A JUSTIFICATION OF GENERAL SULLIVAN

I regret to see an injustice done to the memory of one who made as great sacrifices for the cause of American liberty and national independence as any other general officer of the Continental army. I allude to General Sullivan. The following considerations show that the charges in the July number [1879], in the article on the French in Rhode Island, imputing unnecessary delay to General Sullivan in 1778 are not just.

It is there stated (III. 390) " that the plans of the allied forces were to fall to the ground from the delay of General Sullivan in his preparatory movements," and the golden opportunity lost between the 29th of July (when D'Estaing arrived with his fleet off Newport) and the 9th of August (when the French army disembarked on Conanicut, and reembarked, and the Americans crossed on to the island). I have in my possession the correspondence of the general officers connected with the expedition, and have studied it carefully in preparation of a paper on the siege of Newport, read in 1875-1876 before the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania Historical Societies. I shall be glad to submit this correspondence to any student of our revolutionary history who takes an interest in the subject. I am confident that no one familiar with this, the best evidence of what occurred, will discover in it the shadow of foundation for the charge of needless delay, but on the contrary every proof of dispatch. These papers came into my possession from the grandsons of General Sullivan, and I feel it my duty, and shall be doubtless justified in the public mind, to defend his reputation when unjustly assailed.

When D'Estaing arrived off New York a joint attack was intended by his fleet and the army of Washington on that city. But this not proving practicable, on the 20th of July Hamilton wrote Washington that D'Estaing had decided for Newport. By the 23d, Sullivan, apprised of this intention, began his preparations. A few weeks earlier he had informed Congress that the 1,500 men under his command were scattered from Point Judith to Seconnet Point, sixty miles. As on the 17th of July the garrison of Newport had been reenforced to 7,000 veterans, at least double that number, according to military rules, were needed for the attack, and to form part of this force there were 4,000 French soldiers in the fleet. Washington sent him about 2,000 men from the army

which fought at Monmouth. The greater part of his army Sullivan had to collect from their farms and workshops throughout New England or from their business pursuits in its large towns. Supplies for twenty thousand men, including the French soldiers and sailors, were to be gathered, boats, guns and ammunition to be provided; and D'Estaing looked to him for whatever he needed, after his long voyage aboard his ships.

The army was thus not only to be largely created, but organized, drilled and disciplined; the officers in many instances being as inexperienced as their men. As to the battle of Butts' Hill on the 29th of August, of the 5,000 who then composed the army, only 1,500 had been under fire, and these must have consisted of the Continentals sent by Washington; it will readily be conjectured how difficult was the task. These preparatory movements and arrangements took time; and by the 8th of August-when the arrival of a considerable portion of his troops from Boston rendered it prudent to cross on to the island, and the withdrawal of the two regiments of the enemy posted at Butts' Hill permitted the Americans to cross unopposed, to have gathered together an army of ten thousand men in two weeks from such distances, and to have organized out of such material, militia and volunteers, fit for service, a force competent to cope with seven thousand veterans, strongly entrenched, deserves praise, and not blame.

It should be remembered that the arrival of the English fleet from Europe or the storm were not events for calculation. The conjuncture demanded dispatch, but not precipitation. Had Sullivan crossed on to the island with an inferior force and insufficient supplies, and encountered disasters, he would have been more reasonably obnoxious to criticism. The requirements of his responsible command were zeal, activity and prudence, and whoever reads the letters which were passing in those eventful days, urging forward troops and supplies, and upon other matters-forty or fifty in French-will be convinced that they were not wanting in the General-in-Chief or in his coadjutors; and he had with him the Greenes, Varnum and Cornell, and much of the time Lafayette likewise.

Before the arrival of the troops from Boston and the evacuation by the enemy of the lines on Butts' Hill on the 8th of August, the design had been for the Americans to cross at Fogland Ferry, and the Provence and Engageante, under Preville, were ordered while the troops were approaching to join the Alcméne and Aimable, under St. Cosme, stationed there since the 30th of July to protect the crossing. Opposition

was expected, and due precautions taken, requiring time, as also preconcerted arrangements, as the French were to have landed simultaneously on the west shore of the island, either near Dyer's Island or between it and Coddington Cove, and thus cut off the two regiments at Butts' Hill. Wind and its direction were important elements for consideration, as the movements depended on support from the fleet. Up to the 9th all had gone prosperously, no time had been lost; neither the people who, in their exhausted condition, sent so large a force into the field; neither officers nor men, French nor Americans, were chargeable with procrastination. They had all done marvellously well. The appearance of the English fleet, the storm, were beyond their control. The spirit of detraction must travel far to find fault with any one. Mr. Stevens relies, I presume, on what he considers good authority for his statement, but I am sure on review of the actual circumstances he will be just to General Sullivan, and at least allow those who have read the charge to consider the reasons which go to disprove it. This charge of delay I have not seen before.* All other charges have been shown to be groundless, and I am sure if the correspondence were published, there would be an end to the fault finding with one who was faithful to the cause, and lost his health and a large part of his means in the contest.

I also submit to the readers the enclosed portions of the General Orders of the 24th and 26th of August, that they may judge for themselves if the opinion alluded to on page 392 of the Magazine, when taken in connection with the occasion and the context, was just or well grounded. It was very prudent and reasonable that Washington and Greene should "disavow" what seemed to be an imputation on the good faith of our allies, who, after inducing such costly preparations, abandoned our army in a position of such great danger and probable humiliation. Unless compelled by greater disasters than they seemed to have sustained on their return on the 20th, in the pursuit of the English fleet, from the storm or partial engagements, they certainly were under obligation to incur some risk, and if they had tarried forty-eight hours Newport would have fallen. Sullivan no doubt, as a good officer and patriot, was willing to be sacrificed to prevent any unpleasantness endangering the alliance and cooperation of the French, but it does not necessarily follow that his language in the orders of the 24th was indiscreet or unseasonable. It certainly did not prevent a good understanding before the week was over with D'Estaing. Considering what is now known of the state of feeling in the fleet, the irritations existing between the Admiral and his officers, reported by Greene, should be taken into account.

Towards the close of the General Orders of August 24th is the passage to which exception has been taken by the article. It reads: "The General cannot help lamenting the sudden and unexpected departure of the French fleet, as he finds it has a tendency to discourage some, who placed great dependence upon its assistance, though he by no means supposes that the army, or any part of it, is the least endangered by the movement. The enemy now on the island are far inferior in numbers to this army, and are so sensible of their inferiority that nothing can tempt them to action. This superiority we shall maintain, so long as the spirit and ardor of Americans continue to be the same as in the beginning of this enterprize, unless the enemy should receive a strong reenforcement. This is the only event which can oblige us to abandon any part of the island we are now possessed of, and this event cannot take place in an instant. A considerable time will be required for a fleet to enter the harbor, come to anchor, and land a body of men sufficient to make the number of the enemy equal to ours. The General assures the army that he has taken into consideration every event that can possibly happen, and has guarded in such a manner that in case of the most disagreeable, a retreat, it can be made with the greatest safety. It is with grief and astonishment he finds large numbers of volunteers are about to quit the island at this time, and give to America a lasting proof of their want of firmness and bravery. The approaches to the enemy's line are to be carried on with the greatest despatch. The General is fully sensible of the value the brave officers and soldiers and citizens are to America, and he is determined that no rash steps shall make a sacrifice of them. At the same time he wishes them to place a proper confidence in him as their commander-in-chief, whose business it is to attend to their safety. Yet he hopes Americans will prove by the event able to procure that by their own arms which their allies refuse them assistance in obtaining."`

It having been suggested that the last sentence of this General Order might give umbrage to the unreasonable susceptibilities of the French General and his officers, General Sullivan, not that he conceived any reparation was due, for the withdrawal of the fleet at such a time warranted an expression of warmth, and the language used was that best adapted to keep up the spirit of his troops, on which their safety depended, but still not disposed to endanger the good understanding between the two countries, endeavored the day but one after to do away any impression that might have that tendency.

On the 26th August he says in his General Orders: "That having secured his heavy cannon and provided a safe and easy retreat in case of misfortune, he thinks proper to inform the army that he has the strongest reason to expect that before reenforcements arrive to oblige us to quit our present position, that the French fleet will return to cooperate with us in the reduction of the island. It having been supposed by some persons that by the orders of the 24th instant the commander-inchief meant to intimate that the departure of the French fleet was owing to a fixed determination not to assist in the enterprise, and as the General would not wish to give the least color for ungenerous and illib eral minds to make such unfair interpretations, he thinks it necessary to say that he could not be acquainted with the Admiral's orders, or determine whether the removal of the French fleet was absolutely necessary. He, however, hopes that their speedy return will show their attention and regard for the alliance formed between us, and add to the obligations which the Americans are already under to the French nation. However mortifying the departure of the French fleet was to us at such a time of expectation, we ought not too suddenly to censure the movement, or for an act of any kind to forget the aid and protection which has been afforded us by the French since the commencement of the present contest. He regrets the numbers of militia or volunteers whose time is up who are going off, and begs those who can to stay a few days longer."

This was on Wednesday, and on Friday, the 28th, 3,000 of the volunteers and militia having gone home, leaving his force less than the British behind their entrenchments, and informed by Washington that reenforcements to the garrison (who-about 4,000-actually arrived on Monday, the 31st) were on their way from New York, he moved his army Tuesday night in good order eleven miles to Butts' Hill, and on Saturday took place what Lafayette pronounced the best fought battle of the war. The numbers on either side were equal, about 5,000, and it ended by a charge of the light corps and a regiment under Jackson from Massachusetts, under Colonel Livingston, ordered by Sullivan, which drove the British to their lines on Quaker Hill at the point of the bayonet; and on the night of the 30th the Americans left the island without loss, unopposed.

THOMAS C. AMORY

* "On the eighth, the French fleet, which a whim of Sullivan had detained for ten days in the offing, ran past the British batteries into the harbor of Newport." Bancroft's History of the Unitec States, Vol. X., p. 147, Boston, 1874. EDITOR.