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to American leadership pales beside those posed by international terrorism and that U.S. policy should accordingly stress cooperation rather than competition with other great powers?
The Global War on Terrorism is the Department’s first priority. U.S. military posture will be tailored to match emerging relationships and local conditions, to contend with uncertainty, and to bring relevant allied capabilities to bear against our terrorist foes. The President’s National Security Strategy emphasizes the imperative of cooperating with major powers in the war against terrorism and in efforts to enhance regional stability.
The United States seeks a candid, constructive, and cooperative relationship with China for that reason among others. China is an emer 'ng power, and we hope to see a China that makes a constructive long-term contri ution to prosperity and security in the region and globally. The United States also intends to continue to play a fundamental role in Asia-Pacific security, maintaining and strengthening its alliances and friendships.
At the U.S.-South Korea “Future of the Alliance” meeting in April, the U.S. proposed a plan to invest over $11 billion over the next four years in enhancements to combined U.S.-South Korean defenses. Could you give us a little more detail about the types of enhancements the U.S. is contemplating?
The upgrades in capabilities that we are committing to will demonstrate the firm US commitment to the U.S.-ROK alliance. Near-term enhancements will include upgrades to our intelligence collection systems, increased numbers of improved precision munitions, rotational deployment of the Army’s newest Stryker unit, and additions to Army pre-positioned stocks to increase readiness on the Peninsula.
The Second Infantry Division has had a primary mission of defending South Korea along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and, specifically, slowing North Korean invasion forces north of Seoul in the event of an attack. Is the Pentagon’s plan to withdraw the Second Division 75 miles south of the DMZ based on an assessment that North Korean conventional forces no longer have the capability to launch a massive invasion of South Korea, an assessment that South Korea is more able to provide for its own frontline defense, or something else? When the Second Division is relocated, what will be its primary military mission on the Korean peninsula? Does the $11 billion force improvement plan announced by the Pentagon include mobile transport assets for the Second Division?
North Korean conventional forces remain a si ificant threat. While South Korean forces have certainly increased their capabi ities significantly in recent years, the successful defense of the Peninsula remains tied to our combined U.S.-ROK defense posture. Realignment of the Second Infantry Division will increase the overall deterrent and defensive posture of our combined forces. This realignment will consolidate the Division’s now-scattered elements outside of North Korean conventional artillery range, increasing force protection for U.S. troops as well the ability of our commanders to employ the formidable capabilities of the division. The Second Infantry Division will continue to have a peninsular focus for the foreseeable future but will also become available for regional contingencies. While the enhancements we are implementing will increase the division’s capabilities as a deployable force, these force improvement plans do not include strategic mobility assets.
The 1991 U.S.-South Korean agreement to shut down the Yongsan Base in Seoul and relocate the U.S. Command personnel to a new base outside of Seoul floundered over the issue of who would pay the cost of this relocation. Has the cost issue been resolved between Washin ton and Seoul over the new agreements to relocate Yongsan and the Second Division. What are the prospective costs of these moves?
In January 2002 we reopened discussions with the ROK government on Yongsan relocation. At this time, several cost-related issues remain between the two governments. We continue to consult closely with the ROK government and are jointly devploping a comprehensive master plan that will allow us to determine the full costs 0 the move.
Some South Korean and U.S. experts have criticized the Bush Administration for deciding to withdraw the Second Division without trying to negotiate with North Korea over mutual force pullbacks from the DMZ, including a pullback of the North Korean artillery that threatens Seoul. They have cited North Korean statements indicating interest in force reductions and pullbacks. Why hasn’t the Administration proposed negotiations for mutual force pullbacks? Why have all Administration statements on conventional force reductions and pullbacks been demands for unilateral North Korean pullbacks?
The possible relocation of the Second Infantry Division south of Seoul is not intended to be a confidence-building measure toward North Korea. The objective of such a relocation would be to improve the capability and flexibility of U.S. and combined forces to respond to a North Korean attack and to respond to hostilities elsewhere around the world. Therefore, the U.S. does not intend to signal to North Korea that we would reduce our forces on the DMZ in return for a withdrawal of North Korea forces from the DMZ.
The heavy concentration of North Korean forces and artillery along the DMZ clearly poses a dangerous threat to Seoul and to our combined US-ROK forces. The U.S. and its ROK allies are agreed that any comprehensive resolution of the tensions on the Peninsula must include a reduction in North Korea’s conventional military threat.
What is the outlook for American bases on Japan, particularly Okinawa? Will the Marine Expeditionary Force currently stationed on Okinawa be relocated elsewhere in the region, and if so, where?
The outlook for U.S. basing in Japan is good. The Japanese Government supports our continued presence, as do most local communities. Neither we nor the Government of Japan seek to have the III MEF relocate out of Japan. At the same time, some of our facilities are located in congested areas, such as the carrier air wing at Atsugi and some of our facilities in southern Okinawa. Where we can find ways to reduce the impact of our presence in such areas, we work with the Government of Japan and affected communities to do so.
What role have the U.S. Marines on Okinawa played in the Afghanistan campaign, the U.S. military support operation in the Philippines in 2002, and the invasion of Iraq? Would relocating them elsewhere in the region enhance their utility?
The Marine Forces based in Okinawa and mainland Japan provided support for the operation in the Philippines in 2002. Some of the forces that went to the Philippines used facilities in Okinawa for intermediate staging. Our Marine forces in Japan did not have a major role in Afghanistan or in Iraq, but instead continued to support our critical security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. On an annual basis, the Marine Forces in Japan conduct some seventy exercises with Japanese and other forces throughout the region. This is in addition to their important deterrent and defense roles. Okinawa’s location makes it an ideal place from which to carry out all these missions.
What is the status of the current plan to relocate Futenma Marine Air Station to a somewhat less congested part of Okinawa, near Camp Schwab, and how might this be affected by the possible withdrawal of major elements of the 3rd Marine Division from Okinawa? Would F utenma or a replacement facility still be necessary to maintain the required level of logistical capacity in the event of a Korean Peninsula or other East Asian contingency?
The Government of Japan and local communities have agreed on what they call a “Basic Plan” under which the Government of Japan will finance and conduct this relocation. The plan envisions construction of a civil-military dual-use facility on landfill in the waters off of Camp Schwab. We support the Basic Plan. Currently, the Government of Japan is conducting environmental assessments associated with the proposed plan. In the meantime, we continue to use the current MCAS Futenma, and expect to continue using it until the new facility is completed. There are no plans to remove Marines from Okinawa in any way that might eliminate the need for MCAS Futenma or its replacement facility.
What is the specific policy goal of the US cooperation with the AFP currently being contemplated? Is it focused only on the elimination of the ASG? Does it extend beyond the ASG to the MILF or the NPA?
The goal of US cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is multifaceted: to help the AFP develop and maintain a logistics, maintenance and supply system; to assist in developing a plan that will support the AFP’s modernization; and to enhance the AFP’s counterterrorism (CT) capabilities. The CT training programs funded initially by the FY02 emergency supplemental include training and equipment for five purposes (or program “modules”):
Helicopter night flying
Assorted courses of instructions (e.g., PSYOPS, Civil Affairs)
Infantry battalion training
President Bush has assured President Arroyo that we will continue this important CT cooperation. In addition to the CT military assistance money, we are helping the AFP develop a maintenance and logistics plan.
In May 2003, Presidents Bush and Arroyo committed to carry out a joint assessment of Philippine defense capabilities and needs in order to help improve the abilities of the AFP to respond to threats to Philippine national security. We are finalizing this Joint Defense Assessment (JDA), and plan to assist the Philippine Government in implementing its key recommendations. The JDA addresses long-term, systemic deficiencies of the AFP as well as near-term operational problems.
What is the current status of discussions between the US and the Philippines about how future counterterrorism deployments can be structured in order to conform to the Philippine constitution? What are the current sticking points, which have delayed the follow-on to last year’s “Balikatan” exercises?
The Defense Department concept for Balikatan 03-1 envisioned U.S. combat support for an operation on Jolo Island led by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), including intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance support; humanitarian and civic action projects; and U.S. advisory teams operating at the battalion level. Through the middle of the year, the Philippines government saw constitutional obstacles to a US combat support role in this AFP-led mission. Additionally, the Philippines side discussed the need to reduce the number of US advisors-observers.
In June 2003, the two sides put these plans on indefinite hold because of continuing constitutional concerns in Manila regarding the Terms of Reference. Both sides agreed to conduct a modest training exercise at the end of 2003, after we have completed our security assistance training modules.
What is the current status of the investigation into the ambush last August in Papua, Indonesia, in which two Americans and one Indonesian were murdered, and several other Americans (including a young girl) were shot? Do you have any reason to dispute the preliminary investigations by Indonesian police and human rights groups, which indicated that Indonesian military personnel were likely involved with the killings? What effect will this investigation and its possible outcome have on U.S. military assistance to Indonesia?
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is investigating this attack, and I would encourage you to ask the FBI for information about the investigation. Our understanding is that the FBI is receiving extensive cooperation from the Indonesrans.
Dod and the USG as a whole are concerned by allegations that members of the Indonesian military may have been involved in this crime, as well as by the slow progress and inconclusive results of the investigation thus far. The Administration’s decision to limit the fiscal year 2003 IMET program to Expanded-IMET courses re
flects these concerns. The U.S. government has made it clear to the Indonesian government at the hi hest levels that we need and expect satisfactory cooperation from Indonesia or it wil affect the entire bilateral relationship.
Do you agree or disagree with the assessment of some observers that reform of the Indonesian military (in terms of increased civilian control and accountability for abuses) has stalled? Does the civilian government have pervasive control of the military? What can the U.S. do to ensure that our assistance to and cooperation with Indonesia helps increase civilian control of the military?
Military reform in Indonesia made dramatic steps forward in the immediate postSoeharto era, but the pace of that reform has slowed. There is civilian control of the military in Indonesia, but it is not as pervasive as in the United States. In time, the consolidation of Indonesia’s new democracy, cultural change in the military, and growing expertise on the part of civilians in Indonesia will enhance civilian control.
he Indonesian Government’s inability to provide ade uate funding to the armed forces hinders efforts to strengthen civilian control. Abo ition of the Territorial System, which enables the Indonesian military, to maintain a pervasive presence down to the village level, will be another im ortant factor for reform.
The administration continues to be ieve the increased interaction with the Indonesian military, not the curtailing of that interaction, is the way to promote reform. IMET and other assistance and cooperation with Indonesia are important precursors to reform and will help to increase civilian control. U.S. training can help build civilian expertise and promote culture change within the military. This is a long-term process and will not achieve results overnight. But we believe that cutting back these U.S. exchanges and training programs is likely to be counterproductive.
During the FY2002 appropriations cycle Congress created a new Regional Defense Counter-terrorism Fund. Have any of those funds been used for Indonesia? If so, how much funding was provided, and what did it go for?
The Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (“CT Fellowship”), administered by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD SO-LIC), has focused on building the military counterterrorism capacity of key countries around the world. The CT Fellowship has enabled Indonesia to participate more fully in U.S. efforts to fight terror in the region. In Indonesia, the CT Fellowship has helped identify current and future military leaders in counterterrorism activities and support their education and training.
Of the $3.7 million of FY02 no-year funds allocated by SO-LIC for assistance to Indonesia, $2.3 million has been spent. In accordance with existing statutory language, all training and education provided under the CT Fellowship program are non-lethal and are limited to Indonesian military officials.
Highlights of courses and programs delivered to Indonesian military students under the CT Fellowship program include:
' Indonesians have attended the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in-residence seminar and the mobile education team seminar on Civil Military Responses to Terrorism created for the CT Fellowship program.
0 Indonesians are attending the new masters degree program Security Building in Post Conflict Environments at NPS.
0 Indonesians are attending a new CT Fellow ship-developed program at the National Defense University’s School for National Security Executive Education. The NDU CT Fellows program draws from several of Dod's most prestigious educational institutions. This is a graduate-level course of study roughly-equivalent to a Masters degree.
. Indonesians have attended the USMC Command and Staff College and the Air Command and Staff College
0 An Indonesian intelligence officer attended Defense Intelligence Agency’s International Intelligence Fellows Program, an invitational program designed to strengthen intelligence community ties and promote regional intelligence cooperation
0 An Indonesian officer attended the National Defense University’s National War College.
0 To address the scarcity of English speakers in the Indonesian military, the CT Fellowship program brought the senior Indonesian military officials responsible for training to the Defense Language Institute-English Language Center (DLI/ELC) to develo an intensive program for increasing English language proficiency in the In onesian military.
— Indonesian military language instructors are being trained at DLI/ELC.
— Language instruction materials and equipment have been provided to the Indonesian military.
— DLI/ELC will send its experts to Indonesia to assist in-country efforts to develop additional language training programs.
The Administration recently has proposed a “Proliferation Security Initiative” intended to cut off international trade in illicit weaponry and material, primarily by North Korea. What is your understanding of how this initiative will work and how detailed the current concept is? Does the United States presently possess adequate legal authorities to interdict weapons shipments on the high seas? Does the Administration intend to seek additional international legal authorities for such actions?
The Proliferation Security Initiative, (PSI), was launched by President Bush in Krakow, Poland on May 31, 2003. Composed of the United States and ten like-minded countries (Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom), the PSI is designed to facilitate active measures to stop the flow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. PSI is a global initiative with global reach. PSI efforts are not aimed at any one country, but at halting worldwide trafficking in WMD, delivery systems, and related materials.
On September 4, PSI participants agreed on a “Statement of Interdiction Principles” outlining a series of practical steps. Many countries around the world have indicated an interest in supporting the PSI principles and contributing to these efforts, and we welcome this support. President Bush has made clear that we seek to broaden PSI to include all countries that have the capacity and willingness to help halt proliferation-related shipments.
PSI countries are committed to acting in a manner consistent with national legal authorities and international law and frameworks. In general, legal authorities already exist to a considerable extent to undertake interdiction operations; PSI countries seek to enhance coordination and use of those authorities.
How important is developing a credible missile defense system to advancing U.S. interests in the Asia Pacific? To what extent, if any, are U.S. and allies at risk from the growing threat of high-speed, precise cruise missiles as well as land-based ballistic missiles which can target fixed position bases and naval deployments? Would an increasingly high threat environment for the U.S. and its allies give the latter pause in joining U.S. actions and perhaps lead the U.S. to reconsider the wisdom of forward deployment in the Pacific?
Developing missile defenses that can protect the U.S. territory and opulations, the territory and populations of friends and allies, and our forward-dep oyed forces is a critical U.S. strategic interest. Missile defenses are part of the new triad for a new era, as outlined in the Defense Department’s Nuclear Posture Review:
0 strike capabilities, both non-nuclear and nuclear, and their associated command and control;
' active and passive defenses, including the command and control for air and mrssrle defenses; and
0 research and development and industrial infrastructure for developing, building, and maintaining offensive forces and defensive systems.
Our allies recognize the growing threat posed by missile defenses, which is why Japan has been working with us in development of missile defense technologies for several years and is now considerin acquisition of missile defenses. Like the U.S., Japan understands that we cannot low others, through their possession of ballistic missiles, to intimidate and blackmail us. Missile defenses will, therefore, reinforce the credibility of the commitments that we and our allies have to one another.