EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issue 93European University Institute, 1993 - Europe |
From inside the book
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Page 4
... Budgeting , according to these studies , is decentralized and incremental , resulting in automatic increases that further insulate the bureaucracy from political control . Also Niskanen's formal model of the budget maximizing bureaucrat ...
... Budgeting , according to these studies , is decentralized and incremental , resulting in automatic increases that further insulate the bureaucracy from political control . Also Niskanen's formal model of the budget maximizing bureaucrat ...
Page 7
... budget of the agency , the reform agenda remained only partially implemented by 1984. This was due mainly to Congressional opposition to budget cuts . No longer able to use budget increases to induce the agency to comply with their ...
... budget of the agency , the reform agenda remained only partially implemented by 1984. This was due mainly to Congressional opposition to budget cuts . No longer able to use budget increases to induce the agency to comply with their ...
Page 8
... Budget ( OMB ) . The Wood and Waterman study of seven administrative agencies from the late 1970s through most of the 1980s probably represents the most detailed analysis to date of various control instruments including political ...
... Budget ( OMB ) . The Wood and Waterman study of seven administrative agencies from the late 1970s through most of the 1980s probably represents the most detailed analysis to date of various control instruments including political ...
Common terms and phrases
adjudication Administrative Procedures Act administrative regulation agency decisions agency theory American Experience asymmetrically distributed Author Title Autorités Administratives Indépendantes Baldwin and McCrudden branch of government budget budgetary Bundeskartellamt bureaucratic discretion capture Cass Sunstein competition control problem Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies coordination cost-benefit costs courts direct-expenditure EC regulations enforcement EUI Working Paper European Community European University Institute Federal Republic Federal Trade Commission function Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD Hence important regulatory independent agencies independent fourth branch independent regulatory commissions interest IRCS Jean BLONDEL judicial review large number legislative Mayntz McCrudden 1987 minister ministerial monopolies national regulations nationalized industries non-majoritarian institutions Policy-Making political accountability political control political executives political principals Political Science presidential control privatization problem of political procedural Public Choice regulated firms regulation in Europe regulatory agencies regulatory policy responsive role rule Scharpf separation of powers Shapiro social regulation Sunstein traditional Veljanovski 1991 Wood and Waterman Yandle