THE ASSISTANT PLANT MANAGER STATED THAT HE TRIED TO CONTACT THE

NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR BY PHONE LATE IN THE DAY ON JULY 5TH, BUT

WAS UNABLE TO REACH HIM.

ON THE MORNING OF JULY 6, THE ASSISTANT PLANT MANAGER ANNOUNCED

AT A STAFF MEETING, "HEY, WE WENT CRITICAL AND WE REALLY LOOK BAD

ON! THIS ONE. THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT VIOLATION OF PROCEDURE NOT

FOLLOWING THE PULL SHEET, AND WE GOT TO PAY ATTENTION."

THE ASSISTANT PLANT MANAGER INITIALLY STATED, DURING THE 01

INTERVIEW, THAT HE THOUGHT THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS PRESENT

AT THAT STAFF MEETING, BUT HE LATER CHANGED HIS MIND ABOUT THE

NRC INSPECTOR'S PRESENCE.

FROM JULY 8-12, BOTH THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND HIS ASSISTANT

WERE PRESENT AT THE FERMI 2 FACILITY AND PARTICIPANTS IN A

VARIETY OF DECO STAFF MEETINGS. DURING THAT TIME, NO ATTEMPT WAS

EVER MADE BY ANY DECO OFFICIALS TO NOTIFY THEM OF THE UTILITY'S

FINDINGS THAT THE PLANT DID, IN FACT, EXPERIENCE A PREMATURE

CRITICALITY ON JULY 2.

ON JULY 10, 1985, THE COMMISSION MET TO CONSIDER THE READINESS OF

THE PLANT FOR A FULL POWER LICENSE.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE

UTILITY DID NOT INFORM THE COMMISSION THAT THE PLANT HAD GONE

CRITICAL PREMATURELY, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT AT LEAST ONE OF

THE UTILITY'S SENIOR MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVES AT THAT MEETING

KNEW FULL WELL WHAT HAD HAPPENED ON JULY 2. BASED UPON THE

INFORMATION PRESENTED AT THAT MEETING, THE COMMISSION VOTED 5-0

TO ISSUE FERMI 2 A FULL POWER LICENSE.

ON JULY 15, 1985, THE DAY THE UTILITY PHYSICALLY RECEIVED THE

FULL POWER LICENSE, AND TEN DAYS AFTER THE UTILITY HAD DETERMINED

THAT THERE HAD BEEN A PREMATURE CRITICALITY, THE ASSISTANT PLANT

MANAGER TOLD THE NRC'S SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR OF THEIR FINDING

THAT A PREMATURE CRITICALITY HAD OCCURRED ON JULY 2.

IN A SUBSEQUENT INTERVIEW WE CONDUCTED WITH THE NRC'S ACTING

DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION, HE STATED

THAT HAD HE BEEN AWARE OF THE OPERATOR ERPOP WHICH RESULTED IN A

PREMATURE CRITICALITY, HE WOULD NOT HAVE SIGNED THE FULL POWER

LICENSE UNTIL A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF THE MATTER WAS

CONCLUDED. THE NRC'S REGION III ADMINISTRATOR AND HIS DEPUTY

ADMINISTRATOR BOTH INDICATED THAT KNOWLEDGE OF THE PREMATURE

CRITICALITY WOULD HAVE PROMPTED THEM TO RECOMMEND THAT THE

COMMISSION VOTE BE POSTPONED PENDING AN INVESTIGATION, AND THE

REGION III ADMINISTRATOR STATED THAT HE VIEWED A PREMATURE

CRITICALITY AS A SIGNIFICANT INDICATOR OF THE LICENSEE'S ABILITY

TO SAFELY OPERATE A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT.

Or: NOVEMBER 7, 1985, AFTER MY REVIEW OF THE INVESTIGATION WAS

COMPLETED, THE SIGNED CASE REPORT WAS FORWARDED TO THE OFFICE CF

INVESTIGATIONS, HEADQUARTERS, IN BETHESDA, MARYLAND,

IN CONCLUDING MY PREPARED TESTIMONY TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE

YOU WITH MY ANALYSIS OF THE INFORMATION I'VE JUST PRESENTED.

FIRST, I BELIEVE THAT BEGINNING ON JULY 3, 1985, UP UNTIL

JULY 15, 1985, WHEN THE NRC WAS FINALLY NOTIFIED, VARIOUS DETROIT

EDISON COMPANY OFFICIALS AFFILIATED WITH THE FERMI 2 NUCLEAR

POWER PLANT EITHER SELECTIVELY WITHHELD OR COMPLETELY WITHHELD

SIGNIFICANT PIECES OF INFORMATION FROM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR

AT THE SITE, WHICH PRECLUDED HIM FROM LEARNING THAT A PREMATURE

CRITICALITY HAD OCCURRED ON JULY 2.

SECOND, DESPITE HAVING A CLEAR OPPORTUNITY TO SET THE RECORD

STRAIGHT DURING THE FULL POWER LICENSE COMMISSION MEETING ON

JULY 10, 1985, CERTAIN DETROIT EDISON COMPANY OFFICIALS IN

ATTENDANCE AT THAT MEETING FAILED TO BRING UP THE PREMATURE

CRITICALITY EVENT, EVEN WHEN IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE NRC, IN

DESCRIBING WHAT IT PERCEIVED WAS DETROIT EDISON COMPANY'S

EXCELLENT CONTROL ROOM PERFORMANCE, WAS TOTALLY UNAWARE OF THE

JULY 2 EVENT.

THIRD, THE UTILITY'S COINCIDENTAL NOTIFICATION OF THE PREMATURE

CRITICALITY TO THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTGF ON THE DAY THAT THEY

HAD THEIR FULL POWER LICENSE SIGNED AND IN THEIR HANDS, WAS AT

BEST SUSPICIOUS AND AT WORST, DECEPTIVE.

AND FINALLY, IT IS MY OPINION, BASED UPC: THE FACTS OF THIS CASE

AS I KNOW THEM, THAT CERTAIN DETROIT EDISON COMPANY OFFICIALS

PURPOSELY WITHHELD FROM THE NRC INFORMATION ABOUT THE PREMATUPE

CRITICALITY BECAUSE THOSE CORPORATE OFFICERS FELT THAT IF THAT

INFORMATION! WERE KNOWN, IT WOULD HAVE PUT THE ISSUANCE OF THEIR

FULL POWER LICENSE IN JECPARDY. BY DOING THIS, THESE OFFICIALS

WERE GUILTY OF WILLFULLY COMMITTING A MATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT BY

BOTH OMISSION AND CO-MISSION. I BELIEVED THIS WHEN I SIGNED THE

REPORT IN 1985, AND NOTWITHSTANDING AN NPC STAFF ANALYSIS TO THE

CONTRARY, I STILL FIRMLY BELIEVE IT TODAY. THIS CONCLUDES MY

PREPARED TESTIMONY.