the day the Bill was filed, has been held to be á contempt (s). And though a Marriage has been had with a Ward of Court, and some years elapse before it comes to the knowledge of the Court, yet it will not suffer time to affect the right of the Court to interpose in respect of the contempt (t); but it will not punish the Party in such case, unless very strongly called upon so to do (u). If the Father is of ability, and implicated in the procurement of the Marriage, the Court, it seems, will use its animadversion, to obtain a proper provision from him. In Settlements of the Property of Female Wards of Court, much will depend upon the Fortune of the Husband, and his conduct. If a Beggar marries the Woman for the sake of her Fortune, the Court will not permit him to touch that Fortune; but if the Husband be of equal rank and fortune with the Ward, and as considerable a Settlement is made by the one as by the other, attention will be paid to such circumstances (r). The usual Settlement seems to be, to settle one fifth of the Dividends and Interest of the Property upon the Husband, and the residue upon the Wife, for her sole and separate use during their joint Lives, with a clause to prevent antici (s) Sallis v. Savignon, 6 Ves. 572. The modes in which a marriage in Scotland may be effected, are fully considered in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, decided, with his usual learning, eloquence, and judgment, by torial Court of London, 16th July, 1811. See Dr. Dodson's Report of this Case. (t) Ball v. Coutts, 1 Ves. and Beames, 297. (u) Ibid. 302. pation (y), and a power to the Wife to give another one-fifth to the Husband by Will; the residue, subject to a Provision for maintenance, to accumulate, and with the Principal to go to the Children at their ages of twenty-one or Marriage, or if only one Child, to that Child; and in the event of a second Marriage (2), a power to the Wife to charge, by way of Appointment, to each Child by the first Marriage (a). In case of no Children, the Husband surviving, the Limitation is, in default of appointment, to her next of Kin, exclusive of the Husband (b). In a gross case on the part of the Husband, the Court refused even to pay his debts out of the accumulations (c). Contriving a Marriage, without a due publication of Banns, is a conspiracy at Common Law, exclusive of the contempt, for which, it has bean said, a Party may and ought to be indicted (d); and where, upon the Marriage of a Ward of the Court, the Husband had falsely sworn she was of age, though only fourteen, the Clergyman was ordered to attend, and was reprimanded, and the Husband was committed, and ordered to be indicted, which he was, and was convicted, and suffered the punishment of the Pillory and Imprisonment. On his Petition to be discharged (y) See Chassaing v. Parsonage, 5 Ves. 17. (z) In one case on a second Marriage, the Wife was enabled to settle the Interest of a moiety of her fortune on the second Husband. See 4 Ves. 386. (a) See Wells v. Price, 5 Ves. (b) Bathurst v. Murray, 8 Ves. 74. (c) Chassaing v. Parsonage, 5 Ves. 15. (d) Priestly v. Lamb, 6 Ves. 421. Schrieber v. Leteward, 2 Dick. 592, and the cases cited; and 2 P. Wms. 560. on executing a Settlement, the Chancellor would not approve a proposal giving him any further Interest than in case of his surviving his Wife, and no Children, and an Appointment in his favour by his Wife (e). It has been determined, that a General Act of Pardon, though with an exception of contempts, extends to pardon contempts in marrying Infant Wards of a Court of Equity (ƒ). Agreements before Marriage, and in consideration of the Marriage, on behalf of Infants, by Parents and Guardians, or by the Infant alone (g), have, as to Personal Estate, been held binding on the Infants (h). Indeed, if a Parent or Guardian could not, in such cases, contract on behalf of a Female Infant, so as to bind the property, the Husband, as it is a personal thing, would be absolutely entitled to it immediately upon the Marriage (i). And though in cases of this kind, Parents or Guardians act fraudu lently or corruptly, the Marriage Agreement is not therefore to be set aside, or the Children to be stript, but the Father or Guardian will be decreed to make satisfaction, as will, also, the Husband, if a Party to the Fraud (k). It seems, however, to be (e) Millet v. Rowse, 7 Ves. 419, and vid. what is said of that case in Ball v. Coutts, 1 Ves. & Beames, p. 298. (f) Phipps v. Earl of Anglesea, 1 P. Wms. 696. (g) Williams v. Chitty, 3 Ves. 545; see on this subject Slocombe against Glubb, 2 Bro. C. C. 551. (h) 3 Atk. 613. 2 P. Wms. 608. Anslie v. Medlycott, 9 Ves. 19; and see Durnford and (k) Harvey and Ashley, 3 Atk. 611. settled, (after much contrariety of opinion,) that a Female Infant cannot be irrevocably bound by Articles entered into during Minority, as to her Real Estate, but may refuse to be bound, and abide by the Interest the Law casts upon her, which nothing but her own act, after the period of majority, can fetter or affect (1); such as by receiving Interest (m), or accepting a Jointure for a year and a half (n). Even a partial accession at twenty-one to a Settlement by a Female Infant would be considered as an Election to abide by the whole (o); and it is to be observed, that if a Male Infant marries an adult Female, who by Settlement covenants that her Estate shall be settled to certain uses, he is bound by her Covenant (p). And if a Female Infant does not when of age choose to accede to the engagement on her Marriage, the conscience of her Husband is bound not to aid her in defeating it; and in Equity, as he would not be permitted to do so, her act during Coverture would not be effectual (9). If, for instance, the property of the Female Infant consisted of an Estate for Lives, she might, when of age, refuse to do any act; but the Husband being seised jure uxoris, would have a right to say, that if she would not settle according (1) Clough v. Clough, 5 Ves. 717. S. C. before Lord Thurlow, 4 Bro. C. C. 510, mentioned, 3 Wooddeson's Lect. 453, in note; and see what is said in Durnford and Lane, 1 Bro. C. C. 115; and what Lord Eldon says in Milner v. Lord Harewood, 18 Ves. 275, contra Cannell v. Buckle, 2 P. Wms. 243. And see Lord Hardwicke's observations on that case in Harvey v. Ashley, 3 Atk. (m) Franklin v. Thornburgh, 1 Vern. 132. (n) Harvey v. Ashley, 3 Atk. 607, mentioned 2 Ves. 671; and see Smith v. Low, 1 Atk. 490. (0) Milner v. Lord Hare wood, 18 Ves. 277. (p) Slocombe v. Glubb, 2 Bro. C. C. 548. (q) Milner v. Lord Harewood, 18 Ves. 275, 6. to the Agreement, he would take the Rents; and as she could not renew without his consent, he would not give his consent; and if the Estate expired during the coverture she could not complain (r). A Female Infant may be barred of Dower at Law by a Jointure; not, however, in consequence of any agreement of hers, but by force of the Statute, 27 Hen. 8, c. 10. s. 6; and though the Act recites only five modes of limiting an Estate in Jointure, yet these are only mentioned as examples, and do not exclude any other Estate consistent with the intention of the Act (s). So also, in like manner, an Infant may be barred by an Equitable Jointure, provided the Jointure be competent and certain (t), -as certain as her Dower; but if not certain, if only to take place upon a remote contingency, it will not bind (u); in which it differs from a Settlement by an adult Female previously to her Marriage, as to whom, though the provision be inadequate or precarious, it will be a good equitable Jointure (a). A Settlement to bind an Infant must be fair and (r) Milner v. Lord Harewood, 18 Ves. 276. (s) Duchess of Somerset's case, Dyer 97. and see 2482. 4 Rep. 2". (t) See Drury v. Drury, or Earl of Bucks v. Drury, by which name it is reported in 3 Bro. P. C. 492. Wilmot, 177, reversing Lord Northington's decree, which is reported 2 vol. Eden, 39. The opinions in the House of Lords are also reported ibid. p. (u) See Carruthers v. Carru thers, 4 Bro. C. C. 500. Smith v. Smith, 5 Ves. 189. Clough v. Clough, 5 Ves. 710. Lecky v. Knox, 1 Ball & Bea. 215. The essentials to a good jointure under the stat. 27, H. 8. are well stated and illustrated by cases in Cruise's Digest, 1 vol. 218, &c. edit. 2. (x) Carruthers v. Carruthers, 4 Bro. C. C. 500. Williams v. Chitty, 3 Ves. 545. Estcourt v. Estcourt, 1 Cox, 20. Simpson v. Gutteridge, i Madd. Rep. 613. |