Ethics With AristotleIn this incisive study Sarah Broadie gives an argued account of the main topics of Aristotle's ethics: eudaimonia, virtue, voluntary agency, practical reason, akrasia, pleasure, and the ethical status of theoria. She explores the sense of "eudaimonia," probes Aristotle's division of the soul and its virtues, and traces the ambiguities in "voluntary." Fresh light is shed on his comparison of practical wisdom with other kinds of knowledge, and a realistic account is developed of Aristototelian deliberation. The concept of pleasure as value-judgment is expounded, and the problem of akrasia is argued to be less of a problem to Aristotle than to his modern interpreters. Showing that the theoretic ideal of Nicomachean Ethics X is in step with the earlier emphasis on practice, as well as with the doctrine of the Eudemian Ethics, this work makes a major contribution towards the understanding of Aristotle's ethics. |
Contents
Happiness the Supreme End | 3 |
The Statesmans Objective | 8 |
Method and Starting Points | 17 |
What is Happiness? | 24 |
Happiness Defined | 34 |
Taking Stock of the Definition | 41 |
On the Other Goods and the Scope of Happiness | 50 |
Virtues and Parts of the Soul | 57 |
The Works of Reason | 225 |
End and Means in Deliberation | 232 |
Character and Intelligence in Deliberation I | 242 |
Character and Intelligence in Deliberation II | 250 |
Incontinence | 266 |
How Incontinence Is Possible I | 274 |
How Incontinence Is Possible II | 280 |
Incontinent Ignorance | 287 |
Division of the Soul I | 61 |
Division of the Soul II | 67 |
Preliminaries on the Development of Virtue | 72 |
Virtue of Character and the Orthos Logos | 74 |
A Prohairetic State | 78 |
Conditions of Virtuous Action | 82 |
With Pleasure and for the Sake of the Noble | 90 |
The Status of the Mean | 95 |
How We Learn to Be Good | 103 |
A Basis for Justice | 110 |
The Voluntary | 124 |
Strains in the Voluntary | 132 |
Excuses and Nonexcuses | 142 |
It Depends on Him | 149 |
Character as Voluntary I | 159 |
Character as Voluntary II | 164 |
Practical Wisdom | 179 |
The Purpose of NE Book VI | 185 |
Probing the Craft Analogy | 190 |
Against the Grand End View | 198 |
Practice and Production | 202 |
Thought and Desire in Rational Choice | 212 |
Practical Truth | 219 |
Essential Features and Contingent Manifestations | 292 |
Aristotles Analysis | 297 |
Pleasure | 313 |
Pleasure and Natural Inclination | 320 |
The Challenge of Neutralism | 324 |
Pleasure as ValueJudgment | 331 |
Against the Process Theory | 339 |
Nature Pleasure and Reason | 346 |
The Limits of Hedonism | 353 |
Aristotles Values | 366 |
The Problem | 370 |
Goods and Ends in the Eudemian Ethics | 373 |
Theōria in the Eudemian Ethics | 383 |
A Sketch of the Nicomachean Position | 388 |
The Need to Justify Theōria | 392 |
Divine Activity versus Human Happiness | 398 |
Living like the Gods | 408 |
The Best Life | 427 |
Works Cited | 439 |
445 | |
453 | |
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Common terms and phrases
according actual affirmation Akrasia animals answer argued Aristotelian Aristotle says Aristotle's Aristotle's Ethics assumption behaviour cause character cognitive conception concerned conclusion consider countervoluntary craft deliberation deliberative depends desire disposition distinction divine enjoy ethical eudaimonia Eudemian Eudemian Ethics Eudoxus excellence explain fact function Glaucon grasp ground happiness hedonism Hence human ical ignorance implies intellectual intelligence interpretation J. O. Urmson judgment kind knowledge live logically matter means metaphysical moral virtue nature Nicomachean Nicomachean Ethics noble nonrational object one's orthos logos particular passage person philosopher Phronesis physical Plato pleasant pleasure politikos position possible practical argument practical virtue practical wisdom premisses prescription principle prohairesis prohairetic pursue question rational choice reason response sake seems sense situation Socrates someone sort soul suppose supreme Theaetetus theoretic activity theōria theory things thought tical tion true truth virtuous action voluntary agent