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him and, therefore, he did not try again (Colbert 7-8). Colbert said he didn't because it became "general knowledge" (id). When Colbert was questioned he said not general knowledge to persons at his level of management (id). The people he dealt with knew (id). When asked whether it was general knowledge up to the point that Jens knew about it, he said, "I suppose that is what I must have thought. I really didn't think that much about it at that point in time....it was not a matter of great urgency or importance in the scheme of things...at least not in my mind." (id) Colbert may have made the assumption that Jens knew but Colbert said he really did not recall (Colbert 9). Colbert clarified what he meant by general knowledge by saying he knew the reviews had occurred that afternoon and then Colbert said "I am not sure who generally knew it, but it was certainly more than myself" (Colbert 10).

Lenart did not inform Jens of the criticality determination though in hindsight it may have been appropriate to do so (Lenart 12). Jens states he was not aware of the criticality determination until Lessor spoke to him on July 13th, after the Commission meeting (Jens 6). Lessor does not think Jens was aware of criticality before July 13th. During a discussion on the rod pull incident that day with Lessor, Jens used the words "not critical." Lessor responded by saying "Well, wait a minute. You know, we did determine that we had gone critical" (Lessor 9-10). Lessor said Jens seemed surprised that a criticality determination had been made (id). Jens' reaction "shocked" Lessor (Lessor 23).

VI. COMMISSION MEETING

On July 10, 1985, a Commission Meeting was held to discuss the licensing of Fermi 2. Davis was completing the discussion of Slide 8 that mentioned "Personnel Errors." Commissioner Zech wanted to discuss this issue more because of a scram on July 9th. Davis said he would get to it (TR 37). He then discussed Slide 9, "Personnel Errors/LER Reports" from TR 37 to TR 41. Davis concluded by saying, "that is the only scram that has resulted from a control room operator." (TR 41) Commission Zech then discussed operators and corrective action (TR 41-41). Then Davis said he had been handed a note from the Region III staff that said, "This was the only operator error in the control room so far since they have loaded fuel, so---or went critical, so that's very good" (TR 42, 43). He added that the company focuses attention on problems (TR 43). Commissioner Zech then talked about management involvement (TR 43-44). The discussion then continued on other topics. When the licensee addressed the Commission they did not address the subject of operator errors.

It is unclear what the note that Mr. Davis read meant. Clearly there were operator errors (Jens 10) (Lenart 14, 21). Chrissotimos, the person who gave the note to Mr. Davis stated to OIA, "We only report significant errors at Commission briefings." He said to OIA, "The context of Davis' statement was in reference to reportable events." But

Chrissotimos also said if he knew about criticality there would have been a definite difference in Davis' presentation (OIA interview October 31, 1985). Byron did not object to the note passed to Davis because the discussion related to LER's and the rod pull error was not reportable. (OIA interview October 3, 1985.)

Lenart stated that the significant difference between the scram incident discussed at the meeting on July 10th and the rod error was that the scram was reportable (Lenart 19). In terms of on-site performance Lenart said there was no difference in handling the two incidents, the resident was informed in each case (id).

Lenart was asked did he perceive that Mr. Davis or the Commissioners were not informed of the criticality error? He responded by saying, "No Sir, No Sir." The resident was informed---the NRC was informed (Lenart 14).

Jens said "he did not know" in response to a question that if the Commission knew about criticality, whether it would have affected their licensing decision (Jens 11). Then he added, "in today's environment, yeah. Today it would have had an effect" (Jens 12). Jens was not aware of anyone suppressing information about the criticality matter (id).

Mr. GEJDENSON. I thank both of you for your statements here today. Again, I think I recognize the courage it takes to come forward in this process, but I think that your service to the American people in this country will hopefully get us in a direction where we can have confidence in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the way it operates; that clearly if we are to gain the respect of the public, that when operators of nuclear powerplants violate the procedures as they are given by the NRC, there needs to be a penalty in that process.

Management that ignores these kinds of dangers ought to be prohibited from participating in the management of utilities in the future. If NRC staff and NRC Commissioners don't understand their role in this process as the only real avenue for the citizens to have themselves protected in direct action, then we are going to see a lot more of these hearings until there is a recognition that in this process where we regulate nuclear power, the NRC has to represent the entire country, not just the industry's view of how this country ought to run.

Let me ask you a couple of quick questions and then I will let you go.

First, let me ask, Mr. Pawlik, what would you propose if this went through a full hearing and a determination was made that a high official of a utility participated in withholding critical information from the NRC, information that they are required to present to the NRC?

What does the present law hold as potential penalties, and what would you suggest?

Mr. PAWLIK. If in fact the information was material and was withheld, the license of the utility could be revoked or suspended, which means basically they would have to shut down and stay shut down until the NRC was satisfied that whatever measures the NRC felt were appropriate were taken in order to put it back on track again.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Could the NRC, for instance, say that the managers involved in a coverup-not making a final judgment of this case even-but if managers involved in a coverup-could they be precluded from working at any nuclear facilities or power companies in the country? Does the NRC have that power?

Mr. PAWLIK. I don't think they have that power. That is basically a black list.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Sinclair.

Mr. SINCLAIR. I am not certain the NRC has that power either. Mr. PAWLIK. They can take them out of the line there at that utility. But in terms of them leaving and going on to some other place, I don't know if they could do that or not.

Mr. GEJDENSON. It seems to me that there is tremendous pressure on managers of a utility by the stockholders and the accountants to make sure they start on time. One of the things we have to do is to find a way to find an equal pressure for some balance to make sure they follow the laws as they exist.

Mr. Sinclair, in the NRC's Proposed Rules on March 11, 1987 defining material statements, if something is not specifically required to be reported to the NRC, isn't it left to the licensee to determine whether or not it is significant and therefore must be reported?

Mr. SINCLAIR. That is my understanding of the new rule; yes. [EDITOR'S NOTE.-NRC proposed rule on completeness and accuracy of information follows:]

Federal Register / Vol. 52, No. 47 / Wednesday, March 11, 1987 / Proposed Rules