a right result has been attained according to the evidence and where they do not believe the result would have been different if the error had not been committed.

It is difficult for lawyers trained to give unquestioning assent to the old common law principles of procedure thus unceremoniously to renounce the ancient fetishes. There is a sort of sacrilege involved in the desecration of the ancient shrines of common law procedure that brings with it the unaccountable fear of the pronouncement of some indefinable anathema by the blind goddess who presides in awful majesty over the administration of the law, from which the legal conscience recoils with horror. But the principle of harmless error, as stated in its affirmative and not in its negative form, appeals so strongly to the legal as well as the public conscience that it will in time prevail everywhere. Bar associations will continue to pass resolutions, legislatures will continue to legislate until finally the last appellate court will give up the fight.

A. H. R.

POWER OF COURT TO SUSPEND EXECUTION OF SENTENCE IN A CRIMINAL CASE.

Out of a laissez faire theory there has grown up in this country, especially in the lower federal courts, a practice whereby judges have assumed to extend favors to convicts of the law. It is easy for an abuse of this kind to

"Be recorded for a precedent

And many an error by the same example
Will rush into the State."

-Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Sc. I. In Ex parte United States Petitioner, 37 Sup. Ct. 72, our great tribunal gives what should be an effective quietus not only to judges of federal courts but to judges of state courts, attempting to exercise a policy, more or less well-defined, of English judges correcting, out of what was denominated the discretion of a judge, the execution of the sentence of the law judicially ascertained.

The Chief Justice in his analysis of the principle, that was recognized at the common law, asserts that it never stood for anything else, whether extended before or after the pronouncing of sentence, than a temporary staying of execution, until the Crown could be appealed to in behalf of a convict.

But in America by some courts it has been asserted that this interposition was inherent in the courts to permanently interpose and prevent the law's enforcement, where the judge deemed that otherwise injustice would be wrought beyond the law's contemplation.

Even under English law, which grew up out of customs and usages, this seems to be a strange view, when at the same time it is admitted that in the king was reposed the power to grant absolute pardon or to mitigate the severity of sentences as applied to particular cases. Under our law, which recognizes such customs and usages only as they are applicable to our system of government by written law, it seems even less tolerable than at the common law that our judges should have any semblance of what some of our courts ascribe to English

courts.

All official authority in this country is conferred by constitution or statute, and being in derogation of private right it would seem to take nothing by intendment. But, of course, the rule obtains in such cases as in others, that the grant of authority extends to whatever is necessary for its due execution. It is not, however, in due execution of authority, that courts may decline to proceed, in particular cases, to the end of what it is designed to subserve. Discretion, as commonly understood, is as general as the law is general, and it is to aid, not interfere with enforcement of the law.

In the case considered by our Supreme Court, it appears that the judge of a federal district court pronounced the sentence of the law on a convict, and then ordered that "the execution of the sentence be, and it is hereby, suspended during the good behavior

of the defendant, and for the purpose of this case this term of this court is kept open for five years." It was not said that there was any precedent for this order. In the face of it, if valid, all the refinement of argument about changing a judgment during or after a term of court disappears. Inherent power declares a term of court to exist as long as a particular case may require that it should exist. Why, if this is so, need there be a special order that it shall exist?

But the "arbitrium judicis" that led to the making of the order is declared by the judge to rest, not particularly in the facts of the case before him, but on "modern notions respecting the treatment of lawbreakers," as, of course, discerned by this judge.

Thus for his reason for this suspension, the judge said: "Modern notions respecting the treatment of lawbreakers abandon the theory that that the imposition of the sentence is solely to punish, and now the best thought considers three elements properly to enter into the treatment of every criminal case after conviction. Punishment in some measure is still the object of sentence, but, affecting its extent and character, we consider the effect of the situation upon the individual, as tending to reform him from or to confirm him in a criminal career, and also the relation his case bears to the community in the effect of the disposition of it upon others of criminal tendencies."

But where does he find that the judge who is sworn to administer the law as it stands, is also appointed to theorize, according to his individual notions, in what cases it is to be applied? If another judge would not agree with him as to the triumph of what he calls "the best thought," or should not apply it as he would apply it to a particular case, there might be no doubt that the law has in one case been enforced and in another enforcement has been denied. Error certainly in one or the other case would "rush into the state." This an

archy is by the Chief Justice thoroughly rebuked in his reversal by a unanimous opinion which concludes as follows: "While the conclusions just stated inevitably exact that the rule which is before us (to vacate the suspension) be made absolute and that the mandamus issue, nevertheless we are of opinion that the exceptional conditions which we have described require that we exercise that reasonable discretion with which we are vested to temporarily suspend the issue of the writ so as to afford ample time for executive clemency or such other action as may be required to meet the situation."

As we understand this ruling, there can be nothing done by any judge to declare a suspension of the enforcement of any sentence founded on a fact judicially ascertained, unless this be of a temporary character so as to give to competent authority the right to interpose in any way it may see fit.

A governor may differ from another governor, or a president from a former or a successor president, in any view he may have of "modern notions respecting the treatment of lawbreakers," but as to his interfering with the enforcement of law, he is responsible, as the rest of us may be, for righteous discharge of the duties imposed upon him. If he is vested with discretion. in such matters, every case should come to him with no attempt to interfere with its proper exercise.

The aggression of an office-holder, under the plea of the exercise of mercy, needs to be halted at the outset or our servants may become our masters. It has been stated that this decision will affect some 2,000 cases in which similar orders have been made. At this rate, what would a verdict of guilty eventually amount to, and what would stay the force of tears and supplications, of political or financial influence, on judges, whose labors are supposed to be sufficiently exacting in the necessary discharge of their duties? N. C. C.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

BILLS AND NOTES DISCHARGE OF DRAWER BY CERTIFICATION OF CHECK.Kansas City Court of Appeals holds that where a check is presented by a bidder for public work which is certified by the bank before being delivered to a city letting the work so as to qualify the bidder to have his bid entertained, such certification is at the request of the drawer and not at the request of the holder, and the drawer is not discharged. City of Brunswick v. People's Sav. Bank, 190 S. W. 670.

It may be admitted that the rule declared is sound, if under such circumstances it is the drawer's request that the check is certified. But taking the substance of the requirement in the case stated, it seems to us, that the drawer in procuring the certification was carrying out a demand of the holder on the bank.

The purpose of having the check certified was to make it stand in the place of a deposit for cash qualification. The obligation of the bank and not the obligation of the drawer was by and through the certification to be taken as satisfactory.

The court said: "The certification simply vouches for the genuineness of the check and that it will be paid on presentment and merely adds to its easy negotiation by adding the promise of the bank." We greatly doubt whether a promise is added to that of drawer, but rather is there guaranty to take the place of the drawer, especially if the bank knows the purpose for which the check is to be used. The court states the rule truly in announcing that if the holder of an uncertified check has it certified,, this discharges the drawer. But that is only because the purpose of the holder is thus manifested. Why is not the future holder of a check conditioning its being certified showing his purpose to accept the bank as his sole debtor? It is its will that brings about the certification, just as where a drawer exercises his option in this regard.

TRADE-MARK AND TRADE-NAME-CORPORATE NAME PERMITTED BY LAW.Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming a decision by District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, that permission by Secretary of State forbidding use of a corporate name, will not prevent use of such name by a court of equity, where it was chosen by a corporation for a fraudulent purpose. General

Film Co. of Mo. v. Gen. Film Co. of Me., 237 Fed. 64.

The court said: "Plaintiff's name was chosen by the plaintiff. It was chosen for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud upon the defendant. The approval of that name was permissive and not mandatory. This authority was confined to comparing plaintiff's name with the names of other corporators licensed to do business in the state and ascertaining whether there was such similitude as would be likely to confuse and mislead. Secretary had no power to consider the course of trade of different corporations and determine whether plaintiff's name was chosen for the fraudulent purpose of unfair trade competition."

This ruling appears true beyond controversy. The vesting of an administrative officer with a ministerial duty of the kind spoken of, and, also, the right to determine the question in an ex parte showing, should not conclude opposing rights, nor could it have been meant to have any such effect. Its utmost effect ought to be, that, other things being equal, the of ficer sees no opposition in a corporation doing business under a name it has chosen.

FEDERAL

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STATUTE NEEDING STATE LAW FOR ENFORCEMENT.-The most strenuous objection urged against the Webb-Kenyon liquor law was that it was to have no practical effect whatever, except as aiding a state or states in the enforcement not of a national, but of a state, policy. It was upon this theory that President Taft had vetoed the enactment, and it was passed over his veto.

The Chief Justice, by a majority opinion, dissent being by Justices Holmes and Van Devanter, and concurrence in result by Justice McReynolds, rules that this is not a valid objection to constitutionality. Clark Distilling Co. v. Am. Exp. Co. and West Virginia, 37 Sup. Ct. -.

The Chief Justice said: "It is not in the slightest degree disputed, that if Congress had prohibited the shipment of all intoxicants in the channels of interstate commerce and therefore had prevented all movement between the several states, such action would have been lawful, because within the power to regulate which the Constitution conferred." Then the court cites the Lottery Case, and the White Slave Case. "The issue, therefore, is not one of an absence of authority to accomplish in substance a more extended result than that brought about by the Webb-Kenyon Law, but

of a want of power to reach the result accomplished because of the method resorted to for that purpose."

We pause to express our doubt as to the correct statement of the issue. More properly it ought to be said the issue is whether Congress may regulate commerce in one way as to one state and another way as to other states, or whether all regulation between the states should be by uniform law-whether a federal policy is always back of federal law, or wheth er Congress, because of practical difficulties in the enforcement of state law may pro hac vice forego federal policy in some cases and enforce it in other cases. If it may not, it seems idle to talk about the power to enforce being complete.

The Chief Justice proceeds: "So far as uniformity is concerned, there is no question that the act uniformly applies to the conditions which call its provisions into play, that its provisions apply to all the states, so that the question really is a complaint as to want of uniform existence of things to which the act applies and not to an absence of uniformity in the act itself. * * * In view of the conceded power on the part of Congress to prohibit the movement of intoxicants in interstate commerce, we cannot admit that because it did not exert its authority to the full limit, but simply regulated to the extent of permitting the prohibitions in one state to prevent the use of interstate commerce to ship liquor from another state, Congress exceeded its authority to regulate."

We confess our inability to follow the reasoning of the Chief Justice, but it might be admitted that Congress has the power to restrain the shipment of liquor into a particular state or even into a particular district, because conditions therein make it injurious to interstate commerce that liquor should there be admitted.

This Congress could do, not as enforcing the policy of the particular state or district, but because Congress would have reasonable ground for believing that the course of commerce could not be made to flow as uninterruptedly as the law designed that it should flow. If it were conceived that the possession of liquor by citizens operated to so overturn constituted authority as to interfere with the free flow of commerce, this as a physical fact could be recognized by Congress, and the doing of this might be but a definite recognition of the effect of state authority not to be unduly interfered with. But to change a law uniform in its application between states merely to aid state law seems a different proposition.

TRAINING YOUNG LAWYERS IN THE WAY LAWS ARE MADE-CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY'S "MODEL HOUSE."

A young lawyer feels keenly the need of a practical knowledge of parliamentary law, of power to think on his feet and express his thoughts clearly and concisely, and of a practical acquaintance with legislative procedure. Then, too, many legal actions entrusted to the young barrister involve statutory law and his power of statutory interpretation is greatly strengthened if he has a practical knowledge of legislative methods. Aside from this, the relatively large number of lawyers entrusted with the work of legislation imposes an obligation upon the profession that statutory law shall be as clear, definite and effective as possible in its phraseology and method.

All this suggests the desirability of training along these lines as part of the preparation best adapted for the practice of law. The proceedings of the American Bar Association and of the Association of Law Colleges during recent years contain ample evidence of a realization of this need and an effort is being made in law colleges generally, to afford instruction and practice looking toward these ends. Notable among such movements is the recent tendency toward a course in contemporary legislation. As illustrative of this general movement, a brief sketch of the plans and purposes of the Model House as maintained in the Law College of Creighton University, Omaha, Neb., may be of interest.

The entire student body of the law college is organized into what is known as a Model House of Representatives, which meets on Wednesday night of each week during seven weeks in each semester, making fourteen sessions during the scholastic year. The proceedings of this body are under the supervision of a member of the faculty as Director, who attends all its meetings. Each student is assigned to some one of the representative districts provided for the lower house of the Nebraska Legislature. At the close of each school year officers of the House are elected for the next year, consisting of a speaker, chief clerk, journal clerk and sergeant-at-arms. Candidates for these offices must be placed in nomination by a petition signed by at least twenty students and the election is by ballot, conducted by an election committee of the House and under the supervision of the college librarian.

Before the close of the school year, the officers-elect, together with the outgoing of