in Chancery, and a perpetual Injunction granted for this Fraud in B. in concealing the Entail; since, had it been disclosed, the settlement might have been made good by a recovery (0).

Although (except in some few cases already noticed) a power defectively executed does not admit of relief, yet if the Remainder-man, with notice of the defect, has lain by a considerable time, and suffered the Appointee to expend Money on the Estate, and acquiesced in his Title, a Court of Equity will compel him to make good the defect (p).

So, where one made his Will, and his Wife Executrix, and his Son afterwards prevailed on his Mother to get the Father to make a new Will, and to name him Executor, he promising to be a Trustee only for his Mother; this was considered a Fraud, and the Son held to be accountable as a Trustee (q).

There are a variety of cases where a person standing by, and by silence contributing to a Fraud, has been compelled to remedy the mischief his fraudulent silence has occasioned (r).

The servants of a Grazier driving a flock of Sheep to London were encouraged by an Innkeeper to put the Sheep into pasture grounds belonging to the Inn;

(0) 3 Bacon's Abr. 299. (p) Sugden on Powers, 303, 1st edit. and the cases there cited.

(g) Thyne v. Thyne, 1 Vern. 296; and see also other cases determined on the same principle; as Mead and Webb, 4 Bro. P. C. 497, a case between Lessor and Lessee as to a suppression of the amount of Land demised. Ramsden and Hyl

held bad on account of the suppression of a Settlement. Beatriff and Smith, Eq. Ca. Abr. 357, which was a Sale of Land and suppression of articles.

(r) See Hunsden v. Cheney, 2 Vern. 150, the concealment of an Entail; see also Draper and Borlan, 2 Vern. 370, Concealment of an Encumbrance. Ibbotson and Rhodes, 2 Vern. 554, Concealment of a Mort

the Landlord seeing the Sheep, consents they shall stay there one night, and then distrains them for Rent; but the Court relieved him against the distress, with Costs, at Law and in Equity (s).

If a Conveyance by Lease and Release, or Bargain and Sale, has been obtained by means, which in a Court of Equity have the character of Imposition, Fraud, Oppression, or under Advantage, which, indeed, may all be comprehended under the general term Fraud, a Fine, constituting part of that Conveyance which is so affected, whatever may be the effect at Law, is no bar to relief in Equity. The Person deriving Title under it is a Trustee; and the species of relief is by directing a Re-conveyance (t). If a Contingent Remainder is destroyed by a legal Conveyance, and that Conveyance is obtained by Fraud, Equity will relieve against it (u). And so, where a Fine, followed by Non-claim, was levied by one who got possession under a forged Deed, a Court of Equity decreed against the Fine (x). In a very early case, where a Fine and Recovery were obtained by circumvention, it was held, that the Party taking the benefit of them was compellable to recompense the person circumvented (y).

(s) Fowkes v. Joyce, Prec. Ch. 7. S. C. 2 Vern. 129.

(t) Pickett v. Loggon, 14 Ves. 234; see also Wilkinson v. Brayfield, 2 Vern. 307. Baker v. Pritchard, 2 Atk. 390. Barnsley v. Powell, 1 Ves. 289. In Penne v. Peacock, For. 42, it was doubted how far fraud could affect so solemn an act as a Fine; but in the same case in MS. no such doubt appears.

(u) Englefield v. Englefield, 1 Vern. 443, 446.

(x) Cartwright v. Pulteney, 2 Atk. 381; and see Addison and Committee v. Dawson, 2 Vern. 678, and Clarke by Committee v. Richards, 2 Vern. 412.

(y) Welby v. Welby, Tot. 164; and see Wright v. Booth, Ibid. 166. Coleby v. Smith, 1 Vern. 205.

Letters Patent, if obtained by Fraud, may be set aside at the suit of the Attorney-General (≈).

Fraudulent Instruments may be proved to be such by facts apparent on the face of the Instrument, as well as by extrinsic Evidence. The consideration of a Deed may be such as, of itself, to show the Deed was fraudulently obtained. Allusion has already been made to the case of young Heirs, and Reversioners, and in what manner inadequacy of consideration affects Contracts by them (a). In regard to Persons not standing in those situations, mere inadequacy of Price, unless it amount to what is termed, gross inadequacy, is not a ground for annulling an Agreement, though executory, if the same appears to have been fairly entered into, and understood by the Parties, and capable of being specifically performed; still less does such inadequacy form a ground for rescinding an Agreement executed; but under such circumstances the Court would not decree a specific performance of an executory Agreement (b). Lord Chief Baron Eyre observed, that "there was no case where mere inadequacy of Price, independent of other circumstances, had been held sufficient to set aside a transaction (c)." A bargain may be hard and unconscionable, and yet valid, "unless " as Lord Eldon says, "the inadequacy of Price is such as shocks the conscience," and amounts in itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of Fraud in the trans

(z) Attorney-General v. Vernon, 1 Vern. 277, 370. S. C. 2 Ch. Rep. 353.

(a) Ante, p. 119. (b) See Day v. Newman, 2 Cox 77; and see post.

2 Bro. 180, in n. S. C. 1 Cox, 383, by the name of Griffith v. Spratley; and so Moth v. Atwood, 5 Ves. 845, and what is said by Lord Erskine in Lowther v. Lowther, 13 Ves.

action (d). The inequality must be so gross that a man would start at the bare mention of it (e); but "inadequacy," says Chief Baron Macdonald, "is not to be measured by a little on one side, or the other, by this or that excess, if so, where shall we cast anchor (f) ?”

Whenever, therefore, an Agreement is so extremely inadequate as to satisfy the conscience of the Court, by the amount of the inadequacy, that there must have been imposition, or that species of pressure upon distress, which in the view of a Court of Equity amounts to oppression, the Court will give relief (g); as where fifty guineas were given for an Estate worth 700l. (h). An Annuity cannot, generally speaking, be set aside for inadequacy of Price (i); but if the price be grossly inadequate, it may, it seems, be set aside (k). What shall be termed gross inadequacy has not been defined, unless the saying, "what shocks the conscience," be a definition. If Premises worth 227. are let for 16 l. 8s., the difference is not so gross as to vitiate the bargain on the

(d) Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. 246; and see Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Wms. 203. Gibson v. Jeyes, 6 Ves. 273. Crowe v. Ballard, 1 Ves. jun. 219. S. C. 2 Cox, 253. How v. Wilden, 2 Ves. 516. Low and Barchard, 8 Ves. 137; and what is said in Burroughs v. Lock, 10 Ves. 474. Murray v. Palmer, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 488. and Western v. Russell, 3 Ves. & Bea. 192, 3.

(e) Per Lord Eldon, in Astley v. Weldon, 2 Bos. & Pull.

(g) Underhill and Horwood, 10 Ves. 219. Peacock v. Evans, 16 Ves. 517; and see what is said in Darley v. Singleton, 1 Wight. 29.

(h) Boothby v. Vernon, g Mod. 147.

(i) Floyer against Sherrard, Ambl. 18. Speed and Philips, 3 Anst. 752.

(k) Heathcote and Paignon, 2 Bro. C. C. 167. Lawley v. Hooper, 3 Atk. 278; but see the observations on those cases in Mac Gee v. Morgan, 2 Sch. & Lefr.395, in note, Lamplugh v. Cox, 1 Dick. 411. Underhill v. Horwood, 10 Ves. 219.

Where

ground of inadequacy of consideration (1). a Sale was for one half of the worth, that, it has been held, would be relieved against (m): such, certainly, was the doctrine of the Civil Law; and in an early Case the Chancellor wished it were so in England (n), but the Decision alluded to does not appear to have been followed (0).

The doctrine of the Scotch Law as to facile Men (p) does not apply, in its full extent, in England; but wherever a person, taking advantage of the necessities of another, practises extortion, a Court of Equity will decree the Party to refund, and without inquiring into the particular circumstances of the imposition (q). Lord Eldon, however, has on this subject put a very strong case: "Suppose," says he, "that A. B. had said, Make out your Title as Heirs; I will give no information or assistance; but if without doing so you will take 1,000l., I will give that sum' considering the passages that are to be met with in the Judgments of this Court, though a valuable Property had been acquired, to which that sum was very inadequate, I will not say whether such a case would have been reached by the Doctrine of this Court, protecting, upon public principles, persons in distress (r)."

When a Bond is obtained from one in distress, and

(1) Lukey v. O'Donnel, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 471.

(m) Maskeen v. Cole, T. T. 8 Geo. 2. 1733. MS.

(n) 2 Chan. Cas. 121. (o) See what is said in Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 292.

(p) As to this doctrine it may gratify curiosity to see

in the Hebrides, p. 428, and what Dr. Johnson observes upon it.

(q) Thornhill v. Evans, 2 Atk. 330.

(r) Pickett v. Loggan, 14 Ves. 240; and see on this subject Ardglasse v. Muschamp, 1 Vern. 237, 239. Proof v.