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DEITY.

Quid potest esse tam apertum, tamque perspicuum cum cœlum suspeximus, cœlestiaque contemplati sumus, quam esse aliquod numen præstantissimæ mentis, quo hæc regantur.

Quod qui dubitet, haud sané intelligo, cur non idem, sol sit, an nullus sit, dubitare possit. Quid enim est hoc illo evidentius? Quod nisi cognitum comprehensumque animis haberemus, non tam stabilis opinio permaneret, nec confirmareter Diuturnitate Temporis, nec uná cum Seculis tatibusque Hominum inveterare potuisset. Etenim videmus, cæteras opiniones fictas atque vanas diuturnitate extabuisse, opinionum enim commenta delet dies; naturæ judicia confirmat.-Itaque, &c. Cic.

Every plant, every animal, every object of nature which we cast our eyes upon, contains the proof of Deity. We need go no further than ourselves; the mechanism which we carry about in our bodies, and which is constantly at work. The feelings of which we are conscious, the powers which we exercise, and the intellect we possess, carry us irresistibly back to a source of all these wonders, and fastens down our faith to an intelligent Creator.-Bp. Sumner.

Let the constant recurrence to our observation of contrivance, design, and wisdom (and goodness), in the works of nature, fix upon our minds the belief of a God; and after that all is easy. There cannot be contrivance without a contriver, design without a designer.-Paley.

By considering the works, acknowledge the workmaster.—Bible.

Nam siquis nulli sectæ addictus, sed liberâ sententia, rerum considerationem inierit, conspicatus in tantâ carnium ac succorum colluvie, tantam mentem habitare, conspicatus item et cujusvis animalis constructionem (omnia enim declarat opificis sapientiam), mentis, quæ homini inest excellentiam intelliget, tum opus de partium utilitate,* quod prius exiguum esse sibi videbatur, perfectissima theologiæ verum principium constituet,-Galen.

Εις δε ων, πολυωνομος εστι.-Arist.

God is a Spirit.-John. Clouds and darkness are round about him.-Psalms.

Nec vero Deus ipse, qui intelligitur a nobis, alio modo intelligi potest, nisi mens soluta quædam et libera, segragata ab omni concretione mortali, omnia sentiens et movens, ipsaque prædita motu sempiterna.-Cic. Tuscul.

Πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφή μια-Æschyl. Prometh. v. 208.

* As shewing contrivance.

Εν μεν αρα και λογω, και αριθμώ, το πρωτον κινων ακινητον ον.— -Aristotle.

Πρῶτον μεταβαλλον.

Something that first

causes any alteration to be made in a thing.Plato.

Αρχή κινήσεως απάσης. The principle of all motion.-Idem.

Πρῶτον κινᾶν. The first mover.Aristot.
The Being that truly exists.-

Όντως ον.

Plutarch.

Πρεςβύτατον τών ὄντων θεος αγέννητον γαρ· Thales in Diog. Laert. lib. i. sec. 35. p. 23.

Τί τὸ θεῖον ; το μήτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον, μητε τελευτήν. —ib. p. 24.

Providit illa Maximus Mundi Parens Seneca. Hippoly. 466.

'O is. The one.-Plato.

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Ο πρωτος και μεγιςτος έκεινος θεος.—Dion. Cassius. lib. ii.

It is of very little consequence (says Seneca de Beneficiis) by what name you call the first nature and the divine reason that presides over the universe and fills all the parts of it. He is still the same God. You may give him as many names as you please provided you allow but one sole principle every where present. Seneca.

God is one in nature, though many in name. But we, such is our ignorance, assign different titles according to the different helps and favors,

which are afforded to mankind.-Semb: Maxim.

Tyr. Diss. 23.

Nec obstat appellationum diversitas, cum ipsa significatione ad unum omnia revolvantur.Lactant. p. 19.

Two Omnipotent Beings are altogether inconsistent, because there is no one who commands in the last resort; because we must necessarily suppose, that the one must always will what the other does; and, in this case, he whose will is necessarily determined by the other, has not consequently that perfection, since it is better to be free than to be subject to the determination of another's will; but if they are not both reduced to the necessity of willing the same thing always, then the one may desire to have that done which the other would not, in which case the will of the one must prevail over the will of the other, and so he of the two whose power cannot bring about what he would cannot be omnipotent, because he cannot do so much as the other. So that there cannot be two Omnipotent Beings, and consequently not too Gods.-Locke's Letters. Cited also by Barber ; in note, p. 65, to Puffend.

Sovereignty can admit of no share or partition. There is no sovereign at all when there are many, because there is no one who commands in the last resort; and none of them being obliged

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