Thinking and DecidingBeginning with its first edition and through subsequent editions, Thinking and Deciding has established itself as the required text and important reference work for students and scholars of human cognition and rationality. In this fourth edition, first published in 2007, Jonathan Baron retains the comprehensive attention to the key questions addressed in the previous editions - how should we think? What, if anything, keeps us from thinking that way? How can we improve our thinking and decision making? - and his expanded treatment of topics such as risk, utilitarianism, Baye's theorem, and moral thinking. With the student in mind, the fourth edition emphasises the development of an understanding of the fundamental concepts in judgement and decision making. This book is essential reading for students and scholars in judgement and decision making and related fields, including psychology, economics, law, medicine, and business. |
Contents
9780521862073c03_p6176 | 61 |
9780521862073c04_p7798 | 77 |
9780521862073pt02_p99102 | 99 |
9780521862073c05_p103136 | 103 |
9780521862073c06_p137160 | 137 |
9780521862073c07_p161182 | 161 |
9780521862073c08_p183198 | 183 |
9780521862073c09_p199228 | 199 |
9780521862073c13_p311340 | 311 |
9780521862073c14_p341362 | 341 |
9780521862073c15_p363388 | 363 |
9780521862073c16_p389416 | 389 |
9780521862073c17_p417440 | 417 |
9780521862073c18_p441470 | 441 |
9780521862073c19_p471496 | 471 |
9780521862073c20_p497526 | 497 |
9780521862073pt03_p229232 | 229 |
9780521862073c10_p233256 | 233 |
9780521862073c11_p257288 | 257 |
9780521862073c12_p289310 | 289 |
| 527 | |
9780521862073ain_p567576 | 567 |
| 577 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
actively open-minded Allais paradox answer argued argument assume attributes average Baron behavior beliefs benefit better bias biases cancer cause Chapter choice choose concerned consider cooperation correlation cost decision analysis dimension discussed disease dynamic inconsistency effect emotions error evaluate evidence example expected utility expected value expected-utility theory experiment favor formula function gamble given harm heuristic hypothesis idea inference intuitions involve irrational judge Kahneman kind less logic loss means measure method moral normative model normative theory omission bias one’s option outcomes patients people’s possible predict prescriptive present primacy effect principle prior probability probability judgments probability theory problem prospect theory question rational reason representativeness heuristic result risk risk aversion rule score situation social dilemmas standard gambles subjects were asked Suppose tend things tradeoff true Tversky utilitarianism utility theory vaccine winning