papers left by him, and discovered after his death, Ryall v. Ryall, Ambl. 413. Lane v. Dighton, Ib. 409; and it seems that parol evidence is admissible, though after the death of the supposed nommal purchaser. See Lench v. Lench, 10 Ves. 511. But where a purchase, either of a fee-simple or a reversion (Finch v. Finch, 14 Ves. 50.), is made by a father in the name of a child, legitimate or illegitimate (Loft. 490. Fearn. Post. 327. 2 Fonbl. Eq. 124, 125.) (if in the name of a grandchild, the father being alive, Ebrand v. Dancer, 2 Ch. Ca. 26. it might be different, see Lloyd v. Read, 1 P. Wms. 60.1, this distinguishes it from the case of a stranger, in which there is not that natural affection, that would repel the presumption arising from the advance of the money; and it will, unless some precedent declaration can be proved (Lord Gray's case, 2 Freem 6.), be considered as an advancement of the child, and not as a trust for the father, though the father takes the profits during the minority of the child. Mumma v. Mumma, 2 Vern. 19. Lampugh v. Lamplugh, 1 P. Wms. 113. Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Atk. 386. Stileman v. Ashdown, 2 Atk. 480. Finch. 340. Reddington v. Reddington, 3 Ridgw. P. C. 106. But it might be different, if he received the rents and profits after the child was of age (Lloyd v. Read, 1 P. Wms. 608.) especially if the child was of age when the estate was purchased, 2 Mad. Ch. 99; and the presumption in favour of an advancement, is liable to be rebutted by subsequent acts. Lord Gray's case, supra. Pole and Pole, 1 Ves. 76. A purchase by the father in the names of his son, and a trustee (Lamplugh v. Lumplugh, P. Wms. 111.), or, as it seems, in the name of himself” and his son (though this has been doubted, 2 Atk. 180.), will still be considered as an a Ivancement. Scrope and Scrope, I Ch. Ca. 27. Back and Andrews, 2 Vern. 120. Dyer v. Dyer, 1 P. Wms. 112. 1 Watk. Copyh. 216. Finch v. Finch, 14 Ves. 50. But in these instances, the father will have the benefit of survivorship in case the son die during his minority; though the son is not entitled to the benefit of survivorship as against the judgment creditor of his father. Stileman v. Ashdown, supra. S. C. Ambl. 13. It seems in all these cases, that if the son is provided for at the time of the purchase in his name, he will be but a trustee, and stands in the same predicament as a stranger, Elliott and Elliott, 2 Ch. Ca. 232. Pole and Pole, supra. Lloyd v. Reed, 1 P. Wms. 607; but it has been determined, that a reversion settled on the son, expectant on the mother's death, is not such a provision as will prevent the son taxing, Lamplugh ▼. Lamplugh, supra. So it seems, if a husband purchases lands in the name of his wife, it will be presumed, in the first instance, to be an advancement and provision for the wife, Rider and Kidder, 0 Ves. 367. Back v. Andrews, 2 Vern. 67. 128, Batch v. Andrews, Ch. Ca. 53. Sed vid. Smith v. Baker, Atk. 385; for the wife cannot be a trustee for

her husband. Kingdon v. Bridges, 2 Vern. 67. It may be further observed, that where a purchase is made by a trustee with trust money, a trust will result to the owner of the money. Ryal v. Ryal, Ambl. 413. So where a trustee or guardian renews a lease in his own name, the renewed lease shall in equity be subject to the former trust, Keech v. Sandford, Sel. Ca. Ch. 61. Holt v. Holt, 1 Ch. Ca. 191. Pierson v. Shore, 1 Atk. 480. Abney v. Miller, 2 Atk. 597. Edwards v. Lewis, 3 Atk. 538. Et vid. Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves. 395. Brewell v. Millett, 7 Bro. P. C. 367. Tomlins edit. Annesley v. Dixon, Ib. 213. Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves, 298; even when it is clear that the lessor would not have renewed for the benefit of the cestui que trust. Fitzgibbon v. Scanian, 1 Dow. 161. And if a lease be settled upon A. for life, with remainders over, and A. obtains a renewal of the lease, the renewed lease shall be bound by the trusts of the will or settlement. Taster v Marriott, Ambl. 668. Raw v. Chichester, lb. 715. Owen v. Williams, lb 734. Pickering v. Vowles, I Bro. C. C, 197. Coppin v. Fernyhough, 2 Bro. C. C 291. Killick v. Flexney, 4 Bro. C. C. 161. James v. Dean, 11 Ves. 383. 15 Ves. 236. But there can be no implied trust between a lessor and lessee; because every lessee is a purchaser by

his contract and his covenants, which excludes all possibility of implying a trust for the lessor. Pilkington v. Bayley, 7 Bro. P. C. 383. It is also observable, that where a person conveys an estate to a trustee, upon such trusts as he shall appoint, and no appointment is made, there will be a resulting trust for the grantor. Fitzg. 223. And where an estate is conveved to a trustee, and a trust is declared as to part only (Lloyd v. Spillett, 2 Atk. 150.), or where the whole of an estate is conveyed for particular purposes, or on particular trusts only, which, by accident or otherwise, cannot take effect, a trust, will result to the original owner, or to his heirs. Prec. Ch. 162. 541. 1 Cru. Dig. 475. We have seen, that in the absence of express or demonstrable intention to the contrary (Kirkmon v. Milles, 13 Ves. 338.), it is a rule of equity, that money directed to be laid out in land, and land directed to be sold and converted into money, are to be considered as that species of property into which they are directed to be converted. Ante, vol 1. p. 559. n. (9). Et vid. Doughty v. Bull, 2 P. Wms. 323. Attorney-General v. Johnston, Amb. 580. Robinson and Taylor, 2 Bro. C. C. 589. Williams and Coade, 10 Ves. 500. Berry and Usher, 11 Ves, 87. Gibbs and Ouzier, 12 Ves. 415. But where a person dealing upon his own property only, has directed a conversion for a particular special purpose, or out and out, but the produce to be applied for a particular purpose; when the purpose fails, the intention fails; and a court of equity regards him as not having directed the conversion. Ripley v. Waterworth, 7 Ves. 435. Et vid. Townley v. Bedwell, 6 Ves. 194. In cases of wills, therefore, as in deeds, it is important to consider, whether the testator meant to give to the produce of the real estate the quality of personalty, to all intents, or only so far as respected the particular purposes of the will; for unless the testator has sufficiently declared his intention, not only that the realty shall be converted into personalty for the purposes of the will, but further, that the produce of the real estate shall be taken as personalty, whether such purposes take effect or not, so much of the real estate, or the produce thereof, as is not effectually disposed of by the will at the time of the testator's death (whether from the silence (Collins v. Wakeman, 2 Ves. 687.) or the inefficacy of the will itself, or from subsequent lapse), will result to the heir. See Cruse v. Barley, 3 P. Wms. 22. n. 1. and the cases there cited. Et vid. Randall v. Bookey, 2 Vern. 425. Stonehenge v. Evelyn, P. Wms. 253. Ackroyd and Smithson, 1 Bro. C. C. 502. "Robinson and Taylor, 2 Bro. C. C. 589. S. C. 1 Ves. Jun. 44. Kennel v. Abbot, 4 Ves. 810. Stansfield v. Habergham, 10 Ves. 278. Williams and Coade, 10 Ves. 500. Berry v. Usher, 11 Ves. 87. Gibbs and Ougier, 12 Ves. 415. Hooper v. Goodwin, 18 Ves. 156. Hill v. Cock, 18 Ves. 174. Chambers v. Brailsford, 18 Ves. 369. Gibbs v. Rumsey, 2 Ves. & B. 294. If the intention to convert it into personal property, for all the purposes of the will, though some of those purposes should fail, and, though in consequence of that failure part results to the heir, it would result to him as personal estate, and be so considered in a question between his representatives. 16 Ves. 191. Et vid. Hewitt and Wright, I Bro. C. C. 86. Kidney v. Coussmaker, 2 Ves. jun. 268. 2 Mad. Ch. 110, 111. If a sum of money be devised in trust to be laid out in land, and the uses to which the land should go are not declared, the benefit of that money, it seems, will go to the heir at law, as a resulting trust. Hayford v. Benlows, Ambl. 582. Se on the other hand, if a real estate be devised to be sold, and no particular directions are given, how the purchase money should be applied, in whole or in part, the money undisposed of, will, it seems, go to the executor, to be applied in a course of distribution, or to a residuary legatee of the personal estate, if any such there be. Ibid. 583. So where a testator creates an executory trust, or devise, to take effect within the limit allowed by law, and makes no disposition of the intermediate beneficial interest, the trust or equitable estate will de scend to the heir,until the contingency happens, up on which the equitable executory devise is to arise. Sand. 263. Fearn. Ex. Dev. 537. Hopkins v. lopkins, 1 Atk. 584. S. C. Fort. 44. and in MS. Attorney

General v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. 725. Stanley v. Stanley, 16 Ves. 491. Thus, on a devise of an estate to a person, when he attains twenty-one, there results a trust for the heir until that period; and by the previous death of the devisee the remainder will be accelerated. Chambers v.

Brailsford, 18 Ves. 363. But upon a devise to a good charitable use, the heir has no right to the rents and profits accrued before the use is carried into effect. Attorney-General v. Bowyer, supra. In case there be a devise of real estate for payment of debts, and nothing more is meant than to make a provision for the debts, all beyond what is required for that purpose, will remain real estate, and as such go to the heir. Wright and Wright, 16 Ves. 191. Hill v. Cock, 18 Ves. 174. King v. Denison, 1 Ves. & B. 272. Southouse v. Bate, 2 Ves & B. 396; the general principle being, that the heir takes all that, which is not for a defined and specific purpose given by the will, Chitty v. Parker, 2 Ves. jun. 271. But although, where the whole legal interest is given for the purpose of satisfying trusts expressed, and those trusts do not in their execution exhaust the whole, so much of the beneficial interests as is not exhausted, belongs to the heir; yet where the whole legal interest is given for a partieular purpose, with an intention to give to the devisee of the legal estate the beneficial interest, as, for instance, if one gives to A. and his heirs all his real estate, charged with his debts; in this case, if the whole is not exhausted by that particular purpose, the surplus goes to the de. visee, it being intended to be given to him. King v. Denison, 1 Ves. & B. 272, 273. It may be further observed, that, though voluntary eonveyances may be good and effectual, yet circumstances of fraud, mistake, or the like, may convert a grantee under a voluntary conveyance, into a trustee. Duke of Norfolk v. Browne, Prec. Ch. 80. 1 Eq. Abr. 381. 1 Freem. 305-308. 2 Atk. 150 And wherever any fraud is committed in obtaining a conveyance, the grantee in such conveyance will be considered in equity as a trustee for the real owner. Fearn. Cout. Rem. 479. And it is a rule in equity, that all persons coming into possession of property bound by a trust, with notice of the trust, shall be considered as trustees, Daniel v. Davison, 16 Ves. 249. Adair v. Shaw, 1 Sch. & Lef. 262; though they take by fine. Kennedy v. Daly, 1 Seh. & Lef. 379. And if a purchaser has notice of the trust before the execution of the conveyance, he is bound, though he had no notice when he paid his money. Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 384. But where a man by deed or will charges, or orders an estate to be sold for payment of debts generally, and then makes specific dispositions, the purchaser is not bound to see to the application. Jenkins v. Hile., 6 Ves. 654. n. Where a person purchases an estate, which he sees himself has a defect upon the face of the deeds, yet a fine will be a bar, and notice will not affect him so as to make him a trustee for the person who has the right; for the defect upon the face of the deed is often the occasion of fines being levied. Story v.. Lord Windsor, 2 Atk. 631. A fine and non-claim to or by a person, having notice of the trust, will not bar the cestui que trust. A mortgagee, therefore, cannot by fine and non-claim bar the equity of redemption. Kennedy v. Daly, 1 Seh. & Lef. 380. Story v. Windsor, supra. But it is not clear, how far a purchaser may be affected by a constructive or doubtful trust. See 1 Sand. 356. Warwick v. Warwick, 3 Atk. 293. Senhouse v. Earl, Ambl. 285. Cordwell v. Mackaril, Ambl. 515. Hardy v. Reeves, Ves. 426. Parker v. Brooke, 9 Ves. 583. Where a vendor conveys his estate to the vendee, without receiving all or part of the consideration money, he has, as against the vendee and his heir, (Hughes v. Kearney, 1 Sch. & Lef. 135), and all persons claiming as volunteers, or purchasers for a valuable consideration, with notice, a lien upon the estate for the whole, or such part of the purchase money, as was not paid, Chapman v. Tanner, 1 Vern. 267, Walker v. Prestwick, 2 Ves. 622; and this, though the consideration is upon the face of the instrument expressed to be paid, and a receipt indorsed. Coppin v. Coppin, 2 P. Wins. 294. Fawell v. Heelis, Ambl. 726. S. C. 1 Dick. 485. Cator v. Earl of Pembroke, 1 Bro. C. C. 302. Mackreth v. Symons, 15 Ves. 337-349.

Nor does the bankruptcy of the vendee affect the lien of the vendor. Chapman v. Tanner, supra. Sed vid. Ambl. 726. So, on the other hand, if the purchaser of an estate, prematurely pays the purchase money, before the estate is conveyed to him, the money will be considered as a lien on the estate in the hands of the vendor for the vendee, or in case of his death, for his personal representatives. 15 Ves. 345. 1 Sch. & Lef. 135. The rule, however, is confined merely to the vendor and vendee, and will not extend to a third person. Pollerfen v. Moore, 3 Atk. 272. And in all these cases, if by the contract or other circumstances (as where a special security is given for the purchase money, a pledge of stock for instance, Nain v. Prowse, 6 Ves. 752, or a mortgage of another estate of the vendee, Ib. 760, or where the vendor takes a bond for the consideration money, Fawell v. Heelis, Ambl. 724. S. C. 1 Dick. 485), it is evident that a lien by implication was not intended to be reserved, a lien cannot be claimed. 3 Atk. 347. Et vid. Austen v. Halsey, 6 Ves. 483. 2 Mad. Ch. 106.

With respect to the rules by which trust estates are governed, a trust estate is considered as equivalent to the legal ownership, and is regulated in the same manner as the legal estate. 1 Ves. 357. And the cestui que trust has, in most respects, the same power over the trust estate, as owners of legal estates are possessed of; and by the stat. 7 W. 3. c 25. s. 7. he is allowed to vote at elections for knights of the shire. A trust estate may be aliened by the cestui que trust; and any legal conveyance or assurance by him has the same effect and operation upon the trust, as it would have had, at law, upon the legal estate. North v. Champernon, 2 Ch. Cas. 63-78. Botteler v. Allingham, 1 Bro. C. C. 72. But when the owner of an equitable interest cannot, if such equitable interest were converted into a legal estate, convey it without the aid of a fine or recovery, he must use the same kind of assurance by matter of record in the transfer of his beneficial interest, as if it had been a legal estate; and therefore the equitable rights of tenant in tail, and married women, must be conveyed by fine or recovery. 1 Sand. 273. A common recovery suffered by a cestui que trust in tail, in possession, bars all equitable remainders depending upon such estate tail although there was no legal tenant to the præcipe. North v. Way, 1 Vern. 13. Barnaby v. Griffith, 3 Ves. 276, 277. Wykham v. Wykham, 18 Ves. 418. But it is a general rule, that where the tenant against whom the writ in a common recovery is brought, has only an equitable estate of freehold, the recovery suffered upon that equitable freehold, cannot bar a legal estate tail vested in the vouchee, or any legal remainder, Shapland v. Smith, 1 Bro. C. C. 74. Robinson v. Cumming, 1 Atk. 473. Phillips v. Brydges, 3 Ves. 120. 1 Prest. Conv. 22: but an equitable recovery is good, although the equitable tenant to the præcipe has the legal estate, Sugd. Vend. 287. 1 Prest. Conv. 23; and it is no objection that the equitable remainder is in the trustee of the legal estate. Ibid. Brydges v. Brydges,. supra. Wykham v. Wykham, supra Trust estates also are devisable by the cestui que trust, Greenhill v. Greenhill, 2 Vern. 680; and where they are not devised, they descend in the same manner as legal estates do, whether customary (as borough English or gavelkind), or otherwise, Banks v. Sutton, 2 P. Wms. 713. Fawcet v. Lowther, 2 Ves. 304. vid. 2 P. Wms. 736: and there may also be a possessio fratris of a trust (2 P. Wms. 713-736), as by the common law, there was of an use. Corbet's case, 1 Co. 88. Trust estates also are intailable; and such intail, we have seen, can only be barred by a fine or recovery, which will have the same effect upon a trust estate as upon a legal one. Kirkman v. Smith, Ambl. 518. 2 P. Wms. 133. Supra. So a trust estate may be limited to a person for life; and, in such case, a fine, or other assurance by the cestui que trust for life, will not operate as a forfeiture of his es-tate, Lethiculier v. Tracy, 3 Atk 728. Whetstone v. Bury, 2 P. Wms. 146; nor will such fine, or conveyances by him, destroy any contingent remainders expectant upon his life estate. 1 Ves. 27. So trust estates are subject to curtesy, Watts v. Ball, 1 P. Wms. 108. Chaplin v. Chaplin

Et

3 P. Wms. 234. Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. 603; unless where the husband is excluded by an express trust for the separate se of his wife. Hearle v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 695. 716. 1 Ves. 298. But although a trust estate of inheritance is subject to curtesy, it is not liable to dower. Colt v. Colt, 1 Ch. Bep. 254. Bottomley v Fairfax, Prec. Ch. 336 Goodwin v. Winsmore, 2 Atk. 525. Dixon v. Saville, 1 Bro, C. C. 326. At the common law, a trust estate in fee-simple, or in tail, was not forfeited to the crown by the attainder of cestui que trust for treason, Jenk. 190. Hardr. 495; but the stat. 33 H. c. 20. s. 2. (which extends to all manner of treasons, 2 Co. 14 a), includes trust estates, (Harth. 495), and also extends to an equity of redemption. Attorney-General v. Crofts, 4 Bro. P. C. 136. It is said, that a cestui que trust of a terin for years forfeits it for felony, and upon an outlawry in a personal action Eart of Somersett's case, Hob. 214. Jenk. 190. Hard. 490. But trust estate of inheritance will not escheat to the lord upon the attainder of cestui que trust for felony, or for want of heirs, because upon the attainder or death the trust is absolutely determined. Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Black. Rep. 128. Sandy's case, Hardr. 408. Trust estates also are subject to an extent, Hard. 495; and by the statute of frauds, 29 Car. 2 c. 3. s 10, they are made liable to executions upon judgments, statutes, and recognizances: but the statute does not authorize either the trust, (Scott v. Scholey, 8 East. 467), or the equity of redemption of a term for years, to be taken in execution. King v. Marissal, 3 Atk. 192. Burden v. Kennedy, 3 Atk. 739. Lyster v. Dolland, 1 Ves. jun. 431. From the case of Hunt 7. Coles, Com. Rep. 226, it appears, that under this statute a judgment is not a lien upon the trust estates; and, therefore, that a purchaser for a valuable consideration and without notice, obtaining a conveyance of the legal estate from the trustee, and of the equitable interest from the cestui que trust, will not be bound by a judgment previously entered up against the cestui que trust. I Sand. 220. So trust estates are, by the statute of frauds, made legal assets to satisfy bond debts. See King v. Ballet, 2 Vern. 248, Robinson v. Tong, 3 Vin. 145, pl. 28. But an equity of redemption not being considered a trust within the statute, has therefore been determined to be equitable, and not legal assets. Plunket v. Penson, 2 Atk. 290. The trust of a term for years also is equitable assets, King v. Ballet, supra; except in the case of a term for years attendant upon the inheritance, in which case the term becomes consolidated in equity with the freehold. 2 Ch. Ca. 152, in Ratcliff v. Graves, 35 Car. 2. 1 Saund. 221 Trust estates are subject to merge in the legal estate, whenever both estates come to the same person. Dougl. 336. Ante, p. 562. n. (K). And if an equitable title is not acted upon in the same time the legal should, it is barred, by analogy to the statute of limitations. Medlicot v. O'Donell, 1 Bro. C. C. 167. Hovendon v. Lord An nesley, 2 Sch & Lef. 630. Bonny v. Ridgard, 4 Bro. C. C. 138. An drew v. Wrigley, 4 Bro. C C. 125. Townsend v. Townsend, 4 Bro. C. C. 138. Beckford v. Wade, 17 Ves. 87. 97. 15 Ves. 496.

With regard to the rules by which trust terms are governed, terms for years are either vested in trustees for the use of particular persons, or for particular purposes, or else upon trust to attend the inheritance. In the first case, they are called terms in gross, and the persons entitled to the beneficial interest, have a right, in equity, to call on the trustees, or persons who have the legal interest in the term, for the rents and profits of the lands, and also for an absolute legal assignment of the term. In the latter case, they are called terms attendant on the inheritance. Although the trust of a term for years in gross cannot be so limited, as to make it descendible as real estate; yet when the cestui que trust of the term is also the beneficial owner of the immediate inheritance in fee-simple, the equitable interest in the term will become, by analogy to the doctrine of merger, consolidated with the inheritance, and will follow the limitations of it. Best v. Stamford, Prec. Ch. 252. S. C. 2 Freem. 288. It will belong to the heir or devisee, 3 Cha. Rep. 37; it will be real assets, 2 Ch. Ca. 152, supra; it will, as against the heir, (Wray v. Williams, Prec VOL. II.

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