Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic ProblemWhen, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an argument? What is the proper criterion of premise acceptability? Can the criterion be theoretically or philosophically justified? This is the first book to provide a comprehensive theory of premise acceptability and it answers the questions above from an epistemological approach that the author calls common sense foundationalism. It will be eagerly sought out not just by specialists in informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation theory but also by a broader range of philosophers and those teaching rhetoric. |
Contents
| 3 | |
Acceptability and Presumption | 21 |
Basic Considerations | 38 |
Acceptability | 73 |
What Types of Statements Are There? | 93 |
Necessary Statements and A Priori Intuition | 114 |
Descriptions and Their BeliefGenerating Mechanisms | 124 |
Interpretations and Their Modes of Intuition | 143 |
Evaluations and the Moral Faculties | 218 |
The Interpersonal BeliefGenerating | 281 |
An Outline of the Practice of Epistemic Casuistry | 319 |
A Commonsense | 367 |
Notes | 379 |
| 389 | |
| 395 | |
Other editions - View all
Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem James B. Freeman No preview available - 2004 |
Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem James B. Freeman No preview available - 2005 |
Common terms and phrases
affairs agapic spectator aretaic value argue argument assert aware basic beliefs basic premises belief-generating mechanism beliefs concerning causal challenger challenger's point Chapter claim cognitive commitment common knowledge concept constitution Descartes design plan desire determine dialectical exchange dispositional epistemic epistemic justification epistemic probability evaluation evidence experience explanations facie duty facie intrinsic feeling form the belief foundationalism further given Hence inference inference rule internalist interpretations intrinsic value introspection involves issue Jones judgments means moral intuition moral sense natural signs nomic notion object one's particular perception personal intuition personal testimony Plantinga pleasure point of view premise acceptability presumption of reliability presumption of warrant presumptively reliable presupposes prima facie duty principles properly basic proponent proponent's proposition question reason recognize Reid Ross rules satisfaction Section sensation signs situation someone subjunctive conditional Suppose synonymy tion true truth truth-functional type of statement undercut the presumption understanding vouching W. D. Ross word
Popular passages
Page 6 - I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that, however faith be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind ; which, if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason, and so cannot be opposite to it.