...What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced...they are entitled on this subject to the same regard. I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or...

...What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced...they are entitled on this subject to the same regard. I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or...

...What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced ? When, therefore, those reelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind,...

...except the feelings and judgments of the experienced ? When, therefore, these feelings and judgments declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties...are entitled on this subject to the same regard." — pp. 310-31 1. . He rejects strenuously the conclusion that this doctrine i« incapable of producing...

...except the feelings and judgments of the experienced ? When, therefore, these feelings and judgments declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties...higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this-subject to the same regard." — pp. 310-311. He rejects strenuously the conclusion that this...

...therefore, these feelings and judgments declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to toe preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity,...are entitled on this subject to the same regard." — pp. 310-311. He rejects strenuously the conclusion that this doctrine is incapable of producing...

...except the feelings and judgments of the experienced ? When, therefore, these feelings and judgments declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in Lin, I. apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the...

...cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced ? When, thei'efore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures...they are entitled on this subject to the same regard. I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or...

...particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those reelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the...they are entitled on this subject to the same regard. I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or...

...What is there to decide whether n particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment deelare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question...