Considerations on the Choice of Public Rulers: On the Extent of Their Powers; and on the Best Means of Securing the Advantages, and Reforming the Abuses, of Popular Elections |
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Page 1
... period of about 230 years , the first magistrate of the Romans was called King . But their historians have not gi- ven any account of the particular powers an- nexed to that office , nor of the power of the Senate , or of the society ...
... period of about 230 years , the first magistrate of the Romans was called King . But their historians have not gi- ven any account of the particular powers an- nexed to that office , nor of the power of the Senate , or of the society ...
Page 2
... period , are not specified . By the narratives of the operations of these different powers , however , after that event , as the history becomes more full and authentic , we arrive at last at a certain knowledge of what these different ...
... period , are not specified . By the narratives of the operations of these different powers , however , after that event , as the history becomes more full and authentic , we arrive at last at a certain knowledge of what these different ...
Page 4
... period , which narrated the princi- pal events only , in which the kings were the supreme commanders and directors . BUT if all the speeches in the senate and fo- if all the acts of the senate , and of the as- rum ; 5 semblies of the ...
... period , which narrated the princi- pal events only , in which the kings were the supreme commanders and directors . BUT if all the speeches in the senate and fo- if all the acts of the senate , and of the as- rum ; 5 semblies of the ...
Page 12
... period , who had not arrived at the con- sulate . And that assembly was filled up at each census to its usual number of three hundred , from the inferior offices , by the censors , not in private , but in the public assemblies of the ...
... period , who had not arrived at the con- sulate . And that assembly was filled up at each census to its usual number of three hundred , from the inferior offices , by the censors , not in private , but in the public assemblies of the ...
Page 13
... was finally withdrawn when the comitia by tribes was established , in the 304th year of Rome . After which period , as the majority of the society , each man having an equal vote in 1 his tribe , could make any new law or annul 13.
... was finally withdrawn when the comitia by tribes was established , in the 304th year of Rome . After which period , as the majority of the society , each man having an equal vote in 1 his tribe , could make any new law or annul 13.
Other editions - View all
Considerations on the Choice of Public Rulers: On the Extent of Their Powers ... Thomas S. Arden No preview available - 2019 |
Considerations on the Choice of Public Rulers; On the Extent of Their Powers ... Thomas S. Arden No preview available - 2017 |
Considerations on the Choice of Public Rulers: On the Extent of Their Powers ... Thomas S. Arden No preview available - 2016 |
Common terms and phrases
absolute power affairs allow appointed army assembly bank bribing a majority cerns choose civil command consequence consul councils court direct disposal distribute justice district effects emoluments enacting laws equal votes executive expected friends give Gracchus HENCE higher ranks historians imprudent increase the number individuals interest intrusted judges jury legislators limited monarchy lord high admiral lute magistrates manage military force murder national officers national senate necessary neighbours neral number of men number of voters obliged obtain oppress passions patricians persons and property plebeians possessed pretences prevent produced proprietors province provincial senators prudent public agents public offices regulations representatives respective Roman constitution Roman republic Roman senate Rome rulers sanguinary schemes seems sena Servius Tullius slaves sole power sovereign power stewards suppose taking the votes talents Tarquin taxes tempted think proper Tiberius Tiberius Gracchus tion trust tyranny virtue ward ward-voters wardens and jury-men whole society
Popular passages
Page 57 - ... such persons with the magistracy, or even with the right of voting. " Would it not be prudent, and give greater steadiness and respectability to national deliberations, if none were allowed to hold any magistracy, or to vote for any public officer, until they were forty years of age ? Such a regulation would very much lessen the number of voters without injuring the...
Page 58 - Would it not be prudent, and give greater steadiness and respectability to national deliberations, if none were allowed to hold any magistracy, or to vote for any public officer, until they were forty years of age ? Such a regulation would very much lessen the number of voters, without injuring the rights of any class, and would put the magistracy, the election and control of public agents, and the judging and voting on laws, into the hands of men, who from having cooler pa*w>n(, and more experience,...
Page 57 - As there are so many instances of young persons, who, in a few years after their majority, spend their fortunes and ruin their health, from the want of experience, and from the violence of their passions, their own interest being an insufficient check to prevent them, nothing can appear more imprudent than to entrust such persons with the magistracy, or even with the right of voting.
Page 59 - Every three hundred of these, living most contiguous, to form a w«rd, and to meet in a church, or some other convenient place, on a certain day annually, to elect two provincial senators, and one ware'en or judge for the ward.
Page 50 - But by the constitution which was formed for the bank, the directors are not only elected annually, but they are liable to be superseded at any time by their constituents, and each director is liable individually, for every act which he has not protested against which the members of congress are not.
Page 51 - ... congress with power over the property of the nation; yet the American legislators did not think it prudent to allow the directors of the bank any absolute power whatever.