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The Pacific region needs three of the six planned Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) to fully support theater warfighting capabilities and region transformation efforts. The primary military force of our friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific region is their Army. §&F participation in regional events reinforces our commitment to support allied transformation efforts and coalition building by continuing Army-toArmy high technology training and exercise events. Additionally, the SBCTs show eat promise in providing joint commanders the means to better integrate Army orce capabilities as part f a ioint or coalition task force. Training Areas. We are tasked to perform an increasing number of missions, from peace operations to strikes and rid. to noncombatant evacuation to humanitarian assistance. Each mission requires preparation. The only way to prepare and ensure readiness is through tough, oriented, and realistic training. 5. ping dummy bombs and firing inert ordnance cannot replace “live-fire” practice. The first exposure to “live fire” our forces face must be in a controlled training environment where they learn from their experience at less risk than in combat. However, we routinely receive encroachment pressure on our training ranges throughout the AOR. Restrictions on space, hours, ordnance, and radio frequencies impact our ability to exercise our o and train to standard. Last Spring, a suit poss to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) temporarily closed our primary aircraft live-fire range, Farrallon de Medinilla, near Guam, until the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals granted an emergency stay. Fortunately, timely Congressional action of the § to exempt DoD military readiness activities, and a subsequent appellate court order dismissed the case as moot. Likewise, Makua Range on Oahu is in use, but severe limits in the number and type of ground force training cycles have forced us to ...'...}. most small unit training in Hawaii through exÉ. deployments to the Pohakuloa range on the Big Island. Range and training imitations in Japan and Korea cause units to deploy away from their home station for routine training. Moreover, although aircraft, artillery, and pistols are noisy instruments of war, they are basic parts of our business. $o. now demand noise restrictions that force important low-altitude maneuvers to unrealistically high altitudes and limit the use of ranges. e are good stewards of our environment. Success stories are numerous, but often the stories aren't well known. We have set aside space for protected species, altered or deferred some units' training to avoid interference in nesting areas, and developed specific programs to increase the populations of protected or endangered specles. The military's answer to encroachment challenges has been to work around the problems while seeking to minimize the impact on the quality and quantity of training. But, maneuver space is less, training lanes have become narrow and artificially tunneled, and our individual maneuvers have become too predictable or repetitive. The work-arounds may still accomplish the training, but usually require additional costs—in terms of money, time, and impact to the well-being of our service members. Readiness and training experiences decline; we cannot let this continue. Many of our environmental laws, while well-intentioned, are vague. For example, the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) prohibits harassment of protected species without prior authorization from the respective regulatory agency. The current definition of “harassment” of marine mammals can be mere “annoyance” or “potential to disturb" without biologically significant effects. Any Navy test or training activity that harasses a protected species must be approved by the applicable regulatory agencies—often after delays, or subject to restrictions, that degrade the quality of the training. And sometimes inflexibilities in the statue preclude our regulators from approving even activities that many believe have insignificant impacts. Additionally, litigants using the Endangered Species Act are seeking to force the Fish and Wildlife Service to lock up thousands of acres of military ranges as “critical habitat", even though our own congressionally mandated Installation Natural Resource Management Plans afford habitat protection. In fact, litigants are seeking to force the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to designate such critical habitat on significant areas of DoD training ranges for endangered species that are not even present on such lands. As these examples show, such loose language and broad definitions can and do impede essential air, land, and sea activities near marine mammals or endangered species locations. Clear definitions and consideration of national security requirements should be important points in all environmental legislation. In April 2002, the Administration sent a legislative package to Congress recommending clarifications to certain environmental statutes as part of the Readiness and Range Preservation Initiative (RRPI). The proposed package was prepared to help DoD maintain its ability to train forces and continue to protect the environment in which we train. Last year, Congress enacted three elements of our proposal but did not act on the remaining five. This year, the President has resubmitted the remaining RRPI proposals, with some modifications based on both discussion with Congress and other environmental stakeholders and a significant decision last year concerning the MMPA in the SurTASS lawsuit. We thank Congress for their support of the RRPI thus far and ask for your continued support on future oft. ment issues that impact our readiness. Logistics. An aging aircraft inventory and some parts shortages continue to drive reduced Mission Capable and reduced fill rates for our “go to war” Readiness Spares Packages and high cannibalization rates. The result is lower than expected readiness at increased costs. Although funding for spare parts has improved over the last 2 years, some shortages continue. For example, only three of eight Pacific Air Force (PACAF) A-10, F-15, and F-16 wings maintained minimum Mission Capable standards during fourth quarter FY02. PACAF requires excess cannibalization to meet wartime mission o: sortie generation rates. PACAF cannibalization rates are higher than 8% for the F-16, F-15C/D, F-15E, and A-10. Likewise, the U.S. Army uses controlled substitution to achieve peacetime mission-capable Aviation Fleet goals. Delays in stock availability due to 12–18 month spares delivery lead-times are a root cause of controlled substitution and create difficulty in matching funding lines with projected capabilities. Increased spares at the Army wholesale level are required to meet the increased flying hours necessary to surge to wartime Operational Tempo. We have made progress but need your continued support in fully funding materiel and personnel requirements for organizational, intermediate, and depot maintenance levels. Additionally, we need support for each Service's Life Cycle Support program to extend the life of our aging aircraft fleets. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosive (CBRNE) defense is a significant concern in the Pacific theater, and a potential showstopper for U.S. military operations, causing significant operational risk to Major War OPLAN execution. CB is a critical operating condition and potentially the greatest theater threat I face, affecting everyone, everywhere, including our allies and the homeland. Aircraft exposure on the Korean Peninsula or an attack on a few strategic choke points, j Guam and key Japanese air and seaports, could stop U.S. force flows and other critical support operations. Significant differences exist between what we would like to achieve against CBRNE threats and our actual capabilities. Specific shortages include Individual Protective Equipment, Chemical/ Biological Point and Standoff detection, inadequate decontamination standards, and significant shortcomings in detailed and actionable intelligence on adversary WMD processes and facilities. We are active in the Joint Service Installation Protection Program and with other ongoing studies and demonstrations. For example, we are sponsoring a Restoration Operations (RESTOPS) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) to examine the actions necessary to protect against and immediately react to the consequences of a chemical j attack at a fixed site. Through this venue, we are investigating new tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as exploring new detection, decontamination, early warning networks, and medical technologies. The RESTOPS ACTD had its final demonstration at Osan Air Base, Korea, in February 2003 and was a great success. U.S. Pacific Command is the DoD lead for operationalizing biological warfare (BW) defense. The DoD WMD community collectively assessed the shortfalls within DoD for responding to enemy BW and gave us a way-ahead to resolve these issues. Using the Biological Countermeasures Initiative, we are working to integrate procedures and technologies that allow us to mitigate the impact of such an attack. We cannot do this alone. USPACOM needs support from the entire joint community to improve our abilities to protect our forces and to operate in this difficult environ. should the need arise. Your continued support is critical to CBRNE defense reacilness.

Quality of Service for our Men and Women

While winning the war on terrorism and transforming our forces to ensure a qualitative military edge, we must improve on the Quality of Service (QOS) for our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. QOS means providing the high quality operating facilities, the tools, and the information technology necessary for our service men and women to achieve their goals and execute their missions with efficiency and a minimum of frustration. My travels throughout the Asia-Pacific region—first as Commander, Pacific Fleet, and now as Commander, Pacific Command—confirm my belief you have done a great service to our military members and their families in the area of personnel entitlements.

The QOS initiatives included in the FY03 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) show service members that military and congressional leaders are taking actions to meet the needs of our service men and women and their families. Thank you also for your support on recent initiatives in the FY04 NDAA, including the average 4.1% 3. raise and increases in Imminent oft. and Family Separation Pay. These § S initiatives will assist in retaining highly skilled troops and their families. Many USPACOM personnel will benefit from the ability to defer their Consecutive Overseas Tours travel entitlement, from recent increases in Basic Housing Allowance, and from the additional Basic Allowance for Subsistence provisions in areas with inadequate messing facilities. Deployed personnel will be more at ease knowing that additional family assistance has been provided in the form of childcare, education, and youth services for our men and women who are in harm's way, supporting contingency operations and the GWOT. Military Family Housing remains a top priority. All services have devised plans to eliminate ina §§§ housing by 2007 with a combination of traditional military construction (MILCON) and privatization (Public Private Venture or Residential Communities Initiative). Congressional support has provided immediate benefits to our men and women who serve. Continued funding is essential, however, to enable further progress in reducing the number of inadequate quarters and in limiting out of o: expenses to our service members and their families while maintaining a high standard of construction and quality. While we have made progress, we still have considerable work remaining. We appreciate your continued attention on this important issue. orms and Barracks for our single service members is another area where we have seen significant improvement. Our service components are now pursuing well *::: out plans to meet the FY08 goal of eliminating open bay berthing and central latrine-style barracks. We must retain our current operational funding stream, however, to maintain existing facilities as renovation proceeds. Again, congressional support has had a direct and beneficial impact on our young service members. r base infrastructure is still below standards. Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (SRM) of facilities and infrastructure throughout the USPACOM AOR continues to be an important concern. FY01 Installations Readiness Report rated about 80% of USPACOM facilities at C–3 (having serious deficiencies) or C– 4 (not supporting mission requirements). In many areas, USPACOM facilities are 1940's vintage and not mission conducive. For example, modern weapons no longer fit into I vintage magazines and require improved piers for safe, proper handling. As you know, the DoD goal directs components to achieve a 67-year recapitalization rate by FY07 and restore readiness of existing facilities to C-2 (minimum acceptable performance) status on average, by the end of FY10. In addition to maintaining our facilities, we have equally important infrastructure requirements above SRM needs that require attention. These include new mission bed-downs and essential environmental requirements. Our facilities and infrastructure provide a foundation for optimum readiness and quality of service critical to mission success. We appreciate Congress' past funding efforts and call upon your continued assistance to ensure adequate facilities and proper maintenance for the long term. By far the most important weapons systems in our inventory are our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. These individuals require life-cycle support and maintenance just like other systems. Force Health Protection is that maintenance program. Ensuring the health of our forces directly relates to our ability to implement effective disease countermeasures that include vaccines, antibiotic stockpiles, and automated disease surveillance systems. I ask Y. to continue your support for on§ research and development efforts that will improve our disease detection capailities. The upkeep and replacement of military medical facilities remains one of our top QOS priorities. We are working to replace or renovate our substandard facilities, articularly for Naval Hospital, Guam, further degraded by hoon Pongsona in É. We must continue to ensure our military medical infrastructure is safe, modern, and secure. We appreciate the MILCON appropriations to the USPACOM AOR. These funds are vital to maintain our ability to work and fight together with our allies and to help transform and modernize our forces. In FY03, $1.1 billion was allotted toward mission and mission support requirements and $300 million toward family .."; needs. In FY04, we need continued MILCON support for vital readiness and QO issues. For example, we require MILCON for new mission bed-downs, such as the Stryker Brigade 8. Teams and the C-17 aircraft. Our backlog of major infrastructure repairs is reflected in the need for complete or major repair of airfield pavements at all U.S. Pacific Air Force bases, as well as the major repairs needed on critical infrastructure at bases and long-range radar detection in defense of the homeland. In the wake of destruction from Typhoon Pongsona in November 2002, it is clear we require supplemental MILCON support for a “typhoon-proof” concrete aircraft hangar that will provide reliable support for critically important current and future Air Expeditionary Force and OP requirements. I thank Congress for using MILCON . enhanced force protection is necessary.

Pacific Warfighting Center (PWC). Increasing operational and exercise activity, training complexities, and C4I modernization have rendered obsolete §po; exercise simulation infrastructure and support capabilities. This deficiency significantly reduces the ability to train USPACOM and Joint Task Force commanders in crisis action readinessso. limits their ability to rehearse key operational orders; degrades the ability to improve combined interoperability with friends in the region; and contributes to increased OPTEMPO, training time, and associated costs for USPACOM forces before responding to contingencies. The current facility does not support future technologies or meet force protection requirements. The planned, state-of-the-art operations and simulation center will improve total force readiness and achieve OSD’s goal for transforming training by exploiting emerging technologies to create a robust, networked, live, virtual, and constructive training and on rehearsal environment for joint and combined force commanders and their Staffs.

PWC will be a key node on the Joint National Training Center's global grid of o warfighting centers. Specifically, it will fully integrate with, and extend the capability of, the Joint Forces Command's Joint Training Analysis and Simulation #. and U.S. European Command's Warrior Preparation Center. Accord...; the PWC will provide an effective venue for decision support, OPLAN mission rehearsal, and combat analysis for headquarters and deploying forces. The planned simulation center will transform USPACOM through the use of emerging information technologies to support advanced warfighting concepts and joint experimentation. The PWC promises to save exercise funds and enhance regional security cooperation using INTERNET-based information exchange opportunities via the AsiaPacific Area Network. This MILCON project will provide a secure facility in Hawaii for assembling military, civil-military and interagency representatives from throughout the Asia-Pacific region for interoperability exercises, collaborative research, and seminars. The facility will also support component conference requirements in a secure and protected setting.

Again, much has been accomplished in QOS improvements, but we still have more to do. Thank you again for the support you have provided and I thank you in advance for your continued future support.

Reinforcing the “Constants” in the Pacific Region

Our long-standing bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, our friendships and the presence of our forward-deployed combat forces continue to be the foundation of the region's peace and stability. One of my goals is to build on these relationships while nurturing multinational efforts that support the region's mutual interests. Our forward posture is fundamental and our combat capability essential to deter regional threats. We look for initiatives that help shape our overseas posture.

Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). Dramatic events op the past 2 years have brought into focus new and challenging national security demands for the 21st century. A mix of traditional and non-traditional threats jeopardizes the unprecedented levels of Asia-Pacific security and prosperity of the last 50 years. These threats are reminders that evolving challenges require more prompt and effective responses to ensure peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. At USPACOM, we “operationalize,” national and defense security strategy with regional emphasis. Attaining national security and defense objectives in the Asia-Pacific region requires a broad understanding of threat capabilities, a frank assessment of political-military realities, and a well-charted course supported by meaningful and mutually beneficial security cooperation.

Our acute theater security concerns include conflict on the Korean Peninsula (where although the likelihood of war is low, the stakes are high); miscalculation in places such as the Taiwan Strait or Kashmir; transnational threats such as terrorism, proliferation, drug-associated violence; and instability from failed nationstates. Although we anticipate peaceful resolution of longstanding security concerns in places like the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and so the strategic situation in these potential flashpoints and elsewhere mandates vigilance and preparedness. We are strengthening our current security relationships and military capabilities while developing new relationships and capabilities to deter conflict and dissuade would-be regional competitors.

The USPACOM Theater §. Cooperation (TSC) Plan supports the overall mission by enhancing U.S. influence, expanding U.S. operational access to train (and deploy) forward-deployed and forward-based combat forces, and increasing interoperability with our coalition partners to support potential efforts across the spectrum of military operations. Every TSC activity we undertake enhances our joint/combined capabilities and communicates our intent to assure friends, or dissuade, deter, or defeat potential enemies. Security Cooperation is an engine of change that, along with our Joint Training and Experimentation Plans and our operational focus, solidifies the link between national strategy and focused, enduring regional security. The dividends of a relevant, adaptive TSC plan are clear—our treaty allies and friends have provided incomparable support to OEF, OIF, and the GWOT. Every day, our TSC planners, exercise planners, security assistance personnel, and forward-deployed forces coordinate, plan, and execute meaningful security cooperation activities that strengthen military-to-military cooperation and prepare U.S. forces and their prospective Coalition partners for the next challenge. We appreciate your continued interest and support of our Asia-Pacific Regional initiatives. Japan. The U.S.-Japan alliance has never been stronger. From the outstanding rapport at the highest levels of our governments to the action officers, our two countries are moving forward in strengthening ties and resolving problems. Nearly 38,000 U.S. armed forces personnel are stationed in Japan, which also serves as a forward-deployed site for about 14,000 U.S. naval personnel. Japan provides over $4.5 billion in annual host-nation support, the most generous of any U.S. ally. Without these forward-stationed and forward-deployed forces, it would be much more difficult for the U.S. to meet commitments and defend American interests throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is fundamental to security and peaceful development in the region. Since becoming Prime Minister (PM) nearly two years ago, PM Koizumi has stressed the importance of the alliance and has sought to move Japan's security policies forward. He exerted exceptional leadership in response to the 11 September terrorist attacks, pushing support for the GWOT. After 11 September, the Government of Japan (GOJ) rapidly passed legislation and obtained Cabinet approval of a Basic Plan that provides the framework for significant Japan Self-Defense Force contributions to the war on terrorism. The speed with which Japan reacted is unprecedented in the 50-year history of the Japan-U.S. security relationship. GOJ contributions to the GWOT include the provision of over 80 million gallons of fuel oil to coalition ships by the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. The Japan Air SelfDefense Force has provided over 1700 flight hours moving tons of important cargo and passengers throughout the theater. We take every opportunity to express our appreciation to the GOJ for its support following 11 September. The significant progress in building national support against terrorism does not eliminate concerns, however, about U.S. military activities in Japan. Although Japanese public support for the alliance remains high, about 70 percent—a majority of Japanese citizens—would like to see a reduction in the burden of our presence. The normal range of base-related issues, including constraints on training and concerns about crime and the environment require continued careful management. Efforts continue to implement the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report. While 15 of 27 SACO initiatives have been completed, 12 (2 of 5 noise reduction and 10 of 11 land release initiatives) are still in progress. The cornerstone of the Japan-U.S. SACO Final Report is the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). GOJ approval of a Basic Plan for the off-shore portion of the FRF highlights the progress in the SACO process. However, we continue to emphasize to the GOJ that our requirements have not changed, and a complete replacement facility is required before returning Futenma. The U.S.-Japan alliance requires our proper attention. At the same time, significant growth opportunities exist for advancing U.S. interests. U.S. forces' presence here, from the country team perspective, is secure, and careful management of the issues will ensure it remains so. My hope for the coming year is that our security dialogue with Japan will continue to advance beyond the discussion of current issues related to bases and training to address our longer-term interests in sustaining our vital alliance. We also look to expand and improve U.S.-Japan coordination with other countries within the region to address regional security issues. Republic of Korea (ROK). The ROK remains one of our strongest allies. The new Korean government is committed to the alliance. Unfortunate incidents marred the relationship this past year—the most tragic was the June 2002 death of two young Korean girls in an accident involving a U.S. Forces Korea vehicle. In this regard, the U.S. has at every level offered our profound sympathy and condolences. The late Fall protests indicate the depth of emotion the Korean F. feel on issues related to perceived inequalities in the ROK–U.S. relationship. However, they are not indicative of the solution sought by most Koreans or the Korean government. The Korean people in general recognize the great contributions made by the

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