Dr. Daniel M. Ogden analyzed the politics of Columbia River development in his 1949 doctoral thesis. In the new Federal Department of Energy he served as the Director of Power Marketing Coordination involving the five Federal power marketing agencies.

the President sent Congress a special letter enclosing the three-page report of the Committee on National Power Policy relative to marketing Bonneville power. Representative Nan Wood Honeyman of Oregon introduced H.R. 6151 on April 5, and Representative Pierce H.R. 6387 on April 14. Representative James W. Mott of Oregon introduced H.R. 6973 on May 11 and H.R. 7010 on May 12.

Representative Joseph J. Mansfield, House Committee on Rivers and Harbors chairman, called hearings on the bills March 9 to June 4. He introduced H.R. 7642 as a clean bill June 23, and reported it to the House June 24. The House passed it July 26.

Meanwhile, over the objections of Secretary Ickes, Senator Homer T. Bone proposed an amendment whereby the Corps of Engineers would be allowed to operate the power plant at Bonneville Dam. Senators Bone, McNary, Schwellenback, Steiwer, and Pope introduced S. 2092 in the Senate on April 5 containing the Bone compromise. The Corps had agreed to the compromise and testified in support of the bill. Commerce reported it out with amendments July 22. McNary had it recommitted to the Committee July 27 for removal of the extraneous Boulder Dam provisions, and reported it out again July 31. Striking Boulder Dam from the bill ended the objections that had killed the bill the previous year.

The Senate substituted the language of S. 2092 for the House-passed H.R. 7642 on August 6, then passed the revised H.R. 7642 on August 9. This resulted in a conference committee and ultimate agreement. The President signed the Bonneville Project Act on August 20, 1937.

The growing popularity of the public power movement, as revealed in the Oregon and Washington election results of 1930, 1932, 1934, and 1936 in enacting PUD laws and forming PUDs, helped provide a political climate favorable to passage of the Bonneville Project Act. The President's difficulties due to the so-called court-packing proposal impeded the Administration's 1937 legislative program, but apparently did not hurt the Bonneville bill.

The Act came about as the result of a large effort by many people, named and unnamed. It especially benefited from the philosophical fatherhood of the PNWRPC, backed by the National Resources Committee, the Committee on National Power Policy, their staff personnel, and the President. The agreement between Secretary Ickes and Senator McNary broke the stalement. The Pacific Northwest's Congressional members distinguished themselves with their hard work throughout the 3-year legislative effort.

9. A CHARTER FOR POWER

...in developing electricity from this Bonneville Dam, from the Grand Coulee Dam and from other dams to be built on the Columbia and its tributaries, the policy of the widest use ought to prevail. The transmission of electricity is making such scientific strides today that we can well visualize a date, not far distant, when every community in this great area will be wholly electrified.

- Franklin D. Roosevelt Speech Dedicating Bonneville Dam September 28, 1937

A charter is an organic act. It is a law which creates an agency and tells it what to do. It is replete with policy, including the basic, threshold policy decision to create the agency.

The new law represented another milestone for Roosevelt, and, as it turned out, virtually the capstone for the New Deal power program. Key policies of the Act later became a nationwide power marketing policy in the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944.

Basically, the Bonneville Project Act establishes the Bonneville Power Administration and serves as BPA's charter or organic law. The Act assigns responsibilities: the Corps of Engineers generates the power. The Corps installs and operates generators requested by the Administrator. The Administrator builds and operates transmission facilities, markets and exchanges power, negotiates power contracts, and proposes rate schedules. FPC makes the cost allocations and approves rates. These constitute the structural decisions of the Act.

A Cluster of Policies. The Bonneville Project Act constitutes a cluster of policies. Three short quotations illustrate the cluster idea and bring out most of the Act's major policies and supportive phrases that indicate policy:

"SEC. 2. (b) In order to encourage the widest possible use of all electric energy that can be generated and marketed and to provide reasonable outlets therefor, and to prevent the monopolization thereof by limited groups, the administrator is authorized and directed to provide, construct, operate, maintain, and improve such electric transmission lines and substations, and facilities and structures appurtenant thereto, as he finds necessary, desirable, or appropriate for the purpose of transmitting electric energy, available for sale, from the Bonneville project to existing and potential markets, and, for the purpose of interchange of electric energy, to interconnect the Bonneville project with other Federal projects and publicly owned power systems

"SEC. 4. (a) In order to insure that the facilities for the generation of electric energy at the Bonneville project shall be operated for the benefit of the general public, and particularly of domestic and rural consumers, the administrator shall at all times, in disposing of electric energy generated at said project, give preference and priority to public bodies and cooperatives.

****

"SEC. 6. ...The said rate schedules may provide for uniform rates or rates uniform throughout prescribed transmission areas in order to extend the benefits of an integrated transmission system and encourage the equitable distribution of the electric energy developed at the Bonneville project."

The major policies of the Act include: (1) encourage the widest possible use of electric energy; (2) operate for the benefit of the general public, and particularly domestic and rural consumers; (3) preserve the preference and priority for public bodies and cooperatives; (4) provide for uniform rates or rates uniform throughout prescribed transmission areas; and (5) set wholesale rates on the basis of actual costs, as determined by specific guidelines.

The Administrator is authorized to review and set resale rates to insure they are reasonable and nondiscriminatory. The Act does not mention interest or set an interest rate, nor does it specify an amortization period other than a reasonable number of years.

Certain phrases in the Act assist in interpretation, depending on the context: (1) benefits of an integrated transmission system; (2) encourage equitable distribution of electric energy; (3) to provide reasonable outlets; (4) prevent monopolization by limited groups; (5) as rapidly as markets may be found; (6) within economic transmission distance; (7) detailed instructions on preference; and (8) some guidelines for allocation of the cost of the dam. Perceptions of Policy. Policies discussed previously led to dam building. This chapter begins with policies specifically for and by the Bonneville Power Administration.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt invited the Senators and Representatives from Oregon, Washington, and Idaho to the White House for a conference on February 18, 1937 on the proposed Bonneville legislation. He passed out copies of the tentative bill draft incorporating the recommendations of the National Power Policy Committee. He

pointed out that the draft addressed four policy questions which had concerned him, and the draft answered each question in the affirmative.:

1. Should power from Bonneville Dam be marketed separately?

2. Should a new marketing agency be created?

3. Should the Federal Government construct the necessary new backbone transmission system?

4. Should preference be given to publicly and cooperatively owned distribution systems?

Another question as to uniform or zone rates was left to the Administrator provided that he encourage widespread use of the energy.

These five questions and answers represent President Roosevelt's perception of the major policies of what was to become the Bonneville Project Act.

Another perception of the policies of the bill appears in the 3-page report of the Committee on National Power Policy which the President transmitted to the Congress February 24, 1937. It ennumerated 7 points after explaining that the near completion of Bonneville Dam necessitated early legislation and that the form of administration therefore would be considered provisional or temporary:

1. Secretary of the Interior to appoint administrator who would consult with advisory board.

2. Administrator to dispose of energy as rapidly as markets could be found therefor, and to build transmission facilities to encourage widespread use and prevent monopolization.

3. Give preference to public and cooperative bodies.

4. Enter into 20-year power sales contracts.

5. Provide for review of wholesale rates by FPC, rates to be either on a uniform or zone basis.

6. Provide for administration, personnel, accounts.

7. Project to be self-supporting.

Other sources of policies for the Act included the report of the Pacific Northwest Regional Planning Commission, and the Tennessee Valley Authority Act. Bill drafters included Tom Corcoran, Ben Cohen, and Joe Swidler. Members of the Committee on National Power Policy provided ideas. Senator Homer T. Bone provided the amendment to provide for the Army to operate the generators. Interior Secretary Harold Ickes acted as chairman of the Committee on National Power Policy and probably played a role second only to that of the President.

Five weeks after signing the Bonneville Act, President Roosevelt journeyed to the Pacific Northwest to make a major address at the dedication of Bonneville Dam. With consummate patience he explained the desirability of a policy of widest use of electrical energy and of electrification of every community in the region. He favored decentralization of industry and the spread of people into smaller communities.

The speech had no appeal for his host, Oregon Governor Martin, conservative Democrat, or to Portland Chamber of Commerce members who had favored the sale of Bonneville power in the immediate local area. Nor did Governor Martin and his friends see merit in the many placards along the route to Bonneville Dam and at the dedication that read "We want Ross" for Administrator. Ickes appointed Ross two weeks later on October 10, 1937.

With the passage of the Bonneville Project Act the role of spokesman generally fell to the Administrator of the Bonneville Project. Creating a new agency was indeed an important threshold policy decision. The Administrators pictured the Act as a "bridge" for getting Columbia River power benefits to the people.

The Act's intent became reality in the hands of the first two Administrators. Ross urged quick resolution of the rate issue, the earliest possible start in constructing the Bonneville-Coulee intertie and general support for potential public power systems. A one-man whirlwind, his attempts to do more were cut short by his death.

When James Delmage McKenzie Ross (J. D. Ross) died suddenly March 14, 1939, his friend John Boettiger, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer publisher and President Roosevelt's son-in-law, wrote a tribute to him, saying:

"He sought above all else to transmit the blessings of natural power into the service of mankind... to perfect the grid system by which the power of those projects will be delivered at low cost to homes and farms and factories over this whole Pacific Northwest."

As the first Administrator, Ross had had the advantage of being able to interpret the law or at least do what he felt the President would want him to do, such as adoption of the postage stamp rate policy. Ross set up the construction organization and began to build transmission facilities. As will be seen in later chapters Ross spelled out his program in the first BPA annual report, in his speeches, in testimony to Congress, in the employee bulletin, and in the correspondence. In fact he had begun to influence Franklin Roosevelt's ideas about power in 1931 while Ross was a consultant to the New York Power Authority. He had also