think of the adoption of that system, of which the principle was conceived by the English savant, Thomas Hare, in 1859. It was M. Charles Benoist who took the lead and earned the nickname of "Father of the R.P." He and his followers had strong arguments of a general character to put before the country in favour of their proposed reform, but there are others about which less has been said. The old method of small district voting had resulted in the weakening of political parties and in the formation of groups of Deputies for the defence of their special electoral interests. It may be said that at the present moment there is in the Chamber only one political party in the old and correct acceptation of the expression, and that party is the Socialist party. It is admitted even by their adversaries that the Unified Socialists, with M. Jaures at their head, place the general interests of their party and, as they understand them, of their country, before and above personal considerations. As for the Radicals, they are held together by their desire to continue to enjoy the sweets and advantages of power.

A striking proof of the correctness of this assertion is furnished by the fact that of the ninety odd members composing the newly formed "Committee for the Defence of Universal Suffrage," which has undertaken to agitate the country with the object of inducing the Senate to reject

maintenance of the existing system of small district voting, no fewer than thirty-five are former Ministers or UnderSecretaries of State. It is true many of them are Senators, and consequently not personally concerned in the projected measure, except in so far as its adoption may in a more or less near future lead to the modification of the mode of election of members of the Upper Assembly. As for the exMinisters belonging to the Chamber who are on the list of this Committee, it is quite possible that as they are for the most part eminent men they will keep their seats even with the adoption of Scrutin de Liste with Proportional Representation, but their chances of being chosen as Minister will probably be materially diminished. The same remark holds good even for the exMinisters belonging to the Senate, because they are all Radicals, and if any political party is likely to see its numerical strength in Parliament diminished by the application of the proposed electoral reform it is the Radical party, which made so many promises it never kept and used such scandalous official pressure to secure the election of its supporters. Moreover, the partisans of the reform are convinced the adoption of Scrutin de Liste with Proportional Representation will induce many eminent men, who till now have shrunk from the slavery imposed on their representatives by the electors, to present

themselves as candidates in the enlarged constituencies.

At the present moment, with the Scrutin d'Arrondissement, it is almost impossible for a Deputy to attend properly to his parliamentary work. It may be stated, on most trustworthy authority, that of twenty letters received by a Deputy from his electors an average of eighteen concern local affairs or private interests and only two his legislative mandate. The consequence is that having to attend to those affairs he must write numerous letters, take steps to obtain favours from Ministers and high officials, &c. His time is so fully occupied by this work that he has no leisure to study the questions on which he is called on to vote. All his energy is spent in satisfying his constituents' local or private interests.

Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that of the 497 Deputies composing the present Chamber there were at least 350 who did not study the parliamentary papers (the reports of the Universal Suffrage Commission, &c.) before voting against or for the Electoral Reform Bill, though it is a measure which concerns them personally. As for the other parliamentary papers, it may be taken for granted that even a larger number of Deputies abstain from reading them. It is a regrettable but undeniable fact that the Scrutin d'Arrondissement method of voting has led to the Deputyship being sought by very many men who regard their election as an appoint

ment to a post which, for the emoluments attached to it, has to be preserved. It is probable some of them will fail to secure re-election by the proposed new method of consulting Universal Suffrage, and will be replaced by persons of greater political influence; and perhaps those who succeed in keeping their seats will, when relieved of the constant appeals of their constituents, have the necessary time to study the Bills submitted to them, and thus become good legislators.

The hoped-for results of the application of the proposed Electoral Reform may therefore be summed up as follows:

The reduction to a minimum

of the possibilities of corrupt practices.

The constitution of really homogeneous political parties. The raising of the moral and intellectual standard of Deputies.

The possibility to effect the much-needed and long-promised administrative and social reforms.

The proposed electoral reform does not in any way modify the part to be played by the elector personally. He votes in exactly the same way as if it were an ordinary Scrutin de Liste election. It devolves on the electoral verification commission to make the elementary additions and divisions which are required for the distribution of the seats in the Chamber to the competitors. A citizen cannot be a candidate in more than one constituency (department). If he makes the legal declaration as candidate in

more than one constituency only the first in date is valid, and if they all bear the same date all are null and void. The lists of candidates drawn up by the political parties contesting the election must be presented to the Prefectoral authorities for legalisation. Two or more lists of candidates of a constituency may be allied for the utilisation of their votes remaining over after the first distribution of seats, by the application of the electoral standard measure, which is called "electoral quotient. The declaration of such an alliance, described as "apparentment," signed by the first candidate of each of the contracting lists, must be made at least ten days before the opening of the poll.

The voting tickets are printed and distributed to the electors by the Prefectoral authorities, and none but those tickets are valid. They are given to each elector with his elector's card, and consist in the legally registered lists of candidates, with a blank space at the foot of each, and a completely blank sheet, each of which bears a special number. When a voting ticket contains more names than the number of Deputies to be elected, it is valid, but the additional names are not counted.

The result of the voting at each polling-place is, with the voting tickets, &c., sent in a registered packet by post to the President of the Civil Tribunal of the chief town of the department. On the day previously fixed the registered

packets thus received are opened by the President of the Civil Tribunal, assisted by a Commission composed of three members of the Council General of the department selected by lot, and two representatives of each of the competing lists designated by the candidates themselves. The Commission counts the number of electors who have voted, and the number of votes given to each candidate. To establish the electoral quotient or standard measure, the total number of electors having participated in the election is divided by the number of Deputies attributed to the constituency (department). The first distribution of seats in the Chamber to the respective lists is made by dividing the number of electors having voted in favour of each list by the electoral quotient or standard measure. Though every elector must employ one of the official printed lists or forms furnished by the Prefectoral authorities—each bearing a title such as "Radical List," "Conservative List," "Socialist List," &c., he is at liberty to vote for all the candidates forming the list, or to modify the list by striking out names and inserting others of candidates inscribed on other lists; or he can, if he so chooses, vote with an incomplete list. Consequently, to ascertain the total number of electors who voted for the list, all the votes given to the candidates on the voting tickets bearing the title of the list, and all the votes attributed to its candidates

by electors voting with voting tickets bearing the title of competing lists, are added together. The total forms what is termed the "electoral mass of the list, which has to be divided by the number of Deputies to be elected by the constituency to fix the average number of electors who voted for the list. Each list receives as many seats as the number of its supporters contains the electoral quotient or standard measure. After this first allotment of seats, and in the case of alliances between lists having been contracted, the unrepresented votes votes of each group of allied lists are added together; and in the case of the total being equal to or superior to the electoral quotient, the group gains one or more additional seat. Then if a list or group of lists represents the absolute majority of voters at the election, and has not yet been allotted the absolute majority of seats in the Chamber attributed to the constituency, an additional seat is given to it. In the eventuality of one or more seat still remaining unallotted, it is awarded to the list or group of lists having the largest average of votes for the seat or seats already attributed to it. The distribution of the seats between allied lists of the seats captured by their alliance is also made by the application of the same system of the largest average. To establish the average of a list or group of lists, the votes recorded in its favour are divided by the number of seats

already allotted to it plus one. The first of the seats remaining unattributed is given to the list or group of lists showing the largest average. In the case of lists or groups of lists presenting the same average, the seat is given to the list or group of lists which may have polled the largest number of votes. The same operation is repeated for the allotment of each of the seats which may still remain to be distributed. If no alliance has been made between lists, the unallotted seats, after the first distribution by the application of the electoral quotient or standard measure, is effected by the largest average system. The seats in the Chamber thus secured by the respective lists are allotted to the candidates in proportion to the number of votes recorded in their favour. In the case of equality, the senior in age gets the seat. If a seat can be claimed in virtue of equality by two or more lists, it is given to the list whose candidates may have secured the largest number of votes. A candidate, to be proclaimed Deputy, must have polled at least a number of votes equal to the electoral quotient (standard measure), or half the total number of the votes recorded in favour of his list. When the total number of voters at an election is not superior to half the electors inscribed on the electoral roll, no seat is attributed; but a second ballot takes place fifteen days later, and it is valid whatever be the number of voters. There

This electoral reform may at first sight appear rather complicated; but it is in reality simple, and to make its working quite clear it will suffice to give an example. Let it be supposed that in a constituency (department) called on to elect 6 Deputies, four political parties, the Socialists, the Conservatives, the Radicals, and the Progressists, present lists of candidates. The 6 candidates forming the Socialist list obtain the suffrages of, say, 19,700 electors, those of the Conservative list 14,176, those of the Radical list 51,125, and those of the Progressist list 33,114. The number of electors participating in the election is therefore 118,115, which being divided by 6, the number of the Deputies to be elected, gives 19,685 as the electoral quotient or standard measure. In the first place, each list receives as many seats in the Chamber as the number of suffrages polled by it contains the electoral quotient.

Con

sequently the Socialist list with its 19,700 votes gains 1 seat, and has 15 unrepresented votes; the Conservative list with its 14,176 votes fails to capture a seat, but has 14,176 unrepresented votes; the Radical list with its 51,125

In the case of no alliance between lists having been contracted, the 2 remaining seats are distributed by the system of the largest average. If the Socialists with their 19,700 votes be given a second seat, their average of suffrages for each seat would be 9,850; if a seat be given to the Conservatives who failed to obtain one for their 14,176 suffrages, their average would be 14,176; if the Radicals with their 51,125 votes were granted a third seat, their average of suffrages for each seat would be 17,041; and if the Progressists with their 33,114 votes be given a second seat, their average of suffrages for each seat would be 16,557. Consequently the Radical list having the largest average would get the first of the two seats remaining to be distributed after the first allotment by the application of the electoral quotient. By repeating the operation for the allotment of the last remaining seat it will be seen that it goes to the Progressist list, because its average is 16,557. The result of the election would therefore be