Between Presidential Power and Legislative Veto: The Impact of Polity and Politics on Economic Reforms in BrazilReform success and reform delay are subject to a variety of explanations. In general, high decisiveness leads to reform propensity, while its absence, or high resoluteness, to policy-gridlock. The Brazilian reform experience is contradicting: both aspects are present - factors leading to decisiveness as well as those inducing gridlock and reform delay. Leaving the static point of view and accounting for a dynamic development, this apparent contradiction gets resolved: in fact, the executive gained growing leeway during the 1990s, providing it with the means to achieve a higher degree of decisiveness of the political system by simultaneously guaranteeing resoluteness.It is, however, greatly mistaken to consider this development as a blank cheque to universal, encompassing reforming in all areas. Despite growing executive dominance and growing policy consensus, some particular reforms were a success, while others did not surpass its initial stages. This is finally due to path-dependency and explicit policy-specificities, triggering different institutional constraints and veto-points, which even strong Presidents cannot override. |
Contents
vii | |
13 | |
Crafting Market Reforms with Multiple VetoPlayers The Theoretical Conditions | 27 |
Increasing Decisiveness | 67 |
1988s Constitution 3 2 1 Indecisiveness and Fragmentation as the Incumbents Burden | 80 |
OverRepresentation in Congress | 87 |
b The Negotiating Powers of the Executive Assembling Majorities and Pork Barrel | 104 |
The Missing Powers of the Legislative Stability and Reliance by Submission | 111 |
a Dynamic Perspective | 120 |
Reconstitutionalization | 135 |
Gridlock Delay and Success of Particular Reform Projects | 179 |
constitutionalization | 185 |
Summary and Central Findings | 233 |
Bibliography | 239 |
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Common terms and phrases
actors Additionally Alston Amorim benefits bicameral bills Brazil Brazilian budget budgetary Ciências Sociais coalition College of Leaders compensation Congress consensus constitutional amendment constitutionalization costs CPqD crisis Dados de-constitutionalization debt decentralization decisiveness decree degree democracy deputies dynamics Economic Reform electoral enactment endogenous executive federal government Fernando Henrique Cardoso frequently Fundação Getulio Vargas gains governors gridlock hardwiring ibidem ICMS incentives inflation influence initial institutional issues Itamar Franco Latin America Law of Fiscal leeway legislative major ministries negotiations opposition overall parliamentary particular party patronage perspective pivotal players Plano Real PMDB policy-making Política political system pork-barrelling presidential presidential systems privatization provisional measures provisions rational-choice reform process reform projects relation revenues Revista de Ciências Rio de Janeiro Sao Paulo sector separation of powers separation of purpose social security reform stabilization status quo status-quo structure sub-national success tax reform veto veto-players votes Weyland