EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issue 93European University Institute, 1993 - Europe |
From inside the book
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Page 5
... political principals ; greater attention to the design of control mechanisms as a practical application of the theory of " new institutionalism " in economics and political science ; but also the rise to power of political leaders like ...
... political principals ; greater attention to the design of control mechanisms as a practical application of the theory of " new institutionalism " in economics and political science ; but also the rise to power of political leaders like ...
Page 6
... political superiors . Agency theory suggests that sophisticated politicians recognize these dangers and can take countermeasures . Political control is possible because elected principals ... Political principals also monitor bureaucratic ...
... political superiors . Agency theory suggests that sophisticated politicians recognize these dangers and can take countermeasures . Political control is possible because elected principals ... Political principals also monitor bureaucratic ...
Page 21
... political principals , and especially to those of the legislators . These findings seemed to vindicate traditional beliefs in the possibility of keeping bureaucracies politically accountable . However , the value of agency responsiveness to ...
... political principals , and especially to those of the legislators . These findings seemed to vindicate traditional beliefs in the possibility of keeping bureaucracies politically accountable . However , the value of agency responsiveness to ...
Common terms and phrases
adjudication Administrative Procedures Act administrative regulation agency decisions agency theory American Experience asymmetrically distributed Author Title Autorités Administratives Indépendantes Baldwin and McCrudden branch of government budget budgetary Bundeskartellamt bureaucratic discretion capture Cass Sunstein competition control problem Controlling Regulatory Bureaucracies coordination cost-benefit costs courts direct-expenditure EC regulations enforcement EUI Working Paper European Community European University Institute Federal Republic Federal Trade Commission function Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD Hence important regulatory independent agencies independent fourth branch independent regulatory commissions interest IRCS Jean BLONDEL judicial review large number legislative Mayntz McCrudden 1987 minister ministerial monopolies national regulations nationalized industries non-majoritarian institutions Policy-Making political accountability political control political executives political principals Political Science presidential control privatization problem of political procedural Public Choice regulated firms regulation in Europe regulatory agencies regulatory policy responsive role rule Scharpf separation of powers Shapiro social regulation Sunstein traditional Veljanovski 1991 Wood and Waterman Yandle