Considerations on the Choice of Public Rulers: On the Extent of Their Powers; and on the Best Means of Securing the Advantages, and Reforming the Abuses, of Popular Elections |
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Page 9
... poor- est Roman an equal vote with the richest , in enacting laws , and to be equally eligible to of fices , as had been the constant practice in Rome , from the building of the city until the method of taking the votes by centuries was ...
... poor- est Roman an equal vote with the richest , in enacting laws , and to be equally eligible to of fices , as had been the constant practice in Rome , from the building of the city until the method of taking the votes by centuries was ...
Page 24
... poor , or any neigh- bour in an amergency , and to pay every debt pointedly by these means acquiring influence with the poor and with neighbours ; which in- fluence would command respect from the high- est ranks to those which were ...
... poor , or any neigh- bour in an amergency , and to pay every debt pointedly by these means acquiring influence with the poor and with neighbours ; which in- fluence would command respect from the high- est ranks to those which were ...
Page 26
... poor ; but they generally left the far greatest part of the conquered people in possession of their pro- perty , and under their own magistrates and laws , upon a treaty , as allies of Rome . By the Roman method of electing officers ...
... poor ; but they generally left the far greatest part of the conquered people in possession of their pro- perty , and under their own magistrates and laws , upon a treaty , as allies of Rome . By the Roman method of electing officers ...
Page 36
... poor men to do in like cases , these proud men murdered the person who took the lead in enacting the law , and those who supported him . No king , or other member of a government , could be safe for a moment , if such sanguinary ...
... poor men to do in like cases , these proud men murdered the person who took the lead in enacting the law , and those who supported him . No king , or other member of a government , could be safe for a moment , if such sanguinary ...
Page 39
... poor , who were great sufferers by the clandestine robberies of these individuals . But these proud men , having so many mean sycophants at their command , under the name of clients , determined to abo- lish these laws of the Gracchi by ...
... poor , who were great sufferers by the clandestine robberies of these individuals . But these proud men , having so many mean sycophants at their command , under the name of clients , determined to abo- lish these laws of the Gracchi by ...
Other editions - View all
Considerations on the Choice of Public Rulers: On the Extent of Their Powers ... Thomas S. Arden No preview available - 2019 |
Considerations on the Choice of Public Rulers; On the Extent of Their Powers ... Thomas S. Arden No preview available - 2017 |
Considerations on the Choice of Public Rulers: On the Extent of Their Powers ... Thomas S. Arden No preview available - 2016 |
Common terms and phrases
absolute power affairs allow appointed army assembly bank bribing a majority cerns choose civil command consequence consul councils court direct disposal distribute justice district effects emoluments enacting laws equal votes executive expected friends give Gracchus HENCE higher ranks historians imprudent increase the number individuals interest intrusted judges jury legislators limited monarchy lord high admiral lute magistrates manage military force murder national officers national senate necessary neighbours neral number of men number of voters obliged obtain oppress passions patricians persons and property plebeians possessed pretences prevent produced proprietors province provincial senators prudent public agents public offices regulations representatives respective Roman constitution Roman republic Roman senate Rome rulers sanguinary schemes seems sena Servius Tullius slaves sole power sovereign power stewards suppose taking the votes talents Tarquin taxes tempted think proper Tiberius Tiberius Gracchus tion trust tyranny virtue ward ward-voters wardens and jury-men whole society
Popular passages
Page 57 - ... such persons with the magistracy, or even with the right of voting. " Would it not be prudent, and give greater steadiness and respectability to national deliberations, if none were allowed to hold any magistracy, or to vote for any public officer, until they were forty years of age ? Such a regulation would very much lessen the number of voters without injuring the...
Page 58 - Would it not be prudent, and give greater steadiness and respectability to national deliberations, if none were allowed to hold any magistracy, or to vote for any public officer, until they were forty years of age ? Such a regulation would very much lessen the number of voters, without injuring the rights of any class, and would put the magistracy, the election and control of public agents, and the judging and voting on laws, into the hands of men, who from having cooler pa*w>n(, and more experience,...
Page 57 - As there are so many instances of young persons, who, in a few years after their majority, spend their fortunes and ruin their health, from the want of experience, and from the violence of their passions, their own interest being an insufficient check to prevent them, nothing can appear more imprudent than to entrust such persons with the magistracy, or even with the right of voting.
Page 59 - Every three hundred of these, living most contiguous, to form a w«rd, and to meet in a church, or some other convenient place, on a certain day annually, to elect two provincial senators, and one ware'en or judge for the ward.
Page 50 - But by the constitution which was formed for the bank, the directors are not only elected annually, but they are liable to be superseded at any time by their constituents, and each director is liable individually, for every act which he has not protested against which the members of congress are not.
Page 51 - ... congress with power over the property of the nation; yet the American legislators did not think it prudent to allow the directors of the bank any absolute power whatever.