An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Volume 2J. Johnson, W. J. and J. Richardson, W. Otridge and Son, F. C. and J. Rivington, D. Ogilvy and Son, Leigh and Sotheby, T. Payne, [and 11 others], and J. Mawman, 1805 - Knowledge, Theory of - 510 pages |
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
able agree agreement or disagreement allow answer appear arguments assent authority believe body called cause certain certainty clear colour common complex conceive concerning connexion consequence consider consists demonstration depend determined discourse discover distinct doubt earth equal essence eternal evidence examine existence faculties faith farther figure follow give gold grounds hath ideas ignorance immaterial inquiry kind knowledge known learned least ledge less light material matter maxims means men's mind moral motion names nature necessary never objects observe opinions particular perceive perception perfect perhaps principles probability produce proofs propositions prove qualities question rational reason receive relations revelation rules sciences sense serve side signification simple sort soul sounds speak species spirit stand substance suppose taken things thought tion true truth understanding wherein whereof whole words
Popular passages
Page 102 - Who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament ; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.
Page 127 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Page 102 - As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child: even so thou knowest not the works of God who maketh all.
Page 273 - Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God.
Page 339 - I have mentioned mathematics as a way to settle in the mind a habit of reasoning closely and in train ; not that I think it necessary that all men should be deep mathematicians, but that, having got the way of reasoning which that study necessarily brings the mind to, they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledge, as they shall have occasion.
Page 201 - ... deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels.
Page 163 - ... neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon ; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect, that cannot exist ; an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together.
Page 438 - Heat is a very brisk agitation of the insensible parts of the object, which produces in us that sensation, from whence we denominate the object hot ; so what in our sensation is heat, in the object is nothing b,ut motion.
Page 69 - For if we reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other: and this, I think, we may call intuitive knowledge.
Page 214 - For the ideas that ethics are conversant about being all real essences, and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another ; so far as we can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain, real, and general truths : and I doubt not, but, if a right method were taken, a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness, that could leave, to a considering man, no more reason to doubt, than he could have to doubt of the truth of...