pel the bank directors to be answerable for their conduct. But the members of congress are collectively above law, and they had not made themselves answerable individually. In forming the national constitution, those legislators seem to have been swayed by prejudices in favour of certain political systems*, and by

THE far-famed trial by jury, is an instance of this prejudice and servility of imitation; for though its principles for equity and 'protection are above all praise, yet its form, and the unanimity required in the verdict, can be termed nothing less than absurd.

THE American legislators, in forming, or in reforming the jurisprudence of the States, or of the Union, have not attempted any improvement in it. To require twelve men to think alike, on any subject, discovers, one would suppose, a very imperfect acquaintance with the structure of the human mind, and with the variety of aspect and of evidence which almost every case admits of: but, to require this under the pains of being held in duresse and threatened with starvation, is too ridiculous to be reasoned on, yet too true to be denied. Every conscientious juror has felt the irksomeness and absurdity of this, and the freedom of his mind fettered by its operation. A knave or a fool may, and in fact, has been known to starve a jury into compliance.

IT is alleged, that in criminal cases this unanimity is required out of tender regard for the life of a fellow creature; and there are some who contend, that, should a majority, or two-thirds, be made decisive in other cases, yet humanity would require unanimity in matters of life and death. But even here experience has shown it to be unnecessary; for, in the country of our author, where the trial by jury is almost exclusively confined to matters of a criminal na

a strong bias for personal power and emoluments; but in forming the constitution for the bank, their judgment seems to have been free from all bias. They gave the directors, therefore, such power only, as they judged necessafor executing the business of the company.

ry

Ir is obvious that this constitution, which was formed for the bank by the American legislators, is exactly the same in its essential regulations, as that of the Roman republic. The directors, or senate of the bank, have full power to manage the current business, but the legislative power, and the disposal of offices, remain with the proprietors. This is certainly acknowledging in the most unequivocal manner, the superior excellency of the regula tions adopted by the Romans, for the management of the common concerns of a society.

ture, involving life or limb, and where the jury consists of fifteen, of whom the narrowest majority is equally decisive for or against the person tried, it hath been asserted, and believed to be correct, that in an equal number of cases, tried by a jury of twelve giving an unanimous verdict (as is practised in South Britain) there hath been even a greater number condemned to death. AUTHOR'S FRIEND.

SECTION V.

A sketch of a Constitution for an extensive Country, upon the Roman principles.

As the Roman constitution was at first formed for a few thousands of people possessing a small territory, and never afterwards altered, it is obvious that the inconveniences of its mode of taking the votes in one place, when electing officers, or enacting laws, would increase with the increase of the people, and with the extent of territory. And it has been supposed that these inconveniences cannot be obviated. To show the probability, however, that they may at least be much lessened, I shall attempt the sketch of an ideal constitution for an extensive country, upon the same fundamental principles of justice and common prudence.

FOR this end it is necessary in the first place to inquire, at what age the right of voting, and of holding civil offices, ought to commence? Civilized nations have, in general, thought it proper to refuse individuals power over their own fortune, until they arrive at a particular age, supposing that their passions and want of experience while younger, would induce them to spend it foolishly. But if this restraint be necessary in their private affairs, where interest operates as a powerful check upon their passions, how much more necessary to continue the restraint longer, against their exercising important public trusts, where interest, in place of being a check, often operates as a spur to the passions.

EVEN a right to elect magistrates is a great public trust, when confined to males above a certain age; as such voters act not only for themselves, but also for the females of all ages, and the males under age. But the office of a

magistrate is an incomparably greater trust. Considering the many instances of young persons, who in a few years spend their fortunes and ruin their health, from the want of experience, and from the violence of their passions, their own interest being an insufficient check to prevent them, nothing can appear more imprudent than to intrust such persons with the magistracy, or even with the right of voting. Would it not be prudent, and give greater steadiness and respectability to national deliberations, if none were allowed to hold any magistracy, or to vote for any public officer, until they were forty years of age? Such a regu

Few citizens of the United States will relish this proposal to prohibit the exercise of the elective franchise till forty years of age. The author is impressed with the idea of election mobs: here are no such things-and even in Revolutionary France, we are assured there has never been an election mob; the division of a country into small districts, for elective purposes, is a complete preventive of any such inconvenience. I wish the author could have been present at one of our elections, and seen a youth for the first time numbered with freemen. The valorous knight in the age of chivalry never felt a sentiment more elevated and ennobling than does a youth on this occasion. And I am disposed to believe that the