By the middle of December the downfall of the dynasty had been accomplished. All things considered, the method of its accomplishment was peculiarly peaceful, but this is easily accounted for.

In the first place, through years of corruption, idleness, and debauchery, the Manchus had become an effete race. In the persons of their ruling princes and dignitaries they offered no resistance whatsoever. Such fighting as took place was in the hands of minor military officials. The role of the Manchu Royal House was cowardice personified, and it fell, as it deserved to fall, not being able to inspire the slightest enthusiasm even among its own northern troops.

A second reason for the easy and rapid downfall of the Manchu Dynasty was the lack of available funds where

with to purchase military resistance to the rebellious forces. Nor in this respect were the southern and Republican troops much better off. From the early days of the rebellion it was unanimously decided by the Great Powers that financial assistance should be withheld from either of the combatants. This resolve undoubtedly prevented not only the spread of the fighting, but also the possibility of the struggle developing into another Taiping Rebellion, which latter continued for years.

On December 18 a Peace Conference was arranged between the two contending parties, which, after considerable discussion, it was decided should be held at Shanghai. This large and prosperous Foreign Settlement occupies a unique position in the Far East. Neither a Crown Colony, the possession of an European Power as is Hong Kong, nor a concession granted to any one nation as are Kiao-Chao and Wei-hai-wei, Shanghai is nothing more nor less than a miniature republic. Although British influence and trade predominate, the Settlement, as Shanghai is called, is international, and its residents elect their own small Council of nine by whom they are governed. Behind the Municipal Council stands a Consular Body composed of the representatives of seventeen European nations, whose duty it is to look after

the interests of their own nationals as well as to settle such diplomatic questions as may arise and may need referring to the Foreign Ministers at Peking. It will thus be understood that China has no jurisdiction within the limits of the International Settlement, so for this very reason-strange as it may appear to people unacquainted with Chinese ways -Shanghai has become more than ever during the recent revolution the one safe spot for refugees of all classes. ExViceroys, Generals, Governors, have all with wonderful unanimity sought retirement in Shanghai, flocking there from all parts of their own disturbed empire. It was at Shanghai, therefore, that suitable and neutral ground was found whereon to hold the Peace Conference. That an attempt to solve the differences which already divided North and South might be successful was for a time a possibility. Very soon, however, hopes in that direction were doomed to disappointment.

To represent the Manchu party, as they were still called, Tang-Shao-Yi was appointed principal delegate. On behalf of the Republicans, as they styled themselves, Woo-Ting-Fang acted as leading representative.

been expected to carry through such a settlement. That they were unable to do so is simply to say that the course of events in China was altogether too strong for them.

The Peace Congress having proved a failure, it looked for some time as though a renewal of serious fighting must follow. Fortunately, the want of money on either side by means of which troops and war stores could be purchased was increasingly felt. The European nations still maintained their attitude of financial neutrality, so that small loans from foreign firms with representatives on the spot were alone possible to either would-be combatant. Add to the above the fact that the Chinese as a nation are constitutionally much averse to fighting, though not actually the cowards they are sometimes represented to be, and readers of this article have approximately the true story of why the anti-Manchu rebellion of 1911-12 was such a bloodless affair.

Although the result of the Peace Conference was a failure, the negotiations commenced at it were later indirectly resumed. Tang-Shao-Yi, who had already resigned his appointment as Northern representative, was again called upon by YuanShih-Kai to arrange terms for the withdrawal of the Manchu Court, the main object then being "to save the face" of the retiring Regent and Princes.

That every vestige of natural respect had long since fallen from this corrupt cowardly Royal House

did not

seem to occur to its members. The inscrutable decree of Fate had once more handed over all but supreme power to Yuan-Shih-Kai,-the man by whose action in 1898 the late Emperor Kuang-Hsü (the present Regent's brother) had lost his throne.

Yuan, recalled in a peculiarly insulting manner from his even more insulting banishment by the Regent, had consented to return, and soon began to suffer from insulting innuendoes and personal threats, owing to his action in endeavouring to make easy the final disappearance of the hated Manchus.

To say that the Foreign Ministers were relieved at the reappearance of Yuan-ShihKai in Peking politics is the bare truth. At last there was some one at the head of affairs who had a grasp of the situation, and with whom intercourse, both diplomatic and personal, could be held by selfrespecting Ministers. YuanShih-Kai's policy is not even now fully understood by foreigners; but it is not wide of the mark to say that his aim, while making easy the exit of the despised Manchu Court, was to check, in addition, so far as he could, the inane and dangerous rush into modern republicanism of his southern colleagues.

From the time when the Peace Conference broke up abortively until the beginning of February matters political were in a state of evolution. At last, on the 12th of that month, the Imperial Edict of Abdication was issued, which,

in name at all events, made China a Republic. Thus the most momentous event of the

twentieth century, perhaps of all the twenty centuries of our era, came to pass.

At the beginning of March the arrangement of a foreign loan to China had for the new Republic become the burning question of the hour. SunYat-Sen had already resigned his nominal position as first President, and Yuan-Shih-Kai, a man and a patriot, whatever his faults may have been, had shouldered the heroic burden under which he is still staggering. With a Cabinet of his own choosing he started on the gigantic task of evolving a government for a a continent containing 400,000,000 souls, spread over an area more than three times as large again as Europe, also at the time in a state of complete of complete disorder. Over this huge tract of the earth's surface there had for centuries existed a highly organised government of a kind— perhaps the kind best suited to it. But during the preceding eight months all cohesion had vanished from the the various governmental links. Officials who had been competent to work the old machine were either killed, had fled, or been disgraced. Civil authority had practically disappeared, or had been superseded by a so-called Military Government. It was well known to every one that a bankrupt treasury had been handed over to the new President, and, as if the difficulties already enumerated were not of themselves sufficient to daunt

any attempt at creating a new government, the fates decreed that the form of the government, which had to be evolved from the oldest monarchy in the world, was that of a modern Republic. Could the gods have shown themselves more unkind—even the hideous temple specimens which still in China stand for gods?

Having so far endeavoured to sum up the general situation in China on the date when the new Republic was installed, it is time to describe as briefly as may be the present position and its leaders. In doing so, there is no intention to do more than comment upon affairs in such a manner as to render them intelligible to readers unaoquainted with China, but if such comment exposes some of the worst national faults hitherto veiled to European eyes, no one regrets this more than the writer. In this case, however, "veritas prævalebit."

If the meaning of the word govern may be accepted in its dictionary sense as "to regulate, control, sway, or restrain,' then is China at the present time without any government at all. True, there is at Peking a President, a Premier (resigned within the last few days), a Cabinet, and a National Assembly, but the power of all these combined to impose their will upon the rest of China is practically nil.

In Canton and in the South is open rebellion and defiance of Peking. In the North, Mongolia and Manchuria, the one openly, the other for all practical purposes, have ceased

to belong to the Chinese Empire. In Szechuen and the far North-west, though the lives of millions of people continue as before, they are no longer directed from Peking. South of the Yangtsze river the jurisdiction of Yuan-ShihKai has about as much weight as had that of President Lincoln over the Southern States of America in the fatal year of 1862. And even north of the Great River, provincial distrust of the new Republican Government is settling down into a well-defined feeling of defiance, though less marked than that exhibited at a greater distance from the capital.

One asset there is which should be allowed for on the side of the new government if we wish to estimate fairly its prospects of success or failure. That is, that by means of two main lines of railway running from the capital province to the Yangtsze river, no doubt the power of the President could make itself felt that far south. But can he find the troops he could trust to send there, or a leader to command them who can keep the field for six months? The provinces, it may be said, are fully satisfied that at present he cannot. And for this reason the feeling grows that North and South can never fuse.

Let us now turn to the personnel of the present Cabinet, and endeavour to ascertain what hopes of support the overburdened President may find from among its members. It was in March that the nine Ministers began

to accept portfolios, - though to thus describe the assumption of powers of which they had no experience, and of duties of which they in some cases were deplorably ignorant, is to probably convey quite a wrong impression of the inauguration of the new Cabinet to readers of this article. Of the nine members originally appointed, five have for various reasons already tendered their resignations. It is inadvisable to endeavour to indicate the particular reasons which decided each Minister, but it may be of interest to note that the chief and most important downfall was brought about to a great extent by the trouble over the Six Nations Loan. If to this authenticated reason is added the knowledge that the Cabinet is torn by jealousies, springing mainly from the hidden manoeuvrings of the various political societies which the ineradicable tendency towards secret combinations familiar to the Chinese have introduced into their new political life, it is not difficult to prophesy that the disruption of this present Cabinet will occur at no distant date.

In an earlier portion of this article it has already been remarked that the financial condition of China when the new Republican Government arrived was a state of bankruptcy. From the very beginning the burning question before it was to find money. Money to pay the interest on

foreign loans; money to pay the vast army of half-trained, useless troops which both sides had rapidly enlisted; money to accelerate the disbandment of 60 per cent of the same; money to pay the salaries of Government officials; money to pay the very Ministers at foreign Courts, not to mention the students sent abroad and financed by the late Government; money, in fact, for every conceivable need of a modern Government which estimates its expenditure at £40,000,000, but whose available income at Peking at the present moment is more accurately represented by as many shillings.

To say that the fate of China depends upon whether she accepts the foreign loan or not is to-day a mere truism. That there must be conditions attached to such a loan to safeguard those who are prepared to finance it is obvious to the meanest intelligence, yet not to a number of would-be Chinese patriots. It is the latter, a small but noisy class, who are endeavouring to raise the cry of "China's Sovereign Rights,' and by means of this utterly childish cry to refuse a foreign loan.

It remains to be seen whether they are sufficiently powerful to finally prevent its acceptance by the President. If they are, and noise in China goes a long way, to their account will be credited the break-up of China. Even if they are not, the break-up may still come.