ible and may be changed from time to time as experience dictates. The tendency of legislative codes of procedure to become more and more detailed, and increasingly inflexible and complicated, is precisely the thing which will be avoided by the proposed legislation. And finally, the experience of the English courts which have the power to make rules shows that that method is practicable and successful.

The most powerful agency in arousing public sentiment in support of law reform is the press. The subject has recently aroused considerable comment. A particularly interesting discussion was had at the Annual Conference of Bar Association Delegates held in Philadelphia in July, 1924, in connection with the meeting of the American Bar Association. Mr. Yost, President of the National Editors' Association and Dr. Talcott Williams, formerly head of the School of Journalism of Columbia University, presented the newspaper view. Resolutions were adopted for the appointment of a joint committee of lawyers and journalists to study the subject. The Editors' Association, however, afterwards declined to join in the movement. But the Conference of Bar Association Delegates has not abandoned its efforts and has proposed that local bar associations take up the subject with newspapers in their vicinity. Thus the matter has not been advanced very far, but there is encouragement in the fact that prominent journalists are taking a real interest in making the press useful in improving the administration of justice. Its support, or even its intelligent criticism, of projects of law reform, will tend to arouse public opinion and be reflected in action by the law-makers.

But a newspaper is primarily a business undertaking. Its success depends upon its presenting the news of the day in an attractive form, in obtaining profitable advertisement, and in making editorial comments pertinent to the day's work. It is true that a successful newspaper, from the fact of its influence, becomes charged with a responsibility to use its power for the public good. But is it, therefore, to become a reformer and tilt against every abuse which impairs the workings of our institutions? That would be impracticable. But without affecting its material interests the press could do much more than it is doing to promote law reform. The subject is dull; it has little "news value" and to dwell upon the expense and delay in the administration of justice without proposing remedies is much easier and it attracts more readers. And yet editors and publishers have their own favorite subjects, hardly more interesting, upon which they constantly seek to arouse public opinion, as for instance tariff reform, which they favor because they believe that the protective tariff is based on a vicious and unscientific economic policy. Then some of the oldest and most powerful newspapers are ever alert to crusade against what they conceive to be invasions of the right of free speech, free press and free learning. When happen such episodes as the Dayton evolution trial of Scopes, the exclusion under the Immigration Law of the English communist, Saklatvala, the curbing of Karolyi, the Hungarian statesman, the contempt proceeding against Comptroller Craig, the decision of the Supreme Court in the Abrams and other sedition cases, the bill introduced by Lord Darling in the House of Lords of Great Britain to prohibit the publi

cation of the indecent details of divorce trials-when such episodes as these occur, journals all over the country, sometimes confusing freedom with license, fill their columns with protests concerning the fundamental right of freedom of expression.

The never-failing interest of the press in free speech and in the scientific aspect of the tariff illustrates my point. Both subjects are of great importance; indeed, freedom of speech is vital to the preservation of our institutions. But are they more important than that our laws and their administration should assure to the individual citizen prompt and equal justice according to the Anglo-Saxon conception? Whether or not without a judicial system impartially administering justice to the individual, our institutions would have endured for nearly 150 years, it at least cannot be denied that our courts have contributed more than any other agency of our government to produce stability. Both the legislative and the executive departments may stray from the constitutional path; but the remedy is in the hands of the people and may be applied with sufficient promptness to avoid serious results. With the judiciary the case is different. Invasion of the legal rights of the individual or inefficiency in protecting them, come, as Justice Bradley said in the Boyd case, as a result of "stealthy encroachments," by "silent approaches and slight deviations." No influence in checking such encroachments is so potent as that of a vigilant and patriotic press. And if it will also seriously interest itself in constructive measures for the improvement of our judicial process it will be of immense assistance in promoting the cause of law reform.

We can derive little aid from the experience of England in that branch of our jurisprudence based upon the limitations imposed upon political action by our Constitution. Nor can we model any general scheme of law reform upon the experience of England in the Nineteenth Century to which I have referred; for not many of those reforms could be easily transplanted to this country. Methods of administering justice in this country must be fashioned upon American experience and traditions; and then too we must not hastily assume that the administration of justice in England is perfect. Since the passage of the English Judicature Act in 1873, abuses have crept in and the need for another reform, particularly in court procedure, is freely asserted.

In a recent well-considered article in "The Spectator" it is said: "It does appear. . . . that prolixity at the bar and loquacity on the bench have become a great and growing evil." And again: "It is certain that . cases have often been prolonged to make costs, and that there have been-it is said are-members of the profession notorious for the inordinate length of proceedings for which they were responsible. At times, too, crossexamination has been extended beyond all reasonable limits. Complicated questions are put to which a clear, straightforward answer is impossible; witnesses who should simply testify as to facts are interrogated as to their opinion of their or other people's conduct; sometimes the past history of parties and even of independent witnesses is made the subject of searching questions without any real necessity. It would be well if the courts were much stricter in preventing improper and too lengthy cross-examination. The best hope for checking at its source the evil which appears to be grow

ing lies in the professional opinion of members of the bar expressed strongly but-wisely, as a rule-privately. The temptation is one which some natures find it hard to resist. ... Adverse comment on judicial action ought to be very carefully considered, and-in public, at least -expressed in the most respectful terms, but there are cases when it becomes a duty to make it. It will be generally felt that certain comments made in the appeal in the Midland Bank case on the course of the trial in the court below were not only justified but, if duly noted and attended to, would have a salutary effect in restraining utterances which attract attention but do not aid the proper administration of justice. It is said that Baron Bromwell, having once made a remark that was received with applause in court looked up and said, 'I fear that I have said something foolish.'

The restraint of this criticism and its source give it such weight that we must assume that it does not color the picture too highly. How apt it all is to trials in American courts and particularly in the cities! How it shows that human tendencies and weaknesses in lawyers and judges will affect the working of even an ideal system of procedure! Periodical reforms are the only remedy when the cumulative effect of such criticisms as those evoked by the Midland Bank and the Dennistoun cases shall gradually have reached the public conscious

ness.

It is not to be forgotten that the members of the profession who constitute the English trial bar-the barristers constitute a small, highly organized body of men, generally of broad culture, professional and otherwise, who do nothing but try and argue cases. Their reputation and livelihood depend upon their compliance not