installed in the area," not something like "throughout the area." See SECY-85-306, Enclosure 8, at 3. The staff then applies one of the arguments it applied to the Memorandum's comments on the proposed interpretation on fire boundaries: Exemptions from full area coverage have been granted wherever partial coverage provided protection equivalent to full coverage; future instances of partial coverage, though not subjected as a matter of course to NRC review before installation, will meet the same standard of equivalence.

Id.

The history of the rule on uniformity of fire boundaries made it clear that the exemption process was not clearly justified by the intention behind the rule. However, the history of the rule on coverage by automatic detection and suppression equipment is not similarly helpful. We are left with only the language of the final rule, and agree that the word "in" is versatile enough to mean something other than "throughout."

E.

Independence of Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown

Section III.G.3 of Appendix R provides that whenever alternative or dedicated shutdown systems are required, they shall be "independent of cables, systems or components in

13

the area, room, or zone under consideration," that is, the alternative or dedicated system must be outside the area, room, or zone in which the normal system is located. The staff's proposed interpretation of the quoted language would allow alternate systems to be located in the same area in which the normal system to which they are the alternative is located, as long as the alternate systems were independent of the room or zone in which the normal system was located. SECY-85-306, Enclosure 4, at 3.

The May 1984 Memorandum argues that this interpretation lowers the standard which has been applied in the past, provides no guidance for determining the acceptability of alternate or dedicated systems located in the same area in which the normal system is located, and rewards those licensees who have delayed their compliance with the higher standard. The Memorandum also reports that some members of the fire protection staff recommend that at the very least a licensee proposing to locate alternate and normal systems in the same area be required to undertake a detailed fire hazards analysis justifying the proposal. May 1984 Memorandum at 5-6.

The current version of the proposed interpretation adopts the recommendation of those members of the fire protection staff. See SECY-85-306, Enclosure 4, at 3. Beyond this, the staff (EDO) argues that sec. III.G.3, by saying "room or zone" after "area," "clearly implies that compliance may be achieved by other than separation by fire areas." SECY-85-306, at 8.

It does appear that the intention behind the rule was to permit justifiable presence in the same area of both alternate and normal systems. The proposed version of III.G. said that the alternate capability had to be "independent of the fire area" in which the normal system was located, but made no mention of "room" or "zone." See 45 Fed. Reg. 36087. These latter two words were added in the final version of sec. III.G., and although the comments accompanying the final version of sec. III.G. do not specifically mention the two words, the comments do say that the wording of the section has been revised "to provide clarification." See 45 Fed. Reg. at 76606. We do not see how the Commission could have thought that the addition of "room" or "zone" was clarifying unless the Commission intended the addition to convey the possibility that independence of "room" or "zone," but not of "area," might satisfy the rule.

We note that, as with the proposed interpretation on fire boundaries, the staff, by the practice of requiring exemptions in certain cases, has been construing the rule to be more stringent than it was intended to be. The proposed