EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issue 93European University Institute, 1993 - Europe |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 5
Page 4
... budgetary allocations and the bureaucratic agency that provides public goods , the latter has the upper hand . This is because the agency knows the legislature's demand for its services , while the legislators do not know the true cost ...
... budgetary allocations and the bureaucratic agency that provides public goods , the latter has the upper hand . This is because the agency knows the legislature's demand for its services , while the legislators do not know the true cost ...
Page 11
... budgetary review by the Office of Management and Budget ( OMB ) as line agencies . As the US Supreme Court asserted in Humphrey's Executor vs. United States ( 1935 ) commissioners can be removed from office only for official misbehavior ...
... budgetary review by the Office of Management and Budget ( OMB ) as line agencies . As the US Supreme Court asserted in Humphrey's Executor vs. United States ( 1935 ) commissioners can be removed from office only for official misbehavior ...
Page 31
... budgetary limitations on the activities of regulators . The size of non- regulatory , direct - expenditure programs is constrained by budgetary appropriations and , ultimately , by the size of government tax revenues . In contrast , the ...
... budgetary limitations on the activities of regulators . The size of non- regulatory , direct - expenditure programs is constrained by budgetary appropriations and , ultimately , by the size of government tax revenues . In contrast , the ...
Common terms and phrases
adjudication Administrative Procedures Act administrative regulation agency decisions agency theory American Experience asymmetrically distributed Author Title Autorités Administratives Indépendantes Baldwin and McCrudden branch of government budget budgetary Bundeskartellamt bureaucratic discretion capture Cass Sunstein competition control problem Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies coordination cost-benefit costs courts direct-expenditure EC regulations enforcement EUI Working Paper European Community European University Institute Federal Republic Federal Trade Commission function Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD Hence important regulatory independent agencies independent fourth branch independent regulatory commissions interest IRCS Jean BLONDEL judicial review large number legislative Mayntz McCrudden 1987 minister ministerial monopolies national regulations nationalized industries non-majoritarian institutions Policy-Making political accountability political control political executives political principals Political Science presidential control privatization problem of political procedural Public Choice regulated firms regulation in Europe regulatory agencies regulatory policy responsive role rule Scharpf separation of powers Shapiro social regulation Sunstein traditional Veljanovski 1991 Wood and Waterman Yandle