EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issue 93European University Institute, 1993 - Europe |
From inside the book
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Page 10
... regulatory agencies require more complex systems of control than central administrative offices . This distinction is particularly important in the ... agencies with the most stable outputs were the independent regulatory commissions " ( 10.
... regulatory agencies require more complex systems of control than central administrative offices . This distinction is particularly important in the ... agencies with the most stable outputs were the independent regulatory commissions " ( 10.
Page 11
... independent regulatory commissions ( IRCs ) were created by Congress precisely to ensure agency independence from ... Regulatory Commission , created in 1975 they all share some organizational characteristics that are meant to protect ...
... independent regulatory commissions ( IRCs ) were created by Congress precisely to ensure agency independence from ... Regulatory Commission , created in 1975 they all share some organizational characteristics that are meant to protect ...
Page 16
... agencies . Yet , today's advocates of an independent regulatory bureaucracy can produce a number of political and legal arguments to support their views . In terms of political philosophy , they can draw on strands of the American ...
... agencies . Yet , today's advocates of an independent regulatory bureaucracy can produce a number of political and legal arguments to support their views . In terms of political philosophy , they can draw on strands of the American ...
Common terms and phrases
adjudication Administrative Procedures Act administrative regulation agency decisions agency theory American Experience asymmetrically distributed Author Title Autorités Administratives Indépendantes Baldwin and McCrudden branch of government budget budgetary Bundeskartellamt bureaucratic discretion capture Cass Sunstein competition control problem Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies coordination cost-benefit costs courts direct-expenditure EC regulations enforcement EUI Working Paper European Community European University Institute Federal Republic Federal Trade Commission function Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD Hence important regulatory independent agencies independent fourth branch independent regulatory commissions interest IRCS Jean BLONDEL judicial review large number legislative Mayntz McCrudden 1987 minister ministerial monopolies national regulations nationalized industries non-majoritarian institutions Policy-Making political accountability political control political executives political principals Political Science presidential control privatization problem of political procedural Public Choice regulated firms regulation in Europe regulatory agencies regulatory policy responsive role rule Scharpf separation of powers Shapiro social regulation Sunstein traditional Veljanovski 1991 Wood and Waterman Yandle