2.;

any thing as his due who hath no merit to plead in his behalf.-Cic. de Nat. Deo. lib. i. C. lib. ii. c. 25.

Dieu agit quelque fois par une Providence particulière, soumise à ses lois générales.— Voltaire.

To say otherwise would be to limit his omnipotence.

That influence, by which he is present to intelligent, active and free beings, must be different from that by which gravitation and common phænomena are produced in matter. Nor can God put things so far out of his own power, as that he should not for ever govern transactions and events in his own world; nor can perfect knowledge and power ever want proper means to achieve what is fit to be doneWooll. Sparsim. 199.

Esse præstantem aliquam æternamque naturam, et eam suspiciendam admirandamque hominum generi, pulchritudo mundi ordoque rerum cœlestium cogit confiteri. Quam ob rem, ut religio propaganda etiam est, quæ est juncta cum cognitione naturæ, sic superstitionis stirpes omnes ejiciendæ. Instat enim et urget, et quote-cunque verteris, persequitur; sive tu vatem, sive tu omen audieris; sive immolâris, sive avem aspexeris; si Chaldæum, si Haruspicem videris, si fulserit, si tonuerit, si tactum aliquid erit de

cœlo, si ostenti * simile natum, factumve quippiam; quorum necesse est plerumque aliquid eveniat. Ut numquam liceat quietâ mente consistere.-Cic. de Divinat. 2. 72.

Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem putet inesse, in cœlo mundoque non putet? Aut ea quæ vix summa ingenii ratione comprehendat; nullo ratione moveri putet ?—Cic. de Leg. lib. ii.

It is plain that there is contrivance and a respect to certain ends. The sun is placed near the middle of our system for more conveniently dispensing his influence to the planets. The plane of the earth's equator intersects that of her orbit, and makes a proper angle with it to diversify the year and create a useful variety of seasons; and who can view the structure of a plant or animal and not see design? Who can doubt that his eyes were made to see and his ears to hear? Now, as we cannot suppose the parts of matter to have contrived this wonderful form, there must be some other Being whose wisdom and power are equal to the structure and preservation of the world. That such a beautiful scheme, such a just and geometrical arrangement

*Ostentum (subs.) Any thing that happens contrary to the ordinary course of nature, and supposed to foretel some thing to come.--Dict.

of things, composed of innumerable parts, and placed as the offices and uses and wants of the several beings require, through such an immense extent, should be the effect of chance, is so absurd that no one can espouse the opinion who understands the meaning of the word. Chance is only a term by which we express our ignorance of the cause of any thing. Who can seriously make chance an agent or a really existing and acting cause of any thing, and much less of all things. Whatever events or effects there are must proceed from some cause, either free or not free: if free, it wills; if necessarily, then, not by accident. There can then be no such cause as chance.-Wooll. Sparsim. 82-84.

SOUL.

Illud Tv σeaUTOV, noli putare ad arroganΓνώθι σεαυτον, tiam minuendam solum esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra norimus.

Qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, ingeniumque in se suum, sicut simulacrum aliquod dedicatum, putabit, tantoque munere semper dignum aliquid et faciet et sentiet.-Cic. de Leg. lib. i. 22

Animorum nulla in terris origo invenire potest; nihil enim in animis mixtum atque concretum, aut quod ex terrâ natum atque fictum esse videatur. Nihil ne aut humidum quidem, aut flabile, aut igneum. His enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat; quod et præterita teneat, et futura provideat, et complecti possit præsentia, quæ sola divina sunt; nec invenietur unquam, unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi a Deo. Singularis est igitur quædam natura atque vis animi, sejuncta ab his usitatis notisque naturis. Ita quicquid est illud,* quod sentit, quod sapit,

*Mind or Soul.-A centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow.

The seat of intellect is a person.—ante.

quod vivit, quod viget, cœleste et divinum, ob eamque rem æternum sit necesse est. *-Cic. Tusc. Disp. lib. i. c. 27.

The properties of mind are not limited to any particular corporeal form or to any particular circumscription of space.-Paley, p. 17.

The soul cannot be mere matter; for, if it is, then either all matter must think, or the dif ference must arise from the different modifica. tion, magnitude, figure, or motion of some parcels of matter in respect of others. But all these modifications are distinct from thought or mind W. 351.

Ex ipsâ hominum solertiâ, esse aliquam mentem, et eam quidem acriorem et divinam existimare debemus. Unde enim hanc homo arripuit? Ut ait apud Xenophontem Socrates. Quin et humorem, et calorem, qui est fusus in corpore,

* Study most diligently the divine works of Cicero, which no man, in my opinion, ever perused without improving in eloquence and wisdom. The epistle, which he wrote to his brother Quintus, on the Government of a Province, deserves to be daily repeated by every sovereign in the world. His books on Offices, on Moral End, and the Tusculan Questions, merit an hundred perusals; and his Orations deserve to be translated into every European language. Nor do I scruple to affirm that his sixteen books of Letters to Atticus are superior to almost all histories.-Sir William Jones's Memor. p. 130.