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alliances and friendships to a regional environment in Asia conducive to confidence in economic growth. The one area where we can say with some certainty that United States troop relocations are imminent is in South Korea. Here it is important to stress that the purpose of these adjustments is to enhance security in the Korean Peninsula, improve our combined defense, promote regional stability, and lay the basis for strengthened relations with our valued South Korean allies. It is in this context that we note that the two most challenging geopolitical, as contrasted with geoeconomic, problems in the region relate to North Korea and the capricious violence we sometimes call terrorism. With respect to North Korea, in recent weeks the Administration has augmented its diplomatic strategy toward the North through the development of a proliferation security initiative. As I understand it, largely from the press, this initiative is designed to search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technology. We hope to learn more about this approach during the course of our hearing today. In terms of the campaign against terrorism, it appears that regional extremist networks are larger, more capable and more active than was previously believed. This is a problem in Indonesia, and our allies in the Philippines in particular are presented with a vexing set of difficulties in Mindanao and elsewhere in the southern reaches of the country. While Congress is firmly supportive of United States assistance to Manila, I would hope the Executive Branch understands the negotiations involving the commitment of U.S. troops to potential areas of conflict are a subject the Administration would be wise to consult Congress about in advance. In that regard, we are fortunate to have before us this very distinguished group of witnesses, and we would look forward to your testimony. [The prepared statement of Mr. Leach follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMEs A. LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
On behalf of my colleagues, I would like to warmly welcome our distinguished trio of Administration witnesses. Appearing before us today is the Honorable Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary op Defense, International Security Affairs, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, and Christopher LaFleur, Special Envoy for Northeast Asia Security, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
.S. Department of State. I would particularly like to thank Admiral Fargo, and the many fine young men and women associated with Pacific Command, for their professionalism in representing America in this crucial part of the world. In addition, joining us again today as an “honorary Member” of the Subcommittee, is the gentlelady from Guam, Representative Bordallo. You are most welcome.
The purpose of today's hearing is to review the priorities for U.S. security policy in Asia and the Pacific in light of the global campaign against terrorism, regional threats such as North Korea, technological innovation, as well as our enduring interest in peace and security in this vital region.
As my colleagues are aware, maintaining a robust overseas military presence has historically been a key element of U.S. national security policy in the Asia-Pacific. The U.S. presence in the region, dating from World War II, has been sustained by forward bases in Japan, South Korea, and until 1992 the Philippines, as well as by active defense cooperation with allied and friendly states in Southeast Asia and Oceana, primarily Thailand, Singapore, and Australia.
With th. end of the Cold War, the basis for our forward deployed presence shifted from deterring the Soviet threat to ensuring regional ... This fundamental continuity of policy has been maintained by successive U.S. administrations, all of which have emphasized the linkage between our network of alliances and friendships to a regional environment in Asia conducive to confidence and economic growth. The two most challenging geopolitical as contrasted with geoeconomic problems in the Pacific region relate to North Korea and capricious violence we call terrorism. With respect to North Korea, in recent weeks the Administration has augmented its diplomatic strategy through the development of a “Proliferation Security Initiative.” As I understand it, this initiative is designed to search plans and ships carrying suspect cargo and to seize illegal weapons or missile technology. We hope to learn more about this approach during the course of our hearing today. Change is also imminent in U.S. troop deployments in South Korea. Here it is important to stress that the purpose of these adjustments is to enhance security on the Korea, improve our combined defense, promote regional stability, and lay the basis for strengthened relations with our valued South Korean allies. From a Congressional perspective, there is unanimity in Washington that America's commitment to South Korea has to be steadfast and our alliance held very much unquestioned as the unpredictable unification process with the North proceeds. In terms of the campaign against terrorism, it appears that regional extremist networks in Southeast Asia are larger, more capable and more active than was previously believed. Our allies in the Philippines, in particular, are presented with a vexing set of problems in Mindanao and elsewhere in the southern reaches of the country. While Congress is firmly supportive of U.S. assistance to Manila, I would hope the Executive Branch understands that negotiations involving the commitment of U.S. troops to potential areas of conflict are a subject the Administration would be wise to consult Congress about in advance. In any regard, we are fortunate to have before us a distinguished group of witnesses, and we look forward to your testimony.
Mr. LEACH. Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Once again, I thank you for calling this hearing this afternoon. This hearing completes what I would call probably the kind of like a stool having three legs, so to speak. The fact that we have just about completed the discussions and dialogue on the three fundamental areas that is within the jurisdiction and responsibility of this Subcommittee of reviewing and assessing United States foreign policies toward the Asia-Pacific region. Previous hearings we held touched upon our Nation's policies, on our trade and commercial interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and how these issues fall within the framework of our overall foreign policies toward this region. Today we are to assess the current status of our strategic and military interest in the Asia-Pacific region, and it is without question in my mind that our trade and commercial ties to this region is inherently connected with our policies, our national security and the capability of our country to establish a military presence in order to provide not only regional stability, but to protect our interests in this region of the world. It is always a pleasure for me to remind my colleagues and the American people of how important and vital the Asia-Pacific region is to our Nation. Our country is just as much a part of the Pacific region, and we are a Pacific Nation. Two-thirds of the world's population resides in the Asia-Pacific region. It is my understanding our Nation's trade and commercial ties with the Asia-Pacific region is twice that of Europe or any other region of the world, for that matter. I recall Senator Inouye's observation about the differences between the Asia-Pacific region and the ties that we have with other regions of the world. Senator Inouye said that for every 747 that flies between the Atlantic into our country, four 747s fly in between the Asia-Pacific region and the United States. It is my understanding also, Mr. Chairman, that 6 of the 10 largest armies of the world is in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan alone is second only to our Nation as far as an economic power. Unless that has changed, Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that Japan is the second most powerful economy in the world. It is also my understanding that 60 percent of the world's GNP resides in the Asia-Pacific region. It is my real, real pleasure to see that there is a major shift in our commitments and the actions that our government has taken in dealing with the Asia-Pacific region because of its diversity and because so much of our own security, national interests lie within this area. We are to review our military presence in this region. There is no question about these serious concerns as it was enunciated by our Secretary of State Colin Powell—the crisis with North Korea. The current problems we have in the Taiwan Straits between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. We have some very serious problems of terrorism, Indonesia being the largest Muslim nation in the world. We have elements of al-Qaeda supposedly within Malaysia and also within the Philippines. We have problems dealing with Pakistan and India, their rivalry, not only having in their possession of nuclear weaponry systems. The question of our military presence in South Korea, as well as in Okinawa. It is my understanding that the Administration is now taking a very firm action in restructuring our military forces throughout the Asia-Pacific region as it relates also to the Atlantic and countries in Europe. So these are some of the things that I am looking forward to learning from our witnesses this morning and certainly want to offer my personal welcome to Secretary Rodman and Admiral Fargo and Mr. LaFleur, and I am certain that the expertise and the substantive knowledge that they have in this region will be very helpful not only to our Subcommittee, but certainly to this body. I want to say this especially to Admiral Fargo, because he happens to have the largest military command in the world with some 100 million miles of ocean and country, all the way from Madagascar, Africa, throughout all the Asian countries, and going as far as even Latin American countries and the Pacific Rim. Even in San Diego he has this command, Mr. Chairman. I mean, I don't know how Admiral Fargo is ever able to administer such a vast and comprehensive area, and I am sure that his testimony this afternoon will be welcome by the Members of our Committee, and not to say that any less of the substance that is going to be discussed with Secretary Rodman and also Mr. LaFleur. So I welcome our witnesses this afternoon, and I look forward to hearing from them. Thank you. Mr. LEACH. Mr. Bereuter, do you have an opening statement? Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just commend you on the hearing and say I am looking forward to the testimony, and I yield back. Mr. LEACH. Thank you, sir.
Let me briefly introduce our witnesses. Secretary Rodman has served as the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs since July 2001 during the Reagan and first Bush Administration. He served as Director of the State Department's policy planning staff and also as a Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security. Admiral Fargo, as I was told yesterday, has been in the United States Navy for 63 years. That is an exaggeration. His father was a career Navy officer, so he was brought up in the Navy, and that is a very impressive circumstance. He is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and heads the most important command in the United States Navy, and we welcome you, sir. Mr. LaFleur is a graduate of the Secretary LaFleur is a graduate of Oberlin College, and he joined the Foreign Service in 1973. That was after they lowered their standards when I left, but we appreciate your career service, and we are very appreciative of your joining us. Let us begin, unless there is agreement otherwise, in the order of the introduction. If you would rather testify in another order, let me know. Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA. Will the Chairman yield? I am sorry. Our good friend and colleague Congresswoman Bordallo is with us on the dais, and we certainly want to welcome her. Mr. LEACH. You are welcome, Ms. Bordallo. Secretary Rodman.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PETER RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. RODMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. Mr. LEACH. You have to press it and pull it close, Mr. Secretary. Mr. RODMAN. It is working now, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you very much not only for your courtesy to us today, but for convening the hearing. I think all of us in the Executive Branch see this as an opportunity to reassure not only to Members of Congress, but our friends and allies in the region that the United States remains absolutely committed to being a factor in the Pacific, a bulwark of stability and security and freedom in this vast region that has been described. There have been some confusing reports out there about what our plans are, and this is an opportunity for us to clarify and, as I said, to reassure, most of all to reassure, that the United States remains committed to being a loyal ally and friend and to remaining a factor for peace and security. b You have my prepared statement, which I respectfully ask to e— Mr. LEACH. Without objection, it will be placed in the record. All three opening statements will be placed in the record, and all three of you may proceed as you see fit. Mr. RODMAN. Thank you. So I will just say a few brief words based on the prepared statement.
There are a number of new things going on in the region in recent years. The war on terrorism has introduced a new factor in our national security policy. The technological change in the nature of war, which we have seen in Iraq, leads the Administration to think about new ways of improving our effectiveness and capability as an ally and friend in the region. Transformation is the word that Secretary Rumsfeld likes to use. So there are a lot of new factors in our defense planning, but there are also some things that are not new. The solidity of our alliances is, of course, an old thing. It has been for 50 years or so we have been an ally of alliances which remain the bedrock of our policy. In addition, there are geopolitical realities that don't change, and there are the traditional needs of deterrence. Those basic principles have not changed, and I would draw, as the Ranking Member did, some contrast with Europe. In Europe we see integrated institutions that have reached a high stage of development, pulling the continent of Europe together in a positive way. In Asia the institutions—regional integrating institutions are only in their rudimentary stages, and so America's bilateral security relationships in Asia make up most of the regional security structure that exists. Europe in an important sense was a main beneficiary of the end of the cold war. Europe is settling into some new patterns of stability, but in the Asia-Pacific region, in contrast, we see some more delicate conditions, some more fluid geopolitical conditions, changing geopolitical realities. We see China emerging. We see Japan and the Republic of Korea looking at their defense needs in new ways. North Korea, of course, is still a problem. We see the rise of Islam. You can extremism in Southeast Asia. So that just reemphasizes the importance of the American security, the American security involvement in Asia as a crucial determinant of peace. And this brings me to the issue of the so-called footprint, the American military posture in the Asia-Pacific region. The buzzword in the Pentagon is our military footprint. And I want to say a few words, and my statement and Chris LaFleur's statement go into some of these principles, but let me make just a few brief points. This is a global issue for the Department of Defense. We are looking—it is not just about Asia. We are looking at our presence globally because of, first of all, the end of the cold war, which has made dramatic changes in what our needs are in many parts of the world; technology, as I mentioned, the capabilities and possibilities of fighting wars differently and enhancing our capability in different ways; new missions, some relating to the war on terrorism. But this is something we are reviewing all over the world, and— but one conclusion is clear from this review, at least one conclusion, which is that a forward military presence still remains necessary, not only militarily necessary, but politically necessary, because we have allies and friends who look to us for our commitment, and the forward presence has that political function. But it is clear that in new conditions our forward presence may need to change. It needs to be modernized. It needs to take the fullest advantage of new technologies, new possibilities. It needs to be