Reason is the foundation of every superstruc ture, whether in morality or religion. Farther institutions may improve, but cannot supersede, what the Almighty has revealed in his works, and in the suggestions of reason to man.Ferguson's Lectures.

That which right reason makes plainly to appear, ought to be considered as established by as convincing a proof as if God himself had declared it to mankind by a positive revelation. -2 Burl. 39.

Non est philosophia (recta ratio) populare artificium, nec ostentationi paratum, non in verbis sed in rebus est, nec in hoc adhibetur, ut aliqua oblectatione et consumatur Dies, ut dematur otio nausea; animum format et fabricat, vitam disponit, actiones regit, agenda et omittenda. demonstrat, sedet ad gubernaculum, et per ancipitia fluctuantium dirigit cursum; sine hac nemo securus est. Innumerabilia accidunt singulis horis, quæ concilium exigunt, quod ab hac petendum est. Hæc adhortabitur, ut Deo libentur pareamus, ut fortunæ contumaciter resistamus: hæc docebit ut Deum sequaris, feras casum, &c.-Seneca, let. 16.

To prove the existence of God, and our dependence in respect to him, is establishing the right he has of prescribing laws to man.

Has

he thought proper to exercise this right, is the question?

Answer-On the one side, we find a superior, who, by his nature, is possessed in the very highest degree of all the conditions* requisite to establish a legitimate authority; and on the other, we behold man, who is God's creature, endowed with liberty and understanding, capable of acting with knowledge and choice, sensible of pleasure and pain, susceptible of good and evil, of rewards and punishments. Such an aptitude of giving and receiving laws cannot be useless. This concurrence of relations and circumstances undoubtedly denotes an end, and must have effect, just as the particular organization of the eye shews we are destined to see light, &c.

When we consider the beautiful order which the supreme wisdom has established in the physical world, it is impossible to persuade ourselves, that he has abandoned the spiritual or moral world to chance or disorder. Reason, on the contrary, tells us that an allwise Being must propose to himself a reasonable end in all he does, and that he uses all the necessary means to attain it. The end which God has in view with regard to his creatures, and particularly

* i. e. Wisdom, goodness, power.

with respect to man, cannot be any other, on the one side, than his glory; and on the other, the perfection and happiness of his creatures, as far as their nature and constitution will admit. These two views, so worthy of the Creator, are perfectly combined: For the glory of God consists in manifesting his perfections, his power, his goodness, wisdom and justice; and these virtues are nothing else, but a love of order and the good of the whole. Thus, a being absolutely perfect and supremely happy, willing to conduct man to that state of order and happiness which suits his nature, cannot but be willing, at the same time, to employ whatever is necessary for such an end, and consequently he must approve of those means that are proper, and disapprove of such as are improper, for attaining it. Had the constitution of man been merely physical or mechanic, God would have done whatever is expedient for his work; but man, being a free and intelligent creature, capable of discernment and choice, the means which God uses to conduct him to his end ought to be proportioned to his nature; that is, such as man may engage in and concur with by his own actions. Now, as all means are not equally fit to conduct us to a certain end, all human actions therefore cannot be indifferent. Plain it is, that every action contrary to the ends which God has proposed

cannot be agreeable to God; and that he approves, on the contrary, those which of themselves are proper to promote his ends; since, then, there is a choice to be made, and one road rather than another to be followed, who can question seriously, but that our Creator is willing we should take the right road; and that instead of acting fortuitously and rashly, we should behave like rational creatures by exercising our liberty, and the other faculties he has given us, in the manner most agreeable to our state and destination, in order to promote his views, and to advance our own happiness together with that of our fellow creatures 1 Burlemac. 137.

Now we are under an obligation to follow the dictates of reason (ib. 143); which is that of God himself (p. 144). 1. Then there is a rule; 2. This rule is just and useful; 3. It comes from a superior on whom we entirely depend; 4. In fine, it is sufficiently made known to us by our own reason (p. 144); and to deduce the principles of the law of nature, we have only to attend to the nature of man, and to his states and relations. (p. 153). These states are threefold. In the first place, we may consider him as God's creature, from whom he has received his life, reason, and all the advantages he enjoys. 2. Man may be considered in himself as a

being composed of body and soul, and endowed with many faculties. Lastly, as forming a part of mankind, as placed on the earth with several other beings of a similar nature, and with whom he is by his natural condition obliged to live in society. (p. 158, note.) The consequences of this principle are 1. Piety towards God! 2. Selflove; that is, an enlightened, regulated, and rational love of ourselves, as directed by right reason; (i. e.) the care of our preservation, the care of the soul being preferred to that of the body; the improvement of our reason, &c.; and, lastly, 3. Those duties which have society for their object, and the several relations in which we stand. (p. 162, 3.) We have then, religion, self-love, and sociability or benevolence to our fellow creatures (p. 173); or, in the words of the Scripture, "Our duty towards God, and to love our neighbours as ourselves."-1 Burlem. Sparsim.

In fact, there are natural and necessary differences in human actions and in the effects by them produced. Some agree of themselves with the nature and state of man, whilst others disagree and are quite opposite thereto. Some contribute to the production and maintenance of order, others tend to subvert it; some procure the perfection and happiness of man, others are attended with their disgrace and misery

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