significantly higher statistics." [41] There are no periodic reports detailing how many people underwent drug tests, or how many were positive, negative, or inconclusive. There are no utility reports of how many employees were terminated for drug use, or completed rehabilition programs and returned to duty. There is no way for the NRC to regularly find out how authorities learned of drug abuse (e.g., routine tests, investigations, other employees), or how they dealt with it. Moreover, the staff of the NRC is "not optimistic" that such a reporting program will be instituted. [42] Drinking On The Job Alcohol abuse, likewise, occurs frequently, but is scarcely reported. A small number of cases involving drinking on the job are included in the NRC's Safeguards Summary Event List, but the problem is generally ignored. [43] The NRC admits that alcohol poses a problem, but has shown little concern. For example, in 1982, the NRC warned nuclear utilities of increasing abuse of alcohol, as well as drugs. [44] According to Roger Fortuna, Deputy Director of NRC's Office of Investigations, [45] nuclear power workers partake in "graft, corruption. . . and booze." However, in the NRC Public Document Room computer database, a search under the keyword "alcoholism" turned up just one entry. The keyword "alcohol" produced about 200 entries. Only a handful of these, however, have to do with alcohol abuse. entries deal with non-consumable alcohol used for such things as cleaning and burning. [46] The nuclear industry recognizes, at least, that alcohol abuse is a problem. For example, the title of the Edison Electric Institute's (EEI) voluntary guidebook for drug control programs, "EEI Guide to Effective Drug & Alcohol/Fitness for Duty Policy Development," suggests that the industry has some awareness of the problem. [47] Unfortunately, nuclear plant employees continue to work while under the influence of alcohol. At the Rancho Seco nuclear power plant near Sacramento, California, the plant's operator, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), was prompted to institute a ban on beer consumption during breaks starting last July. The decision, however, prompted a law suit by the union representing SMUD employees. The union is charging that if workers are expected to follow company policies during lunchbreaks, then that time should be considered work time and employees are entitled to overtime pay. (48) Long History of Good Intentions After the 1979 Three Mile Island Accident, the NRC produced a multi-volume list of the problems needing resolution. Each of the various problems was assigned a code indicating the priority the NRC gave its resolution. "Requirements for operator fitness" (i.e. regulations to assure that operators are psychologically fit for duty and do not have histories of drug and alcohol abuse or of criminal backgrounds) was given the lowest possible categorization. [49] The first time the NRC addressed the issue was two years later. In 1982, citing an increase of drug abuse incidents, and the wide-spread use of drugs at nuclear power plants, the NRC proposed a rule to try to ensure that workers were coming to work physically and mentally fit to do their jobs. The "Fitness for Duty" rule would apply to "personnel with unescorted access to protected areas" who might "have the opportunity to affect adversely the health and safety of the public." [50] The proposed rule stated that "persons would be considered unfit for duty if their faculties were affected in a way contrary to safety by substances such as alcohol or drugs," or by factors "such as fatigue, stress, illness, and temporary physical impairments." [51] The proposed rule would have required that nuclear power plant management "establish, document, and implement procedures to assure that personnel are not "unfit for duty." On the whole, however, the rule was weak. It did not, for instance, establish criteria whereby utilities could assess an employee's "fitness for duty" nor did it specify methods for implementation. These matters, according to the rule, would be "left to the licensee" (i.e. the utility). [52] The nuclear industry, however, sensing that the NRC was finally going to do something about the drug problem, promptly sent in a flurry of comments criticizing the rule. The industry claimed that the proposed rule was not necessary because utilities were already "taking appropriate remedial action." [53] Given the premise upon which the rule was proposed -- that the NRC considered the increase in drug abuse cases "alarming" [54] the industry's claim that it was "taking appropriate remedial action" is questionable. Industry Has A Deal In 1984, having taken little action for two years, the NRC began to move again on the pending Fitness for Duty Rule it originally proposed in 1982. During this period, top executives of all U.S. nuclear utilities formed the Nuclear Utility Management & Human Resources Committee (Numarc). Numarc's purported purpose was to encourage "excellence" in nuclear power operations. Together with the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), a self-styled nuclear industry safety organization, Numare opposed NRC proposals for regulations designed to ensure fitness for duty in the nuclear industry. On July 5, 1984, the NRC offered INPO and Numarc a last chance to review the rule before the Commission finalized it. [55] The industry examined the rule again and proposed an alternative. The nuclear industry indicated it would set up fitness for duty programs if the NRC would refrain from promulgating a rule, [56] although three of the five NRC Commissioners were hesitant about delay. [57] According to the industry, "any rulemaking or other form of mandatory requirements would undermine the voluntary efforts of the industry toward self improvement." [58] The NRC negotiated the substance of the Policy Statement with the industry and then left the issue untouched for another two years. [59] In July 1986, the NRC made public the arrangement by withdrawing its 1982 proposed rule and proposing a Fitness for Duty "Policy Statement" in its place. [60] The Policy Statement gave the industry the go-ahead to develop and enforce fitness for duty programs and signalled the NRC's withdrawal from further action. However, no formal written agreement exists between the NRC and INPO defining each other's respective areas of responsibility. [61] The Policy Statement Means No Policy The 1986 Fitness For Duty Policy Statement reflects the arrangement between the industry and the NRC but contains four major flaws: 1. It allows the NRC to abrogate its responsiblitiy in this important area of regulation. 4. The NRC will not be able to evaluate whether fitness for duty programs are working. The Fitness for Duty Policy Statement effectively turns over drug and alcohol abuse prevention to a private organization set up by the nuclear industry. The industry-funded group, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) is a private industry organization whose records are not accessible to the public via the Freedom of Information Act. With little public or government oversight, the NRC/INPO arrangement allows virtually unfettered self-regulation by the nuclear industry. According to the NRC, INPO will do inspections of utilities' fitness for duty programs. While INPO will "allow" NRC inspectors to "go along and observe INPO assessments," the NRC itself will not inspect or evaluate the programs. [62] The INPO evaluations, furthermore, are not adequate. For instance, INPO does not have, nor intends to have, criteria for its inspections. Rather, it relies on a "Performance Objective" less than one page long. [63] According to INPO Vice President Angelina Howard, its inspections are "performance-based, not prescriptive" and therefore don't require detailed criteria. [64] Rather than using an objective set of criteria as a basis for evaluation, INPO's inspections rely on a subjective analysis of the program's overall performance. Further, INPO simply plans to review, but not to accredit, utility fitness for duty programs. [65] Moreover, of over 100 licensed-to-operate plants, only three evaluations have been done as of February 1987. While the Turkey Point and Vogtle evaluations are complete, an evaluation of the San Onofre plant is still under internal review. Because they are done by INPO, the public and the NRC can not find out which plants are slated for inspection. [66]. The NRC write-ups of the inspections are simple and cursory. The evaluation of Turkey Point nuclear power plant mentions, for example, that Florida Power and Light (FP&L) does not collect data on employees who work for the utility's contractors. This may allow a situation in which "a person terminated for drug abuse by one contractor could be hired for work on-site by another contractor." The document does not, however, suggest ways for FP&L to remedy the problem nor does it mandate that the utility do so. [67] Moreover, as there is no formal agreement specifying what the NRC and INPO are responsible for in the fitness area, INPO has no contract to live up to. Thus, there is no assurance that implementation and inspection of fitness for duty programs will be done adequately. 2. The Policy Statement is Vague The Fitness for Duty Policy Statement leaves gaps in other areas as well. As proposed, it gives little guidance to utilities. For instance, the statement provides just three paragraphs defining what "fitness for duty" means, in very general terms. The most detailed direction the statement gives is that persons "shall not be under the influence of any substance, legal or illegal, which adversely affects their ability to perform their duties in any way related to safety." [68] The statement does not mention who is covered by the policy, how utilities should go about finding out who may be "under the influence" or how utilities shall determine whether drugs or alcohol are "adversely" affecting a person's performance. Moreover, the Policy Statement does not define "related to safety" nor does it provide a complete definition of "fitness for duty." Because the NRC and the industry may interpret these items differently, the Policy Statement provides no common ground from which the industry and regulators can work. Therefore, there is no assurance that the policy will be applied to all utilities uniformly in licensing, inspection, and enforcement. Some utilities echo these criticisms. They feel that the statement's vagueness "could result in ratcheting" upwards of requirements by the NRC. [69] The industry has also criticized the Fitness for Duty Policy Statement because it is unclear whether it covers NRC employees, such as resident inspectors who work at each nuclear power plant and who may have unfettered access to critical areas of the plant. [70] Rather than spelling out the detailed guidance usually associated with effective regulation, the NRC's fitness for duty Policy Statement references a guidebook drawn up by the utility industry, the "EEI Guide to Effective Drug and Alcohol/Fitness For Duty Policy Development." The "Guide" was prepared by the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) (the electric utility industry's lobby organization) after the nuclear industry arranged with the NRC to withdraw its original Fitness for Duty Rule. [71] The final NRC Policy Statement states that the Commission stands "in recognition [of industry] intent to utilize the EEI guidelines in developing fitness for duty programs." Thus, the Policy Statement endorses the EEI guidebook and implies that it should be used as a basis for utilities' fitness for duty programs. There are several problems with that approach. First, the EEI guidebook is nothing more than a collection of examples of various utilities' policies, rules, and regulations for their employees. For instance, the guidebook suggests that utilities develop a written policy and that it be distributed widely among employees and contractors. The book also suggests the use of chemical testing of body fluids (i.e. breathalizer tests and urinalysis), and recommends that utilities set up a liaison with local law enforcement agencies. The guidebook makes useful reading for a utility executive designing a fitness for duty program, but it does not provide explicit guidance on what the NRC or the industry expects such a program to accomplish nor what specific measures such a program must employ. The guidebook does not mention what a minimum fitness for duty program must consist of, nor which of the elements it suggests are considered essential. [72] |