EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issue 93European University Institute, 1993 - Europe |
From inside the book
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Page 2
... asymmetrically distributed , with the top lacking the knowledge not only to formulate feasible alternatives , but sometimes even to evaluate them . It follows that a topdown process of policy making where administrators would " derive ...
... asymmetrically distributed , with the top lacking the knowledge not only to formulate feasible alternatives , but sometimes even to evaluate them . It follows that a topdown process of policy making where administrators would " derive ...
Page 10
... asymmetrically distributed between agent and principal ( s ) . However , the model effectively assumes that the courts will not punish administrative deviations from a statutory mandate . On the other hand , if legislators know in ...
... asymmetrically distributed between agent and principal ( s ) . However , the model effectively assumes that the courts will not punish administrative deviations from a statutory mandate . On the other hand , if legislators know in ...
Page 25
... asymmetrically distributed information ( Majone 1991 ) . Of course , the interventionist policies of the past had attempted to solve many of the same regulatory problems , but the traditional solutions tended to be much less precise ...
... asymmetrically distributed information ( Majone 1991 ) . Of course , the interventionist policies of the past had attempted to solve many of the same regulatory problems , but the traditional solutions tended to be much less precise ...
Common terms and phrases
adjudication Administrative Procedures Act administrative regulation agency decisions agency theory American Experience asymmetrically distributed Author Title Autorités Administratives Indépendantes Baldwin and McCrudden branch of government budget budgetary Bundeskartellamt bureaucratic discretion capture Cass Sunstein competition control problem Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies coordination cost-benefit costs courts direct-expenditure EC regulations enforcement EUI Working Paper European Community European University Institute Federal Republic Federal Trade Commission function Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD Hence important regulatory independent agencies independent fourth branch independent regulatory commissions interest IRCS Jean BLONDEL judicial review large number legislative Mayntz McCrudden 1987 minister ministerial monopolies national regulations nationalized industries non-majoritarian institutions Policy-Making political accountability political control political executives political principals Political Science presidential control privatization problem of political procedural Public Choice regulated firms regulation in Europe regulatory agencies regulatory policy responsive role rule Scharpf separation of powers Shapiro social regulation Sunstein traditional Veljanovski 1991 Wood and Waterman Yandle