are down to approximately how many employees in a single nuclear powerplant? 200? Mr. ZECH. At the plant itself? No, it is usually more than that. I think even the smaller numbers would get down to 300 or 400, I think. Mr. SMITH. Well, I am just talking about roughly 300 or 400. Mr. ZECH. We have at least one inspector, at most plants two now, and some even three or four, but especially during the construction phase. During operation, I guess an average number is probably two. Mr. SMITH. Two, and they monitor basically the training of the operators and the handling of the waste or the handling of the fuel rods, that type thing? Mr. ZECH. All the safety measures that go on in that plant, Mr. Smith, are monitored by our people. Mr. SMITH. Basically, though, you are looking at a procedural basis there more than trying to find that operator No. 42 hadn't shown up exactly on time. I mean you are trying to be sure that from a standard procedure, this process was handled properly; right? Mr. ZECH. That is correct. Our resident inspectors, though, live near the sites. They are at the site every day. They have a chance to observe not only management, but the operators. Mr. SMITH. Let's say that in a nuclear powerplant situation you have an inspector who finds that he does not like the way the operator is handling the material. How does he process his unhappiness so that you are aware at the Commission level that there is unhappiness by an inspector down there? And how do you give him care, comfort, and security so that his complaint can achieve the kind of results it should have? Mr. ZECH. He has a number of things he can do. First of all, of course, talk to the operator, if it is an operator that he is not satisfied with, talk to him himself. If that doesn't bring results, he can talk to the plant manager, the plant utility people. If he doesn't get any results that way, he can talk to his own superiors in the region office and ask for their support, too. I am fairly confident that the residents, if they see operations of any kind that they are not satisfied with, can indeed get the kind of support that they need and they can bring it all the way up to the Commission if necessary. Mr. SMITH. I guess that is part of how we get into this little brouhaha, trying to figure out what is going on. If you have got a region that is not being operated properly, i.e., you have got people that are not able to get through the regional supervisor looking at the plants in that area-and it is region IV or the area in Texas, I guess, is this one we are talking about-what do you do about that? You have put up a special chain of command down to this operator; right? Basically, if I understood what went on here. Mr. ZECH. Well, if I may answer just a little bit differently perhaps. We have taken the Comanche Peak plant and given it to one of our senior individuals here at headquarters to oversee. It is not under the control of region IV at this time. We are treating Comanche Peak as we are treating the TVA situation, in a special category. And this individual, Mr. Jim Keppler, is assigned to those two issues because of their importance. So in the case of Comanche Peak, we have treated it a little differently. Mr. SMITH. I guess my question would be, if he was kind of thwarted from getting you in the first place, it seems to me that harkening back to your days in the Navy, that if you had somebody that was not allowing information to get through from a lower command, you would have probably transferred the guy in between. Do you have the authority to do that in the region business we are talking about here? Mr. ZECH. We do indeed. Mr. SMITH. Why didn't you remove the guy instead of setting up a special chain of command? Mr. ZECH. I think in this case, we felt that it was a much better course of action because of all the things that were going on at Comanche Peak, to treat this as a very special case. Ordinarily we could have done that, but we chose in this case to treat it specially. I think we can give it better attention. I think, frankly, that from the Commission level we can be better informed this way, and I personally think we have done the right thing by making this a special project. Mr. SMITH. Do you rotate your regional managers on a regular basis? Mr. ZECH. Not on a regular basis, but we have this past year rotated two of the five. We don't have a formula for doing that, but my personal view is it is important to rotate them. It is healthy for the organization to bring some people from headquarters to the region and vice versa, bring some people from the region to headquarters. We have done that this year, and I think it is again going to pay dividends. Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. GEJDENSON. One final question from Mr. Miller. Mr. MILLER. I think Commissioner Asselstine wished to respond to Congressman Smith's question. Mr. ASSELSTINE. That is right, Mr. Miller. If I could just add, I think it probably just slipped Chairman Zech's mind, when you asked about the question of fraudulent conduct by operators, indeed it was well established that operators at the TMI-2 plant deliberately falsified leak rate tests prior to the TMI-2 accident. We found that and the Department of Justice found that. That is a good example of fraudulent activity by operators. I don't think it is widespread, but there are instances. I would say another instance of potential deliberate violation of our requirements are these sleeping operators up at the Peach Bottom plant, because it appears that they were not sleeping when our inspectors were around or when the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations people were around. It was only when we were not around. And that at least raises questions in my mind about a deliberate pattern of activity to violate our requirements. That is still under investigation, but at least the signs are there initially. So those are a couple of good examples. Mr. Miller, if I could get back to your question on the documents, let me try a crack at it. Our inspectors, the people that raised the concerns at Comanche Peak, had two concerns on the documents. One is, whenever they went to the licensee to ask for documents, the licensees could not produce them. Often it would take months before they could find the documents, and our inspectors concluded therefore that the licensee did not have a system for being able to readily retrieve documents and being able to show that they had the documentation to support the construction work that was going on. I think the other concern had to do with how documents were being maintained and protected, including the question about shipping off site the only copy of the documents back to some contractor for their use, and then having to retrieve them, how they were protected so they would not be destroyed by fire or other problems either at the site or in transit. The group that did take a look at the document question had two points to make in their report back to us: One, they say the record under review does not establish that any plant quality assurance record was lost or damaged. So that is comforting, that at least the ones that went off site apparently found their way back. The other part of their argument that I find a bit more troubling is their argument that well, even if the documents were destroyed, that is only an economic problem for the utility because then they will have to undergo a lengthy and costly program to go back and reverify the quality of the work that has been done. I am less comfortable with that, quite frankly, and I don't really like that argument very well. It seems to me that if we have a need to protect these documents and make sure that they are properly cared for and are readily retrievable, we ought to be enforcing that requirement, and I think that is what the inspectors were trying to do in this case. And we ought to make it clear that that is exactly what we are going to see done. Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Go ahead, Chairman Zech. Mr. ZECH. Thank you, sir. I appreciate Commissioner Asselstine's reference to fraudulent practices, because he is correct that we have had people charged with fraudulent practices, and they have not been prosecuted. I thought I was answering the question as to whether during my visits to plants, I have observed any fraudulent practices. In that case, of course, my answer would be I have not. I want to make sure the record is clear on those points. We have had some, but I have not observed any during my visits. Mr. MILLER. Chairman Zech, let me just ask you, was there any action taken prior to the Senate testimony whereby the Commission had under consideration, a review of the Comanche Peak situation? Mr. ZECH. I don't believe so, Mr. Miller. I think we were satisfied before that time that the investigation had been completely properly. Well, I am being challenged by my staff. If I may, I want to respond correctly. Mr. MILLER. We are all challenged by our staff. Mr. ASSELSTINE. Mr. Miller, I think it is fair to say that the Commission was considering what to do about the report. We had received it. Mr. Stello had initiated some efforts within the staff to take a look at what the report meant, what the safety issues were, and what needed to be done about those. And the Commission was in the process of trying to decide what to do with the issues, including whether to do something about these broader management issues, whether to take disciplinary action against some of these specific individuals that were involved, and I don't think that we have reached a conclusion on anything. Mr. ZECH. No, we have not. That is correct. We had sent out Mr. Arlotto to review the Comanche Peak investigation and give us a recommendation. So we had done that. But we will be mindful of the investigations that are going on now and will make a final determination after we have received the results of those investigations. Mr. MILLER. Thank you. Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Miller. Mr. Roberts, it has been well documented that in 1983, important NRC documents relating to quality assurance problems at the Waterford plant in Louisiana, were leaked from Commissioner Roberts' office, from your office, to the plant owner, Middle South Services, Inc., and I believe has been made available to the Commission-if not, I am sure you have seen it-the memorandum of June 15, 1983, marked confidential, to John J. Cordaro from George E. White, regarding NRC consideration of the Waterford QA. Attached is a memorandum which I have received from sources inside the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the Waterford Quality Assurance matters. This memo is for your information, but I would hope that you would limit its distribution to protect the source within the NRC. [EDITOR'S NOTE.-Memorandum of June 15, 1983, to John Cordaro from George White follows:] M MIDDLE SOUTH SERVICES, INC/BOX 61000/NEW ORLEANS. LA 70161/(504) 529-5262 Attached is a memorandum which I have received from sources inside |