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Federal Register / Vol. 51, No. 149 / Monday, August 4, 1986 / Proposed Rules
required by the regulations. The major cause of these losses was stress resulting from handling and transportation. Under the current 72hour identification requirement, birds are often not fully recovered from shipment-related stress before undergoing identification—a procedure involving the physical seizure and immobilization of the birds. This document proposes to extend the mandatory time period for accomplishment of individual bird identifications by United States Department of Agriculture and approved privately operated quarantine facilities, from the current 72-hours to 7-days. The Department believes that this additional time would significantly reduce facility overtime costs and bird stress. without reducing the effectiveness of the identification procedure.
on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foregin. based enterprises in domestic or export markets. Removal of the footnoted reference would have no impact on the importation of birds into the United States since the referenced importation limitation no longer exists. Extending the individual bird identification period from 72-hours to 7-days would relieve existing restrictions and should result in reduced costs for quarantine facilities and more healthful conditions for imported birds. Under the circumstances explained above, the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has determined that this action would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
Executive Order 1237.2
This program/activity is listed in the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance under No. 10.025 and is subject to the provisions of Executive Order 12372, which requires intergovernmental consultation with State and local
officials. (See 7 CFR Part 3015. Subpart V).
List of Subjects in 9 CFR Part 92
Animal diseases, Canada. Imports. Livestock and Livestock Products. Mexico, Poultry and Poultry Products, Quarantine. Transportation. Wildlife.
PART 92-imporaration of CERTAin AniMALs. And POULTRY AND CERTAin AniMAL AND POut-TRY PRODUCTS: INSPECTION AND OTHER REQUIREMEnts for CERTAIN MEA.ns of conveyance: And shipping containers. Thereon
Accordingly, it is proposed to amendo CFR Part 92 as follows:
not under the influence of alcohol or other drugs or otherwise unfit for duty. The Commission proposed this rule because of a concern that certain persons could become unfit for duty due to the effects of substances such as alcohol or other drugs and, thereby, adversely impact the health and safety of the public. Instead of this rule, the Commission is issuing a Policy Statement concurrent with this action to withdraw the proposed rule. The Commission has decided to defer rulemaking on fitness for duty of nuclear power plant personnel for a minimum of 18 months from the effective date of the Policy Statement. The Commission's decision is intended to recognize and further encourage the initiatives concerning fitness for duty being taken by the nuclear power industry, the Nuclear Utility Management and Human Resources Committee (NUMARC), and by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). The Commission will exercise this deference as long as the industry programs produce the desired results. The Commission will reassess the possible need for further action based on the success of those programs during the 18-month period DATE: This withdrawal is effective August 4, 1986.
roa runtrien-for-at-to-contact: Loren Bush. Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC.20555,
- telephone (301) 492-8080.
1. The authority citation for Part 92 would continue to read as follows:
Authority:7 U.S.C. 1622:19 U.S.C. 1306.21 U.S.C. 102-105.111.134a. 134b. 134c. 13-d. 134s and 135. 7 CFR 2-17.2-51. and 371.2(d)
paragraphs (c)(1). (c)(2)(i), and (c)(3) and
the references thereto would
3. Paragraph (e) of $92.11 would be amended by changing "72-hours" to read "7 days".
4. Paragraph (f)(3)(ii)(E) of $92.11 would be amended by changing "72 hours" to read "7 days".
Done at Washington, D.C.. this 29th day of
10 CFR Part 50
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
su-Any: The Commission is
supplement any information:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The job performance of alcohol and drug abusers can be expected to be hindered by the presence of chemicals in their bloodstream. For example, the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) in its 1981 Report to Congress. reports that 46 percent of all nonfataland 40 percent of all fatal
Federal Register / Vol. 51, No. 149 / Monday, August 4, 1986 / Proposed Rules
U.S. industrial accidents involve alcohol, at an annual cost of $12 to $15 billion. More specifically, 4 ounces of alcohol in the blood steam of a 165pound male requires approximately 12 hours to metabolize. This is one reason that other regulatory agencies (e.g., U.S. Department of Transportation) mandate specific periods of abstinence (e.g., 4 or 8 hours) for interstate truck drivers, commercial airline pilots etc., before these persons come on duty. Drugs other than alcohol, such as cocaine and hashish, require as much as 24 to 72 hours to metabolize. The Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA) 1979 report on its Alcohol and Drug Dependency Program states that the program served 350 employees during that year (one out of every 143). TVA estimates its annual cost due to alcohol abuse alone is approximately S18.5 million. As recently as mid-1981, approximately one-third of the Edison Electric Institute's (EFI) member companies operating nuclear stations had no programs to deal with this
On August 5, 1982, NRC published in the Federal Register (47 FR 33980) its proposed "Fitness for Duty" Rule, amending 10 CFR 50.54. The proposed rule was a broad, non-prescriptive rule that would have required licensees to establish, document, and implement adequate written procedures to ensure that while on duty their personnel and their contractors' personnel with unescorted access to protected areas, while in those protected areas, are not under the influence of aicohol, other drugs, or otherwise unfit for duty. Various questions were posed in the proposed rule to which the Commission wanted responses in order to decide on its next course of action.
A total of 73 responses containing 310 comments were received, all of which were evaluated in the decision to proceed with the Policy Statement and are reflected in it. The following highlights the maior issues raised in the
comments (a more complete discussion of the comments received is available for inspection or copying for a fee in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC). Approximately two-thirds of the respondents disagreed with the need for a rule, stating in essence, that (1) NRC has not established a sufficient need for the rule, (2) the rule should be part of the proposed rule on the "Access Authorization Program" published in the Federal Register on August 1, 1984 (49 FR 30726), and that (3) the utilities are aware of the fitness for duty issue and are taking appropriate remedial action. §j. commented that the development and implementation of "fitness for duty" procedures would cause a licensee legal and union-related liabilities, significant monetary costs, and would have a deleterious impact on employee morale. Comments about implementation issues involving the rule, such as definition of terms, use of diagnostic tools such as breath testers, or establishment of fitness for duty standards, were received from 58 of 73 respondents. Most of these expressed a need for definitions and standards and objected to the use of breath tests. Six specific recommendations for changes in the proposed rule were received from 56 of the 73 respondents. These involved (1) changing the word “ensure" to the term "provide reasonable assurance"; (2) extending the rule to all persons with unescorted access, thereby including NRC personnel as well as personnel of the Department of Energy, and othe Federal, State and local government agencies; (3) limiting the rule to "vital" areas, rather than having it apply to the more general “protected" areas of the plant; (4) eliminating the requirement for maintaining records of written procedures for the life of the plant; (5) providing an appropriate time for implementation; and (6) working the rule broadly and not making it prescriptive.
Initial Response and Additional Comments
On July 5, 1984 the Commission approved publication of the rule, as revised by the staff in response to public comments and per direction provided by the Commission. However, the Commission asked, that prior to publishing the final rule, the staff explore with INPO and NUMARC their willingness to undertake the development of detailed program elements and acceptance criteria for a fitness for duty program. NUMARC responded that they would be willing to develop guidance on fitness for duty as
Federal Register / vol. 51, No. 149 / Monday, August 4, 1980 / Proposed Rules
success of industry's programs and NRC's ability to monitor their effectiveness, the Commission will refrain from new rulemaking on fitness for duty of nuclear power plant personnel for a minimum of 18 months from the essective date of the Policy Statement. While the Commision is deferring rulemaking in this area in recognition of the industry's efforts to date, and the intent of the industry to utilize the "EEl Guide to Effective Drug and Alcohol/Fitness for Duty Policy Development" ", it will exercise this deference only as long as the industry's programs produce the desired results. NRC continues to have the responsibility for independently evaluating applicants' and licensees' efforts in the fitness for duty area to ensure that the desired results are achieved and for evaluating the possible need for further NRC action based on the success of the industry's programs during this 18-month period. Withdrawal of the proposed fitness for duty rule. therefore, does not preclude the Commission from initiating similar rulemaking actions in the future or from taking any other course of action deemed necessary with regard to fitness for duty.
The NRC will evaluate the effectiveness of utility fitness for duty programs by its normal review of industry activities, through reviews of INPO program status and evaluation reports, periodic NRC observation of the conduct of INPO evaluations, and direct inspections conducted by NRC's Performance Appraisal Team. Regional Offices, and Resident Inspectors. NRC will also monitor the progress of individual license fitness for duty programs.
The Commission hereby withdraws the notice of proposed rulemaking published on August 5, 1982 (47 FR 33.350)
Deted at Washington, DC, this 28th day of July 1986 For the Nuclear Regulatory Commision Samuel I. Chilk. Secretary of the Commission. IFR Duc. 86-17498 Filed 8–1–86: 8:45am! -----------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747Series Airplanes
Agency:Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). DOT.
Acnon: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM).
Suwmany: This notice proposes to amend an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that requires inspection of trailing edge slap tracks for cracking on certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes. This amendment would incorporate a decrease in the inspection intervals from 1,000 landings to 300 landings for the fourth fastener from the forward end of the slap track. This action is prompted by eight recent reports of cracking adjacent to the fourth fastener hole prior to the current 1.000 landing inspection interval. This recent service experience has shown that the present 1,000 landing inspection interval is inadequate. Cracking could lead to failure of the flap track, and separation of the flap which would result in partial loss of controllability of the airplane. DATE: Comments must be received on or before September 25, 1906. ADDRESSES: Send comments on the proposal in duplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration. Northwest Mountain Region. Office of the Regional Counsel (Attn: ANM-103). Attention: Airworthiness Rules Docket No. 86-NM156-AD, 17900 Pacific Highway South, C-68966, Seattle, Washington 98168. The service bulletin specified in this AD may be obtained from the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707. Seattle, Washington 98124. It may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. 17900 Pacific Highway South. Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South. Seattle, Washington. for-Furth-En-of-ario-co-orMr. Owen E. Schrader, Airframe Branch. ANM-120S. telephone (206)431-2923. Mailing address: FAA. Northwest Mountain Region. 17900 Pacific Highway South, C-68966, Seattle, Washington 98.15a
Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the proposed rule by submitting such
written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications should identify the regulatory docket number and be submitted in duplicate to the address specified above. All communications received on or before the closing date for comments specifică above will be considered by the Administrator before taking action on the proposed rule. The proposals in this notice may be changed in light of the comments received. All comments submitted wilbe available, both before and after the closing date for comments. in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report summarizing each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this proposal will be filed in the Rules Docket.
Availability of NPRM
Any person may obtain a copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) by submitting a request to the FAA. Northwest Mountain Region, Office of the Regional Counsel (Attn: ANM-103). Attention: Airworthiness Rules Docket No. 86-NM-156-AD. 17900 Pacific Highway South. C-68966, Seattle. Washington 98168,
Amendment 30–4917 (49 FR 36819. September 20, 1984), as amended by Amendment 39–5314 (51 FR1B308; May 19, 1986), AD 84-19-02, requires repetitive inspection of trailing edge flap tracks for cracking at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings. The track web cracks are attributed to fatigue, stress corrosion pitting, and possible work hardening at the fail-safe bar fastener holes. Extensive cracking could result in separation of the flap. This failure could lead to partial loss of controllability of the airplane.
Since the issuance of AD 84–19–02. eight operators have reported 8 additional track web hole cracks adjacent to the fourth fail-safe bar fastenerbole. The flap track is fabricated from high strength steel and testing has shown that the rate of crack growth is very fast once a crack is established. The recent finding of a number of cracks is an indication that the present 1,000 landing inspection interval is too long.
The FAA has reviewed and approved Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57A2229. Revision 2. dated June 6, 1985, which reduces the inspection interval from 1,000 landings to 300 landings and clarifies the specific inspection procedures to be used to check for cracks in the trailing edge slap tracks on certain Model 747 series airplanes.
Mr. GEJDENSON. We are going to continue with Mr. Kelly and then come back to question you after a short break, but let me ask you just one question. In this country, if I drive down the road in my car and I have been drinking or taking drugs, they take my license away. Presently, the way the NRC has this rule established, if I have operators running a nuclear powerplant who are on drugs or intoxicated, what happens? Is there any prescribed action by the NRC2 Mr. BUSH. Under the Fitness for Duty Policy Statement, the Commission would expect that the utility report that. Now, there is another part of the rules in part 55 that deal with operator licensing, and one of the conditions there is that they be free of the effects of alcohol and drugs. So, although there is no specific reporting requirement there, there is an expectation in the rule that they would not be under the influence. Mr. GEJDENSON. But had the original requirements established by the staff been put into place, there would be very explicit rules about individuals in operating facilities under the influence; is that correct? Mr. BUSH. Are you talking about the original rule? Mr. GEJDENSON. The original rule, as it was originally promulgated. Mr. BUSH. The original rule also had some problems because it was a very broad requirement. It was not prescriptive. So until we had prepared prescriptive guidance, then, it is somewhat questionable as to what would have been required of the licensee. Mr. GEJDENSON. We will return, go to Mr. Kelly, and then come back for questions. The committee will be in recess for about 7 minutes, which is . how long it takes me and my young friend to walk back and orth.
Mr. GEJDENSON. Let me call the hearing back to order and apologize for the longest 7 minutes in the history of the world. They started rolling the votes, one upon the other, for us. Mr. Kelly, if you can proceed, we would appreciate it. Mr. KELLY. My name is James Kelly. During the last 7 years, I have been a Senior Security Inspector for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in region IV, Dallas, Texas. I am responsible for coordinating the Security Inspection Program for the NRC licensed nuclear activities within the 13-State region of the United States. The purpose of the Security Inspection Program is to protect against security-related incidents that could result in a radiological release, thereby threatening public safety. This involves threats from both insiders and external saboteurs. As the senior security inspector, my duties include traveling to and overseeing security at all the nuclear power reactors within NRC's region IV. I have been in the security and law enforcement profession for 30 years. I have a Masters Degree in Criminology and have taught criminology at the university level. I have held several managerial positions. As assistant director for the International Association of Chiefs of Police, I developed government, corporate, and executive protection programs against terrorist attacks and established a counter-terrorist and information service for law enforcement and security officials. I co-founded the National Bomb Data Center which is currently run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I am also a licensed polygraph examiner, the first to achieve such status as an NRC inspector. I was previously assistant chief of police for Charlotte, North Carolina, and have extensive experience as a police officer and an investigator for the State of Florida. I have authored several books and articles on law enforcement and security officer training and supervision. Although I did not volunteer to appear before the subcommittee, I did not object to answering the questions of your staff, nor do I now shrink from the responsibility of describing what I consider to be significant problems affecting the safety of nuclear powerplants in this country. This relates to the matter of drug and alcohol abuse on the part of a small but significant percentage of employees who have access to power reactors. The NRC has left to the nuclear industry the responsibility for insuring that personal problems of drug and alcohol abuse do not impact personnel who operate and maintain nuclear powerplants or who otherwise have access to vital areas of these plants. A few utilities have vigorously and courageously addressed the problem, but for the most part the utilities are not up to the task. My observations are that the industry usually does not seek to identify these kinds of problems, often fails to investigate those problems brought to its attention, often fails to report such problems to the NRC, and does not always cooperate with the NRC when the NRC occasionally decides to investigate. The NRC, for its part, has rarely investigated allegations of drug and alcohol problems. My experience reflects, for the most part, the utilities have demonstrated their unwillingness or inability to pursue the allegations. In my job, I have encountered many examples of drug and alcohol abuse at nuclear powerplants. One case in particular provides a comprehensive example of what can go wrong when the industry is left to its own devices. I performed a review of allegations of drug and alcohol-related problems at the Cooper Nuclear Station in Nebraska. For a 2-month period, I surfaced allegations of numerous security violations, to include a number of incidents indicating drug or alcohol use at the utility site. These included evidence of the smoking of marijuana by two security officials in the ownercontrolled area; a security guard unconscious, drunk or drugged in the security ready room; a licensed operator reporting to work drunk; the smoking of marijuana inside the protected area of the plant, to include the diesel generator room which contains vital equipment. These allegations may well represent the tip of the iceberg. They were discovered by random inspection over a short timeframe. None of these incidents were reported by the utility. There was limited, if any, action taken by the utility to investigate or correct these identified problems.