Consciousness and Self-Consciousness: A defense of the higher-order thought theory of consciousnessThis interdisciplinary work contains the most sustained attempt at developing and defending one of the few genuine theories of consciousness. Following the lead of David Rosenthal, the author argues for the so-called 'higher-order thought theory of consciousness'. This theory holds that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at the mental state. In addition, the somewhat controversial claim that consciousness entails self-consciousness is vigorously defended. The approach is mostly 'analytic' in style and draws on important recent work in cognitive science, perception, artificial intelligence, neuropsychology and psychopathology. However, the book also makes extensive use of numerous Kantian insights in arguing for its main theses and, in turn, sheds historical light on Kant's theory of mind. A detailed analysis of the relationships between (self-)consciousness, behavior, memory, intentionality, and de se attitudes are examples of the central topics to be found in this work. (Series A) |
Contents
1 | |
12 | |
36 | |
CHAPTER 4 Objections and Replies | 69 |
CHAPTER 5 Does Mentality Require Consciousness? | 103 |
CHAPTER 6 Phenomenal States | 121 |
CHAPTER 7 The Behavior Argument | 143 |
CHAPTER 8 The De Se Argument | 159 |
CHAPTER 9 The Memory Argument | 183 |
Notes | 201 |
References | 207 |
Index of Topics | 216 |
Index of Names | 219 |
the series ADVANCES IN CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH AiCR | 221 |
Other editions - View all
Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-order Thought ... Rocco J. Gennaro No preview available - 1996 |
Consciousness and Self-consciousness: A Defense of the Higher-order Thought ... Rocco J. Gennaro No preview available - 1996 |
Common terms and phrases
able argued argument awareness behavior beliefs and desires blindsight brain causal chapter claim cognitive complex concepts conscious creature conscious experience conscious mental conscious pains conscious rendering conscious system entails conscious thoughts Dennett difficult directed DSAs entails self-consciousness episodic memory example explain FB role field figure first Fodor frame problem Gulick HOT theory idea inner sense intentional attitudes intentionality internal introspection involves Kant Kant’s Kantian kind language language of thought least Lewis McGinn MEBs mental state conscious meta-psychological thoughts mind Moreover multiple realizability necessary neocortex neural nonconscious pains nonconscious thoughts objects occurrent belief one’s mental one’s own mental oneself perceptual perhaps philosophers plausible possession possible premise problem Procedural memory propositional qualitative properties question reason reflective relevant representation require consciousness Robo Rosenthal’s scious Searle seems self-ascribing sensation sensory sophisticated sufficient temporally enduring theory of mind treat understanding visual experience