mission the condition of his coöperation with them, has disabled himself from carrying on the government. It is enough that he cannot carry on the government, and that it is his own fault. The criminality of the usurpation consists in its effect. The state necessity consists in the necessity of the government going on, and going on without usurpation.

We are told that the Whigs have been trying to "head Captain Tyler," that they have endeavored to drive him into a corner, to reduce him to insignificance. But is it to reduce him to insignificance to counsel him to remain within his own constitutional powers? Would a President of the United States, even without the veto power, be insignificant? And can he be made insignificant by being compelled to exercise it, while he has it, only for the purposes for which it was granted to him? If it be to reduce him to insignificance, to wish him to concede to them in those particulars where it is of their province to decide, is it not to reduce them to an insignificance much more humilitating, to call upon them to yield their opinions to his in matters of their own prerogative? It is not they who have invaded his province to reduce him to insignificance. They have only, by repelling him from theirs which he had invaded, endeavored to reduce him to a just sense of his position and powers, and to a respect for theirs. Let Mr. Tyler guard himself well from this exhortation of his flatterers, or of his own vanity, "not to allow himself to be reduced to insignificance." It is the treacherous sentiment which plays the part of ambition to feeble minds and feeble characters, and inspires the desire for tyranny, without the power of attaining it.

Among the most discouraging symptoms, as to the stability of our institutions, are the total oblivion and decay of the original spirit of our Constitution, and the apathy with which an attempt, which was the very first on the list of grievances charged upon a monarchical government in the Declaration of Independence, is regarded by a party styling itself the dem

ocratic party. They do not seem to care anything for the integrity of the Constitution, or for the ultimate effects which a Presidential Veto is to have upon it, so long as it serves their ends and thwarts those of their adversaries for the time. "He has," says this document, now embodied into the Constitutions of all the States, or at least prefixed to them as a guide in their interpretations, "He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good." "He has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, till his assent could be obtained, and when so suspended he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish," &c. &c.

"He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a long time after such dissolutions to cause others to be elected, whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without and convulsions from within."

These were truly great grievances, and the more annoying that they were such as the King would not have thought of inflicting on his subjects at home, and to which the colonies alone were subject.

Such is the propensity of power! - Such is the pride of opinion! At the end of fifty years we find our own little republican monarch, whose position does not furnish the same guarantees for justice and impartiality with that of the King of England, (those of being raised above the motives of faction, or the influences of peculiar and sectional interests, and of acknowledging nothing but a large and general sympathy and community of interest with the whole mass of his subjects,) recommencing, after as long a cessation from usurpation as can be expected, where the opportunity

is so obvious, the same system of vexation and of grievance, not upon a colony, but upon the people in the midst of whom he dwells, and whose power he acknowledges.

The amendment I propose is as follows:

I. Whenever the President shall not approve a bill passed by both Houses of Congress, he shall return it with his objections as at present.

II. If the ground of objection be other than the unconstitutionality of the bill, it may still become a law, notwithstanding the objections of the President, if passed by a majority of two votes in the Senate, and by a majority in the House of Representatives equal to the average number of the representation of one State in that body.

III. If the ground of objection be the unconstitutionality of the bill, the question of its constitutionality shall be referred to the Supreme Court of the United States.

IV. In case of such reference, the President and the two Houses of Congress shall, within one week from the return of the bill by the President, respectively cause to be prepared, by persons whom they shall appoint for that purpose, an argument in writing on such question of constitutionality, and to be presented to the Supreme Court.

V. Such reference shall, as soon as presented with the arguments on both sides, interrupt and exclude all other business before the Supreme Court until decided.

VI. In their decision of the question, the Supreme Court shall be governed by the same principles of interpretation, and of authority or precedent, as if the question arose between individuals.

VII. The bill objected to, if the only ground of objection by the President be its unconstitutionality, shall at once become a law by the decision of the Supreme Court in favor of its constitutionality, and without the signature of the President.

VIII. The arguments presented to the Court, with its decision and the grounds thereof, which shall be delivered in writing, shall be immediately made public.

If the plan here proposed be compared with that for "a Council of Revision" proposed by Mr. Randolph of Virginia, in the 8th of the Resolutions presented by him at the opening of the Federal Convention, (which Resolutions became, to use the words of Mr. Madison, "the basis on which the proceedings of the Convention commenced, and to the developments, variations, and modifications of which the plan of government proposed by the Convention may be traced,") it will be found, I think, to retain all the advantages of such a council, while it obviates all the objections, which were made to it, either in the Convention or the Federalist, and which drove the Convention to adopt the veto power as it now exists, "sub silentio," (as Mr. Madison expresses it in his report,) and, as it would seem, with evident hesitation and reluctance, after much opposition, even from those who ultimately voted for it, and apparently because the Convention did not know where else to place a check, of which the necessity was almost unanimously admitted.

Mr. Randolph's Resolution which, with the debates on it, may be found in the Madison Papers, vol. 2d, pp. 733, 783, and 329, and p. 809 et seq., is as follows:

"Resolved, That the Executive and a convenient number of the Judiciary ought to compose a Council of Revision, with authority to examine every act of the national legislature before it shall operate, and every act of a particular legislature, before a negative thereon shall be final, and that the dissent of the said council shall amount to a rejection, unless the act of the national legislature be again passed, or that of a particular legislature be again negatived by of the members of each branch."

On the motion of Mr. Gerry of Massachusetts, this resolution. was amended so as to stand pretty much as the veto clause now does, (except that the blank, expressing the number or proportion of votes necessary to pass a bill in spite of the President's objections, was not filled,) Aye, 8 states, No, 2, (Connecticut and Maryland.) A motion was then made by Mr. Wilson of Pennsylvania, seconded by Mr. Madison, to reinsert

the words, "and a convenient number of the national Judiciary," and being voted out of order on that day, was again made on the following day; on which occasion Mr. Madison made the best speech which was made at all upon the subject, in favor of the motion; which was finally negatived, Virginia, New York, Connecticut, Aye, 3; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, N. Carolina, S. Carolina, Georgia, No, 8.

The objections made to joining the Judiciary with the Executive, as a council of Revision, were, to enumerate them

1. "That the Judiciary would have a sufficient check against encroachments on their own department, by their exposition of the laws which involved a power of deciding on their constitutionality."-[Gerry of Massachusetts.

2. That it was quite foreign from the nature of their office, to make them judges of the policy of public measures.—[Gerry and Dickinson.

3. That the judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation. - [King, Mass.

4. That it might safely be entrusted to the Executive, who would need it for self-protection and strength, and would seldom use it, less often even than a King of Great Britain. -[Gerry and the Federalist.

5. That the Executive ought not to be able to divide the responsibility with the Judiciary. [Gerry, King, Dickinson, Pinckney.

6. That there was danger of a corrupt and dangerous combination of the Executive and Judiciary from their being so often associated. [Federalist.

Of these objections to Mr. Randolph's plan, it is obvious that the 2d, 3d, 5th, and 6th are entirely obviated by the differences between my plan and his.

The 2d, because it makes the judiciary judges only of the constitutionality, and not " of the policy of public measures."

The 3d, because the questions of policy and constitutionality not being mixed up, the judges would come to the con