ly becoming his slave; so a people, by giving absolute power to a number of men over themselves, with a military force to support such power, necessarily give up their own liberty, and become slaves.

To suppose that the people have still rights which they can rely upon, and that these absolute rulers must regulate their conduct by the constitution when there is no umpire that can oblige them to adhere to any rule, must be a deception; for it is plain, that the people's rights are of the same nature as the emperor's right to his annuity, and the people, like him, must take such usage as the rulers think proper to give them. There is no alternative but an appeal to a ruinous civil war.

Ir also follows, that where the sovereign power is exclusively possessed by the higher ranks of the society, the lower, in that case, are slaves to the classes that have the sovereignty, and may expect to be oppressed with taxes,

with humiliating laws, to gratify the avarice and pride of the high ranks.

THIS tyranny, which is inseparable from power over the persons and property of others, produces a settled rancour and jealousy between those classes that have the power, and those over whom it is exercised, which necessarily tends to breed sedition and civil war, not only by these galling provocations, but such a situation makes actually the interest of the oppressed classes, to endeavour to raise one person to absolute dominion over the whole society; as that will not only humble their imperious neighbours, and break their galling yoke, but will also have a strong tendency to equalize the taxes, as an absolute monarch has in general no desire to favour the higher ranks by the mode of taxation, far less to extend their power over the lower by humiliating laws; on the contrary, he eyes men of high rank with a constant jealousy.

SECTION X.

Equality of Rights, as advantageous to the highest Ranks as to the lowest.

THE different constitutions, which the American and the French legislators formed for their respective nations, for the preservation of order and public liberty, against anarchy and despotism, were, in essential regulations, exactly similar.

CERTAIN numbers of men, differently divided, were, by all of them, intrusted with absolute power over the persons and property of the society. But if sufficient attention had been paid to the consequences, no hope could have been entertained, that intrusting absolute power in the hands of a number of men, would alleviate the evils which that power had always produced, when in the hands of

one.

Ir seems to be owing to a full conviction. that kings in general will oppress their subjects to gratify their selfish passions, if intrusted with absolute power, that the friends of mankind, in such unqualified terms, reprobate an absolute monarchy, and have shown such an anxious desire to form checks upon such a power.

BUT certainly there is as much reason to suspect the selfishness of the men who are to be the check upon the monarch, and of the men who are jointly intrusted with absolute power in governments called Republican, unless we suppose that absolute kings only are ambitious and selfish.

But as no person of common sense can suppose this to be the case, there is no reason for expecting any advantage from taking a part of the power from the king, and intrusting it with one or more councils, whose interest it is

to connive with the king, or from intrusting the whole power to a number of men without a king.

IN governments in which the sovereign power is divided among a number of councils, whether with or without a king, it is thought to be essentially requisite, that each part of the government shall be so constituted as to be able to preserve its share of power, it being expected that each part will endeavour to extend its power, which, if effected, must necessarily lessen the power of some other part, and destroy the equilibrium and harmony of the whole.

Bur although the power of each of the parts of the government could be so balanced, as that all of them could preserve their respective shares; still the same passions which tempt the parts of the government to encroach upon one another, must operate and tempt the

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